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Introduction
This project is comprised of three units on the Japanese occupation of Korea. All are
designed for use in high school social studies classrooms. Unit one covers the period from 1876
to 1919, including the build-up to annexation and the first decade of Japanese military rule in
Korea. Unit two covers the period from 1919 to 1931, the cultural rule period marked by
relatively relaxed and liberal Japanese policies in Korea. Unit three covers the period from 1931
to 1945, the World War II or Fifteen-Year War era. An overarching compelling question anchors
each unit, and this unit compelling question is broken down into supporting questions. Each
lesson centers around a supporting question. Each unit begins with an overview, with the
template taken from Grant, Swan, and Lee (2014). This overview includes the compelling and
supporting questions, standards with which the unit aligns, a unit hook or introduction, the main
learning tasks of each lesson, the sources with which each lesson engages, the summative
performance assessments, and finally an avenue for student action beyond the classroom. Within
this document, after each overview the unit introduction or “staging the question” is explained in
greater detail. Next follows each lesson, with the sources for it included. The summative
performance assessments and call to action are not explained further than what it is in the
overview. Within each unit, a key lesson is highlighted. This is the ideal lesson to use from each
unit, if educators are short on time. This is explained in more detail in the final overview.
Following the three units is the final overview, a short explanatory paper. After this is the full
reference list for the project.

4

Honors Project Final Overview
Multiple problems in the high school social studies education world inform this project.
The foremost is the chronic absence of substantive East Asian history from high school social
studies curriculum, especially that which prioritizes East Asian voices. For example, the Korean
and Vietnam Wars are almost guaranteed attention in an average high school world history
course. In this case, both countries’ significance extends to their roles as lands in which a
potential fall to communism threatened democracy worldwide, and the necessity of subsequent
American interventions is questioned. Undoubtedly both the Korean and Vietnam wars matter to
their respective countries’ histories, but other time periods and events exist that warrant equal or
even more attention and better prioritize East Asian voices. In Korea specifically, the Japanese
occupation from 1910-1945 is a perfect example and one this project explored. The occupation
period informs the Korean War, modern Korean nationalism, and ongoing tensions between the
two nations. Most significantly, the crucial actors in this time period are Korean and Japanese
people. Western voices are relatively unimportant. Therefore, this project sought first to partially
solve the chronic absence of substantive East Asian history in high school classrooms by creating
three units, fit for secondary classroom use, on the Japanese occupation of Korea. The first
research question guiding this project is: How can the chronic absence of substantive East Asian
history be solved using developmentally appropriate methods?
Second, the need to align Ohio’s definition of civic education with content guides the
project. The second research question is: How can the Ohio Department of Education’s
philosophy about civic competence be truly fulfilled in classrooms? Under the philosophy and
guiding assumptions in the Ohio Learning Standards for Social Studies’ introduction, Ohio
asserts its goal of social studies education as “civic competence.” It defines this as follows: “the
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knowledge, intellectual processes, and democratic dispositions required of students to be active
and engaged participants in public life” (Ohio Department of Education, 2018, p. 3). Later in the
document, this definition gains nuance: “Civic competence rests on a commitment to democratic
values, and requires the ability to use knowledge about one’s community, nation, and world…”
(Ohio Department of Education, 2018, p. 3). Students should be able to “use knowledge about
one’s…world…” (Ohio Department of Education, 2018, p. 3). The idea that true civic
competence requires robust awareness and knowledge of global history is implied within this
statement.
Finally, several standards under the Modern World History strand for high school are key
to this project. The Japanese occupation of Korea may be substantive East Asian history,
prioritize East Asian voices, and provide opportunities for fulfillment of Ohio’s social studies
education philosophy. However, without alignment to the standards, it means nothing.
Fortunately, three content statements under the Modern World History strand deal with
imperialism. They fall under the topic of imperialism, and are as follows: MWH9-12.9 states,
“Imperial expansion had political, economic and social roots.” MWH9-12.10 states,
“Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of Western values
and direct political control.” MWH9-12.11 states, “The consequences of imperialism were
viewed differently by the colonizers and the colonized.” Various aspects of the occupation align
with all three standards. In high school classes, imperialism is a recurrent topic and the Japanese
occupation of Korea provides a unique way to teach it. The occupation not only aligns strongly
with all three imperialism standards, but it also fulfills the Ohio Department of Education’s
implicit definition of civic competence – that it requires robust understanding of global history.
Japan is the only modern example of a major non-white imperial power, and Korea was one of
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its longest-held colonies. It represents a fuller alignment of content and philosophy. The final
guiding research question is: How can the Japanese occupation of Korea be taught in a manner
that is appropriate for high school classrooms?
Background literature
To understand the Japanese occupation of Korea, it is useful to begin with the concept of
degrees or levels of colonization. Historian Mark Caprio (2009) explores this in his book,
Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945. Caprio explains that on a scale of
external, internal, and peripheral, the Japanese occupation of Korea best fits the “peripheral”
definition. Caprio illustrates external colonization through British India. Internal is found in most
nation-building or the integration of minorities such as newly freed African Americans in postCivil War America. In contrast, peripheral colonization is marked by the narrative from the
colonizer that the colonized may one day be accepted by the colonizer, but only if they civilize
themselves first (pp. 23-25). After establishing Japanese Korea as an example of peripheral
colonization, the bulk of Caprio’s book evaluates Japanese attempts to assimilate Koreans as a
policy approach in each distinctive period of the occupation: 1910-1919, 1919-1931, and 19311945. Caprio ultimately concludes it was unsuccessful due to inconsistencies in rhetoric and
actual policy. The Japanese government claimed it wanted Koreans to be assimilated, but the
actual commitment to this policy was weak.
One of the most important realms in which Japan could potentially assimilate Koreans
was education and schools. Pak and Hwang (2011) argue that Japanese policy on Korean schools
evolved throughout the occupation period to fit Japan’s imperial goals and needs. According to
Pak and Hwang, schools were the primary Japanese vehicle for eradicating Korean culture and
assimilating Koreans into Japanese culture. Korean education focused on the reproduction of
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Japanese colonial values and subservience to the empire. Despite the stated goal of assimilation,
Pak and Hwang (2011) also argue that Japan was hypocritical as it continued to discriminate
against Koreans. Japan characterized itself as the “advanced” country that would modernize
“backward” Koreans; this was meant to convince Koreans that subservience to Japan was in their
own best interest.
Debates on whether the cultural rule period of the occupation was broadly liberal or
broadly conservative and restrictive also exist in the scholarly literature. Caprio argues that a
primary goal of the freedoms given to Koreans under cultural rule was to expose them to their
own culture so they would realize its inferiority in comparison to Japanese culture (p. 112).
Henry Chung also criticizes the limitations of cultural rule, saying that the changes were shallow
and oppression of previous decades continued. Prison torture continued, and new freedoms of the
press came with limitations and ulterior Japanese motives as well (1921, pp. 272-274).
Other scholars believe that limited but significant freedoms existed under cultural rule.
Jun Uchida (2013) claims that in a 1931 push in Seoul for publicly-managed electricity, middleand upper-class residents created a robust public sphere. Notably, movement participants were
both ethnically Japanese and Korean. Further complicating the strict narrative of an oppressive
Japan and oppressed Koreans are problems of sexism within the Korean independence
movement. Kwon (1998) argues that the three founders of Korea’s brief-lived New Women’s
movement were influenced by Japanese feminism and that their activism was a response to the
patriarchy found in traditional Confucian culture. After the March First Movement, male
independence activists pushed for a return to traditional Korean culture to contrast with Japanese
culture being forced upon them. Kwon points out the problematic nature of this, as the sexist
Confucianist value of female purity heavily influenced traditional Korean culture and was the
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basis of Korean patriarchy. The New Women’s movement aimed to end all such values; male
activists saw this goal as a potential threat to maintaining a collective Korean identity distinct
from Japanese influence. Before the March First Movement, many had actually supported
feminism and the New Women’s movement (1998).
The final important period of study is the war era from 1931-1945. During this time,
Korean views and support of Japan varied. Japanese assimilation policy reached its most
aggressive point, with policies such as mandatory worship at State Shinto shrines, required
changing of family names to Japanese, and banning the speaking of Korean (Pak and Hwang,
2011, 391-392). According to Kim (2007), a portion of Koreans began to positively identify with
the Japanese empire. They envisioned Japan as a stronger “big brother” who could protect the
weaker “little brother” (Korea) from Western imperialism. Caprio (2009) supports Kim’s
assertion that a portion of Koreans positively identified with the Japan. Caprio, however, focuses
on economic opportunities for Koreans found in Manchuria after the Japanese annexation of it as
a main source of positive Korean identification with Japan.
To answer the project’s research questions, education principles and literature need to be
taken into account. The primary education framework used to unit plan is backward design, as
outlined by Wiggins and McTighe (2005) in Understanding by Design. Now a cornerstone
principle in education, Wiggins and McTighe argued in their book that many educators are
mistaken to design activities and learning experiences without explicit reference to learning goals
and standards. Instead, educators must purposefully craft learning experiences to move students
toward the fulfillment of salient learning goals and standards. Wiggins and McTighe believe that
doing so will create more fruitful learning experiences for students. It also ensures that the value
and purpose of such experiences are clear to students; if understanding by design is used
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correctly, students know why the lesson and strategies chosen matter. Within unit planning, the
principle of backward design is key. All lessons, assessments, and activities must be clearly
aligned with specific, salient learning standards.
A social studies-specific way to approach backward design is the Inquiry Design Model,
which was published by the C3 Teachers and the National Council for Social Studies. Grant,
Swan, and Lee (2017) wrote Inquiry Based Practice in Social Studies Education: Understanding
the Inquiry Design Model. Unit design within this framework begins with a compelling question
that should represent issues relevant to students’ lives but also ongoing debates in social studies
disciplines. Also, these compelling questions must be arguable from different viewpoints (pp.
37-40). Grant, Swan, and Lee (2017) hold that they are a powerful way to frame and organize
otherwise complex, onerous content. They contend that inquiry is a powerful pedagogy that
increases student engagement by making content more relevant to them (pp. 35-36). Unit
overarching compelling questions are supported by lesson supporting questions. In this
framework, students find answers to supporting and compelling questions in a variety of robust
social studies sources, making source analysis key. The Inquiry Design Model also calls on
students to further increase the relevancy of content to their daily lives; students are to end each
unit by “taking informed action.” Students must apply knowledge gained in the unit to real-world
problems and take action to solve them (Grant, Swan, and Lee, 2017, p. 65).
Methods
Three units on the Japanese occupation of Korea comprise this project. They are designed
for use in a high school social studies classroom using the Inquiry Design Model. Each unit
corresponds to a major time period in the Japanese occupation of Korea. Unit one covers
approximately 1876 to 1919. This includes the build-up to annexation as well as the first decade
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of harsh militaristic rule. Unit two covers approximately 1919 to 1931. These twelve years are
the “cultural rule” period, in which Japan relaxed military rule and took a relatively liberal
approach to Korean rule. The final unit, unit three, covers the period from 1931 to 1945. This
was the World War II or Fifteen-Year War era. Japanese expansionism, nationalism, and
aggressive assimilation policies enforced upon the Koreans characterize it. Each lesson in the
project centers on analysis of a wide variety of social studies sources.
As mentioned above, units designed with the Inquiry Design Model framework include
the standards, a unit hook, a unit compelling question, three to four supporting questions, a
summative performance task, and a call to student action (Grant, Swan, and Lee, 2014). The
project’s first unit centers on the compelling question “Why did Japan annex Korea?” The unit’s
three supporting questions break this down further. Supporting question one, which corresponds
with lesson one, is, “What was Korea’s role in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars?”
This lesson emphasizes Korea’s critical role in Japanese geopolitical security. Supporting
question two is, “How did Korea advance from a protectorate of Japan to a colony?” Here, the
different contemporary Korean and Japanese accounts of the 1905-1910 period receive emphasis.
Finally, the third supporting question is, “How competently was Korea ruled by Japan during the
first decade?” This lesson focuses on the political, economic, and social aspects of the first
decade of Japanese rule in Korea. The summative performance tasks consists of two options: an
argument and an extension. In both, students construct an evidence-based answer to the unit’s
compelling question. The argument for this unit was a 300-500 word essay and the extension was
a news clip featuring the student as a newscaster, reporting as if it were 1910 and Japan had just
annexed Korea. Students take action by posting their responses online to Japanese claims that
Korea was annexed legally.
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The project’s second unit builds directly upon unit one. Unit two covers the “cultural
rule” period from 1919 to 1931. Its essential question is: “Can freedom exist under an oppressive
regime?” The first lesson asks, “What was the March First Movement?” The March First
Movement was, in many ways, a direct response to Japanese militarism during the occupation’s
first decade. The protests resulted in policy changes from Japan, leading to limited Korean
freedoms in the press and education. Lesson two, therefore, centers on the question, “Why did
Japan implement the cultural rule policy (bunka seiji)?” In it, students examine the different
factors that influenced Japan’s decision to implement cultural rule. Despite the freedoms of
cultural rule, scholars debate whether the era represented overall liberation or continued
oppression for Koreans. The third lesson engages students in this debate by asking, “Did freedom
and oppression coexist under cultural rule?” The unit concludes with the summative assessment;
the argument asks students to answer the compelling question in 400-700 words while the
extension asks students to write a letter to the editor from a contemporary ethnic Korean’s point
of view. Students extend beyond the classroom by filming a YouTube video to spread awareness
of the March First Movement outside of East Asia.
Unfortunately, the cultural rule freedoms failed to last. The Fifteen-Year War, or World
War II in Asia, represents the most aggressive point of Japanese assimilation and abuse of
Koreans for wartime use. The unit forms around the compelling question “Does war justify
extreme measures?” The first lesson supports this with the question, “Why and how did Japan’s
Korea policy shift with the outbreak of the Fifteen Year War in Asia (World War II in Asia)?”
This lesson covers how the Manchurian Incident of 1931 shifts Japan’s concept of Korea’s role
in its growing empire as well as the aggressive assimilation policies of the era: mandatory Shinto
worship, the name-changing policy, and the banning of the Korean language. The second
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question asks, “How did World War II change how Koreans identified with the Japanese
Empire?” A portion of Koreans positively identified with Japan during this time, seeing
opportunity for themselves if Japan’s empire prospered and grew. The lesson is structured to
help students work through any cognitive dissonance resulting from this counterintuitive
concept. Finally, lesson three asks, “Was Japan’s wartime mobilization of Koreans justified?”
Out of the entire project, this lesson plan undoubtedly deals with the most upsetting, difficult
content. Several of the lesson’s featured sources detail the experiences of comfort women women who were forced into sexual slavery for the Imperial Japanese Army. The unit concludes
with two options for assessment; the argument is a 500-700 word essay responding to the unit
compelling question and the extension is a short speech responding to the unit compelling
question. Finally, students take action by proposing a solution to modern comfort women-based
Korea-Japan tensions. Students are asked to post their proposals online in a blog post format.
Through their informed action, students engage in a real-world, emotionally charged, and very
current issue.
Results
The lesson plans that comprise the project form a part of the solution. Three interrelated
research questions guide this project. The first is, “How can the chronic absence of substantive
East Asian history be solved using developmentally appropriate methods?” The second is, “How
can the Ohio Department of Education’s philosophy about civic competence be truly fulfilled in
classrooms?” The third is, “How can the Japanese occupation of Korea be taught in a manner
that is appropriate for high school classrooms?” The Inquiry Design Model is a secondary-level
appropriate way to frame and organize the Japanese occupation of Korea. This resource for
teachers on the occupation period is one small but significant step toward bringing more
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substantive East Asian history into high school classrooms and filling the gap. An abundance of
scholarly literature on the occupation exists; in contrast, unfortunately very few resources on it
designed for high school use exist. For example, lessons by Ryan (2007) and Sill are available
for free on the internet, but only cover the build-up to annexation. A brief lesson plan by Miller
is easily accessible, but far from substantial. Finally, resources exist from Asia for Educators.
They include excerpts from primary documents and document-based questions (DBQs).
However, these do not include specific strategies for engaging students in the content. No
comprehensive resources designed for high school social studies classrooms exist on the
Japanese occupation of Korea. This project seeks to fill that gap by writing teacher and studentfriendly units.
The nature of the topic itself helps answer or fulfill the second research question: “How
can the Ohio Department of Education’s philosophy about civic competence be truly fulfilled in
classrooms?” As stated earlier in this paper, the guiding philosophy of the Ohio Learning
Standards for the Social Studies implies that for students to truly be civically competent, they
must be globally aware. The Japanese occupation of Korea offers a perfect opportunity for full
alignment of the Modern World History imperialism content statements and the Ohio
Department of Education’s guiding philosophy about social studies education. Implicit in the
philosophy is that social studies strands should be globally inclusive in content. To be globally
inclusive of imperialism, the Japanese occupation of Korea must be taught. Japan is the only
modern example of a non-white imperialist nation. Not only does the Japanese occupation of
Korea offer a chance to examine the nuances of discrimination and race, but it also is incredibly
pertinent to modern East Asian politics.
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Finally, the units aim to be secondary student-friendly. The third research question is,
“How can the Japanese occupation of Korea be taught in a manner that is appropriate for high
school classrooms?” The units are organized using the Inquiry Design Model, a method based on
the C3 Framework and designed for use in K-12 classrooms (C3 Teachers). A variety of
pedagogical strategies are employed, many coming from the text Bring Learning Alive!, which
details strategies appropriate for all age groups (Bower, Lobdell, and Owens, 2010).
The units are made for secondary students. However, they are explicitly designed for
advanced, accelerated, or Honors students. Nearly all of the featured sources in the three units
are text-based and advanced in reading level. In addition to this, much of the material is
complex. The coexistence of freedom and oppression during cultural rule, for example, is the
focus of unit two, lesson two and was rife with possible cognitive dissonance. The lesson plans
in this project are not differentiated for lower-achieving students or those with special needs, for
several reasons. For many groups of high school students, it is unreasonable to ask them to
participate in these lessons as written. However, they can be made more friendly to all types of
learners and students.
Incorporating principles of universal design for learning, especially multiple means of
representation, would decrease many barriers. A teacher who wants to use this lesson plan but
make it appropriate for her classroom of middle to low-achieving students would substitute
several of the more difficult text-based featured sources for alternate means of representation.
For example, the opening lesson of the project on Korea’s role in the Sino-Japanese and RussoJapanese Wars could utilize maps, infographics, and videos instead of or in addition to excerpts
from historian Andrew Gordon’s book. Especially on the Fifteen Year War era, multiple easilyaccessible video resources are available on the Internet. Such sources ware omitted from this
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project, because it is written with accelerated, high-achieving, and Honors students in mind.
They are written with a high aim and without specific differentiation; differentiation without a
context is difficult and would lack a clear purpose. Instead, the units are written with a high aim
because it is easier to modify lessons to an easier level than it is to modify them to a more
advanced level.
For lower-achieving students, the reading level of the featured sources in each unit pose
another high barrier to learning. Again, this is not explicitly accommodated within the project.
However, accommodations can be made. Software like Rewordify.com is crucial. Instead of
teachers searching for new sources, they can use the provided featured sources and
Rewordify.com will simplify difficult vocabulary and sentences. Overall, it should lower the
reading level, making the sources much more accessible to different types of students.
Finally, the everyday reality of teaching is that time is not one’s friend; there is simply
never enough of it. In the average classroom, even an advanced one, there likely is inadequate
time to work through all nine lessons that comprise this project. In a course such as an elective
East Asian history class, it might be possible. For the average broad-coverage modern world
history course, though, it may be impractical to teach all nine. With the time barrier in mind, all
nine lesson plans are included in the project to not limit educators seeking to use this resource.
The logic is to give teachers as many options as possible. Those wanting to utilize this resource
can pick which specific lessons fit their own classroom needs and goals.
If a teacher wants to teach the entire occupation of Korea, but is limited on time, this
project is still useful. The lesson plans are designed to flow together as a group of three in each
unit. For the most comprehensive learning experience, this is ideal. However, the reality of
limited time often does not allow for ideal. Lessons can still stand on their own. The teacher
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might choose one lesson plan from each unit. If so, unit one, lesson two; unit two, lesson three;
and unit three, lesson three are the most salient from each unit. Unit one’s second lesson features
the strongest pedagogy of the unit; students must use higher order thinking skills when
participating in a mock townhall debate on whether or not Korea should be annexed. Unit two’s
third lesson centers on the coexistence of freedom and oppression. This is the most complex
concept of unit two and an ongoing debate among scholars. Most importantly, it is a concept
with which students can relate. Especially in the modern day, students are aware that each of us
has both privileged and disadvantaged identities. Many will understand this about their own
identities. Finally, unit three’s third lesson focuses on the atrocities Japan inflicted upon Korea
during World War II. The comfort women of this era are one of the most emotionally charged
sources of tension between Japan and Korea today. It remains an annually controversial topic;
students in this lesson will experience authentic engagement in a modern real-world issue.
Implications
The units’ overarching themes of racism, colonialism, and oppression are ones which all
students can understand. However, the Japanese occupation of Korea adds a distinct layer to the
conversation as it contrasts sharply with typical American conceptions of race. The perspective
on discrimination provided is distinctly East Asian. In the United States, racial narratives focus
on white people versus people of color. The concept of tension and discrimination from two nonwhite groups is not native to our understanding of race or discrimination. These lessons could
open the door to more nuanced, intersectional understandings of oppression.
The Japanese occupation of Korea as a classroom topic also provides a rare opportunity
to privilege East Asian and East Asian American voices in the conversation. The racially-based
tensions, past and present, between Koreans and Japanese people are ones with which East Asian
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and East Asian American students are the most likely to have had experience. Out of all groups
of students, it will be most native to their cultures and experiences. Simply put, no one
understands it as well as they do. This creates a chance for East Asian and East Asian American
students to be the “resident experts” on a race-based topic, which is a rare opportunity. In
American conversations on race and racism, East Asian American experiences and voices are
often excluded in favor of more high-profile tensions. These high-profile tensions and
experiences matter, but East Asian Americans must also receive chances to speak on their
experiences. The occupation’s unique nature provides for conversations on the intersectional
nature of oppression as well as opportunities to empower East Asian and East Asian American
voices.
Also, the mere inclusion of substantive East Asian history taught from an East Asian
perspective empowers these students. Too often, East Asian history is only taught when
Westerners are involved. For example, the Korean and Vietnam War will undoubtedly receive
ample attention in any high school world history course. However, as mentioned earlier, these
two countries are frequently reduced to potential victims of the “domino theory” and lands in
which we question the necessity of American intervention. In contrast, in the Japanese
occupation of Korea, the critical voices are East Asian people – Japanese and Koreans.
Westerners and any non-East Asian people play relatively insignificant roles, and it would be
difficult to twist the narrative to make it appear that they do. As discussed in the introduction,
East Asian American students deserve opportunities to have their voices heard. Also, given the
recent rise in hate crimes against Asian Americans and the renewed attention to their
experiences, efforts to empower East Asian students are especially needed and timely.
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Reflections on Learning
This project’s conception dates back to December of 2018, when I read the book
Pachinko (2017) by Min Jin Lee. This was when I first learned that the Japanese occupation of
Korea happened, and that Koreans were treated poorly during it. Having been fed strict
narratives of racism as white versus people of color, it was difficult to understand that Koreans
could be discriminated against by people so ethnically similar. The tragic but unique experience
of Koreans under Japanese rule immediately fascinated me, and I wished I had learned of it
sooner. Nearly two years later, in the fall of 2020, I took a historiography course and spent the
semester researching the occupation for that class. Now, in the spring of 2021, the interest first
sparked in December of 2018 has extended into a capstone Honors project. Throughout the entire
experience, numerous lessons have been learned.
The first lesson came forward throughout the background research process that occurred
during historiography. It is that discrimination and racial tensions extend far beyond the simple
narrative of white people versus people of color. Numerous examples exist around the world of
violent ethnic tensions between two non-white ethnic groups, and the occupation is one of them.
Students in America and other Western countries need a more global understanding of racism
and ethnic tensions. I learned this lesson personally, but plan on carrying it forward into my
future classroom. It is ignorant to think, and teach our students, that racism can only exist
between white people and people of color. This narrative is perhaps unintentional but created by
lack of teaching more global examples of racial and ethnic tensions. I will intentionally teach a
more complex and globally inclusive perspective on racial tensions.
Second, audience matters. This lesson was learned through the unit design process. One’s
audience will and should influence the way information is presented. While I knew this already,
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designing the units made it especially clear. During the background research process, I
encountered many rich scholarly sources. They contained fascinating, esoteric information and
analyses, which I anticipated sharing with students. However, it quickly became clear that much
of that information and knowledge did not fit learning goals that were appropriate for a high
school social studies classroom.
Third, clear goals are crucial to focused work and lesson plans. Goals as well as content
must be appropriate for the audience. For high school students, this meant simplifying learning
objectives I would expect of myself as an undergraduate student. For example, I might expect
myself to know the nuances of Government-General relations with the Korean press under
cultural rule. However, I would not expect high school students to learn this. While students are
exposed to it through Yong-Jick Kim’s (2013) book chapter in unit two, lesson three, they are
only asked to broadly understand and be able to explain the coexistence of freedom and
oppression under cultural rule.
Clear goals ensure strong alignment of all aspects of a lesson and a unit. With such a vast
amount of potential content on the occupation, it was critical that I wrote strong learning
objectives and minded them through the design process. For example, the decision to include or
exclude sources, or portions of them, was made based on whether or not the information would
advance students toward the learning goals. All decisions were made with the learning objectives
in mind.
The final lesson learned is that rich extensions of class work are feasible. Whether or not
they occur is dependent upon the student’s willingness to complete extra work. When
researching the occupation for historiography, I knew I wanted it to extend into my Honors
project. However, I had significant doubts as to the feasibility of completing it in a semester and
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was initially reluctant to try. Although I genuinely enjoy learning and extending it beyond the
classroom, I might not have created the units without the requirement to complete an Honors
project to graduate. After nearly completing the process, I can see that it was feasible for me
intellectually and time management-wise from the beginning. The only barrier was my
willingness to complete extra work.
Not only was it feasible, but the process has created several rich learning opportunities
for me. These include a possibility of speaking at a conference and co-authoring a journal article.
If I had remained hesitant, none of these opportunities would exist. This lesson matters on a
personal level because my work ethic and sense of self-efficacy have been strengthened.
However, it is even more important to my future students. Many of my students will wish to seek
out opportunities for academic enrichment, such as dual enrollment courses, summer camps and
seminars, and jobs or internships. Most will be capable of achieving such experiences, but the
difference between whether or not they occur will lie in how much extra work they are willing to
complete and how capable they believe they are. I plan on empowering my students to “go the
extra mile” and seek enriching learning opportunities. Being able to speak from personal
experience will increase will increase my credibility when trying to empower my students.
Overall, the process of completing my Honors project has left me with several key
lessons that will be salient moving forward for both myself and my students. Just through the
process of completing it, my self-efficacy has been increased and I know I can now better
empower my students to seek extended learning opportunities. Studying a nuanced example of
imperialism strengthened my resolve to teach globally inclusive narratives of history. Finally, the
process of designing the units reminded me of the importance of audience and strong goals in
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education. The units designed will serve high school students academically, and the lessons
learned through creating them will serve me professionally.
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Unit One
Inquiry Design Model (IDM) Blueprint™
Compelling
Question

Why did Japan annex Korea?

Standards and
Practices

Staging the
Question

MWH.9-12.9: “Imperial expansion had political, economic, and social roots.”
MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of Western
values and direct political control.”
D2.His.14.9-12. “Analyze multiple and complex causes and effects of events in the past.”
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an examination of the
credibility of each source.”
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.”
MWH.9-12.3: “Historians analyze cause, effect, sequence, and correlation in historical events, including
multiple causation and long- and short-term causal relations.”
Students will view the map on the next page, showing the scope of the Japanese empire in 1914. The
teacher should ask students what they notice that is different than expected about the map (that Korea
and Japan are the same color). The teacher will read/review the news article linked on the next page with
the class as well. The map will introduce students to the idea that Korea was once occupied by Japan, and
the news article will show the continued relevance and controversy of this time period.

Supporting

Supporting

Supporting

Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

What was Korea’s role in the Sino-Japanese
and Russo-Japanese Wars?

How did Korea advance from a
protectorate of Japan to a colony of
Japan?

How competently was Korea ruled by
Japan during the first decade?

Formative

Formative

Formative

Performance Task

Performance Task

Performance Task

On day 1, students will participate in a
concept map activity that details Korea’s
advancement from protectorate to
colony and recognizes the differing
Korean and Japanese viewpoints. On day
2, students will participate in a mock
town-hall debate. Students must choose
a position of being either for or against
Japan’s annexation of Korea and verbally
defend their positions in front of the
class.

Students will analyze sources using the
MOTU method and participate in a
fishbowl discussion surrounding social,
political, and economic aspects of the
first decade of Japanese rule in Korea.

Using the MOTU method, students will
analyze sources and will participate in a
response group discussion to analyze
Korea’s role in the Sino-Japanese and
Russo-Japanese Wars.
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Featured Sources

Featured Sources

Featured Sources
Source A:

Source A:
Source A:
2 excerpts from Gordon, A. (2020). A
modern history of Japan: from Tokugawa
times to the present (4th edition). Oxford
University Press.

Excerpt from Hamilton, A., Austin, H.H.,
& Terauchi, M. (1910). Korea: its history,
its people, and its commerce. J.B. Millet
Company.
Source B:
Excerpt from Korean Mission to the
Conference on Limitation of Armament.
(1921). Korea’s Appeal to the Conference
on Limitation of Armament. Washington
Government Printing Office.

3 excerpts from Chung, H. (1921). The
case of Korea: A collection of evidence
on the Japanese domination of Korea,
and on the development of the Korean
independence movement. Fleming H.
Revell Company.
Source B:
Excerpt from Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K.
(2011). Assimilation and segregation of
imperial subjects: “educating” the
colonized during the 1910-1945
Japanese colonial rule of Korea.
Paedagogica HIstorica 47(3), 377-397.
Source C
3 excerpts from Caprio, M. (2009).
Forming Korean assimilation policy. In
Japanese assimilation policies in
colonial Korea, 1910-1945. (pp. 81110). University of Washington Press.

Argument

Students will construct a brief written essay (300-500 words) answering the unit compelling
question: Why did Japan annex Korea? Students should cite specific evidence from the
sources in answering the question.

Summative
Performance Task
Extension

Taking Informed
Action

Students will film and edit a mock news clip, 3-5 minutes in length, featuring themselves as
the newscaster. Students should report as if it were 1910 and they had just received word
that Japan annexed Korea. In the clip, students should not only report but also answer the
compelling question.

Students will write an individual response to Japan’s claims that the annexation of Korea was legal,
detailed in the news article used in the unit staging the question. Students will decide their stance in
agreement with, against, or in partial agreement with the sentiment expressed. Students will construct a
blog post of 500-700 words and post it using a platform such as Wordpress, Google Sites or Wix.

The unit design template is by Grant, Swan, and Lee (2014) from the C3 Teachers.
Grant, Swan, & Lee (2014). IDM Working Blueprint Template. C3 Teachers.
https://c3teachers.org/inquiry-design-model/.
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Staging the Question

Map of Japanese Empire in 1914
New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage (n.d.). Map of the Empire of Japan in 1914
[Image]. New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage.
https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/map-empire-japan-1914.
News article: https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1995-10-12-1995285023-story.html
New York Times News Service. (1995, October 12). Japan again reasserts legality of annexing
Korea in 1910 Official view ignores history and is likely to anger both Koreas. The Baltimore
Sun. https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1995-10-12-1995285023-story.html.
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Unit 1, Lesson 1
Note: Designed for a standard 50-minute class period
Objectives:
• SWBAT understand the Japanese motivation to annex Korea, including prior Japanese
involvement in Korean affairs and the debate between protectorate versus colony.
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and
secondary sources.
Standards:
MWH.9-12.9: “Imperial expansion had political, economic, and social roots.”
D2.His.14.9-12. “Analyze multiple and complex causes and effects of events in the past.”
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an
examination of the credibility of each source.”
Lesson compelling question: What was Korea’s role in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese
Wars?
Hook (response group):
Time allotted: 5-7 minutes
• Students will be presented with the following quote, projected or written on the
whiteboard and read aloud by the teacher:
o “Korea is a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan.” -Major Jacob Meckel, Prussian
military advisor to Japan, c. 1885-1888
• The teacher will ask students why Major Meckel might have said this to Japanese
officials. The teacher should follow up with asking students if they think Korea truly
posed a threat to Japan, and if so, why. To aid in the discussion, the teacher will display
the map attached at the end of this lesson.
Body (30-35 minutes):
• MOTU source analysis demonstration (10 minutes): The teacher should project the
following worksheet from the National Archives and Records Administration on the
board. It lays out the MOTU method of source analysis developed by the NARA. Link
here:
https://www.archives.gov/files/education/lessons/worksheets/written_document_analysis
_worksheet.pdf. The teacher will use a small portion of featured source 1, perhaps the
first two paragraphs, to demonstrate how students should use this method to analyze
sources.
• Small group MOTU source analysis (15-20 minutes): The teacher will split students
into small groups of 2-4. Students will perform the MOTU source analysis method for
each featured source of the lesson. The teacher should tell students they should pay
particular attention, of course, to Korea’s significance in both wars. Students should be
prepared to share out after completing the small group MOTU activity.
• Response groups (5-10 minutes): On the whiteboard or SmartBoard, the teacher will
create two columns, one with the heading Sino-Japanese War and the other with RussoJapanese War. Students will provide their responses on Korea’s role in each war, and the
teacher will help clarify comments. As students provide responses, the teacher will write
them on the board under the appropriate column. Once 3-5 answers have been provided,
the teacher should move on to the next war.
Closure (10 minutes):
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•

Large group debrief: The teacher will add a “bottom line” to each war on the chart on
the board, and a “bottom line” for the overall lesson. The teacher will ask students what
they think the “bottom line” or most important reason for Korea’s involvement in the
Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars was. The teacher will fill in the “bottom line”
sections with student responses. Finally, the teacher will wrap the lesson by asking
students if they still think Korea was truly a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. Students
will complete the exit ticket, summarizing in approximately 2 sentences per war why the
Korean peninsula was involved.
• The teacher should also assign homework for the following day: Complete MOTU
analysis of the two featured sources for lesson two of the unit.
Sources:
Both excerpts taken from:
Gordon, A. (2020). Empire and domestic order. In A modern history of Japan: From Tokugawa
times to the present (4th edition). (pp. 117-141). Oxford University Press.
Source 1 (pp. 119-120):
“After the Li-Ito agreement in 1885, the Japanese government kept a low profile in Korea
for nearly a decade. The Chinese gained control by stationing ‘advisors’ at the Korean court to
reform the Korean military and communications network. In addition, Russian diplomats won
increased influence at the court, where some Koreans viewed them as a counterforce to excessive
Chinese authority. This, in turn, led the British to occupy a small island off the Korean coast.
The British demanded that Russia pledge to respect Korean territorial ‘integrity’ before they
withdrew in 1887. The United States also joined the contest for influence in Korea. Several
Americans served as foreign affairs advisors to the throne from 1886 into the 1890s.
With foreign powers pressing from all directions, Korea’s own leaders desperately
maneuvered to gain some breathing space and independence. This proved impossible. In the
early 1890s, long-simmering peasant anger at economic distress and the foreign presence erupted
in a major uprising, the Tonghak rebellion. In 1894, this led directly to a war between Qing
dynasty China and Japan, fought in Korea.
The Tonghak was a religious movement whose adherents blamed their impoverished
plight on both the Korean elite and foreigners – the Japanese in particular but the Chinese as
well. By the spring of 1894, Tonghak rebels had taken control of much territory and a major
provincial capital, and the Korean government asked China to send troops to put down the
uprising.
The commitment of Chinese troops gave the Japanese government an opening it was
hoping for, leading to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Japan’s military
buildup had by now given it a rough naval parity with China. Yamagata Aritomo and other top
leaders decided the time had come to secure the upper hand in Korea. In the name of ‘protecting
Japanese residents,’ in June 1894 they sent eight thousand troops to Korea and demanded an
equal voice with China in administering Korea’s internal affairs. The Chinese refused. Japan
responded in July by seizing control of the Korean royal place and installing a pro-Japanese
administration. It forced this government to announce the end to its tributary relationship with
the Qing rulers and to demand the withdrawal of Chinese military forces from Korea. In the
name of cooperation with this puppet Korean government, the Japanese military forces then in
Korea attacked the Chinese military and several days later declared war on China.
The Sino-Japanese War was in this way a struggle for control of the Korean peninsula
fought between Japan and the Qing rulers of China. It consisted of some land battles but
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primarily naval engagements. It ended in complete Japanese victory by April 1895. In the peace
treaty concluded at the Japanese port of Shimonoseki, Japan made clear its aspirations for an area
of advantage well beyond Korea. It won control of Taiwan and some nearby islands, as well as
the Liadong peninsula. Taiwan indeed became a Japanese colony, although not at the simple
stroke of a pen. Japan had to send an army of sixty thousand troops to put down fierce Taiwanese
resistance to Japan’s initial colonial occupation, and forty-six hundred Japanese troops died from
combat or disease.”
It

Source 2 (pp. 123-124):
“From 1895 through the early 1900s, Korea remained their primary strategic concern.
The Shimonoseki treaty of 1895 forced China to recognize Korea as an ‘independent’ state. With
this provision, the Japanese expected to keep the Chinese at bay. But the forced retrocession of
the Liadong peninsula immediately after the war also put at risk Japan’s position in Korea.
Korea’s Queen Min, previously close to China, turned to Russia for support in countering
Japan’s influence. But in October 1895, in an extraordinary act of insubordination, the Japanese
envoy to Korea, Lieutenant General Miura Goro, and his legation staff brutally murdered the
queen and several of her court ladies. The Japanese government subsequently recalled Miura to
Japan and accused him of murder, but the courts deemed the evidence insufficient to even put
him on trial.
Although not a party to the murderous conspiracy itself, the government in Tokyo
supported the goal of maintaining the upper hand on the peninsula. In the following years, Japan
tried to dominate the Korean government by stationing advisors in Seoul to administer Meijistyle reforms. But Korean leaders were unhappy with Japanese control and the direction of
reforms. They continued to play foreign powers against each other by turning to Russia for help.
Over the next decade, the Russians came to rival the Japanese position in Korea. They
challenged it in Manchuria as well by seizing the leasehold for Dairen at the tip of the Liadong
peninsula in 1898. Japanese leaders responded with several initiatives to regain control in Korea
and establish themselves as an imperial power in Asia. In 1900-01, Japan sent ten thousand
troops to China – the largest single national contingent – to join the multinational force that put
down the Boxer Rebellion…
In the wake of the Boxer uprising, the Japanese drew closer to the British, while the
Russians kept their troops in Manchuria and sought to extract further exclusive concessions from
China before leaving. The Japanese and British formalized their cooperative ties with an alliance
in 1902. By this agreement, the British recognized Japan’s special interest in Korea. Each nation
pledged to aid the other if Russia and a fourth party attacked either one. Such a combined attack
never took place. Nonetheless, with a colony in Taiwan, troops in Peking, and an alliance with
the British Japan had secured a place as one of Asia’s imperial powers.
Over the next several years, Japanese leaders sought above all to solidify hegemony in
Korea. One option viewed with favor by Ito Hirobumi in particular was a diplomatic deal with
the Russians. Japan would grant them primacy in Manchuria if they would retreat in Korea.
Through 1903, the government negotiated in a halfhearted way with Russia. In fact, Japan was
unwilling to concede full control of Manchuria to the Russians and the latter were equally
insistent on maintain a Korean presence. In addition, political parties, journalists, and leading
intellectuals, including a group of prominent Tokyo Imperial University professors, held rallies
and issued increasingly forceful calls for war. This strengthened the hawkish voices among the
Japanese negotiators…By February 1904, the Japanese government had decided to secure its
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position in Korea as well as Manchuria by force. It declared war on Russia. This began the
Russo-Japanese War, Japan’s second major military struggle over Korea in a decade…
In May 1905, the Japanese oligarchs secretly asked the American president, Theodore
Roosevelt, to mediate. A treaty of peace was negotiated at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and
signed on September 5, 1905. The settlement reflected the uncertain military situation. The
Japanese gained control of Russian railway lines in southern Manchuria and took over Russian
leases in two Manchurian ports as well. They also won recognition of their exclusive rights in
Korea. But aside from territorial rights on the southern half of the virtually uninhabited Sakhalin
island, Japan emerged with no outright gains of land and no financial compensation. This
contrasted sharply with the Sino-Japanese War. Fed a steady diet of news celebrating victories in
battle, and unaware that Japan was militarily and economically stretched to the limit, public
opinion at home was severely disappointed.
Nonetheless, Japan was now clearly in control of Korea. Its advisors, in fact, ran the
government. The Japanese army, through the office of resident general, administered Korean
foreign relations. The resident general increased his power in 1907 when Japan forced the
Korean monarch to resign and disbanded the Korean army. Japan then annexed Korea outright as
a colony in 1910. The position of resident general was replaced by that of governor general,
appointed by the emperor. Until 1945, the colonial administration under the governor general
held complete military, judicial, legislative, and civil authority in Korea.”
Map to be used in hook:

Encyclopedia Britannica. (n.d.). Battle of Tsushima [Image]. Encyclopedia Britannica.
https://www.britannica.com/place/Empire-of-Japan/The-Russo-JapaneseWar#/media/1/2144218/109273.
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Unit 1, Lesson 2
Objectives:
• SWBAT analyze primary sources to evaluate the bias, reliability, and value of a source.
• SWBAT describe and analyze how Imperial Japan transitioned from indirect control of
Korea as a protectorate to direct control as a colony.
• SWBAT compare, evaluate, and reconcile potentially conflicting views and experiences –
in this instance the Japanese and Korean views on events of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries.
Standards:
MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of
Western values and direct political control.”
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an
examination of the credibility of each source.”
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.”
Lesson compelling question: How did Korea transition from a protectorate of Japan to a
colony?
Hook (5-10 minutes):
• Homework review/review for preview (5-10 minutes): The teacher should briefly
review the MOTU source analysis homework with students. The teacher should review
broadly the main points students should have covered in each category of the MOTU
analysis for both sources. Teachers should ensure they cover several salient points in their
review. First, the author of featured source A is Terauchi Masatake, who was the first
Governor-General of Korea and known for his militaristic rule. He was also the War
Minister of Japan during multiple cabinets and held the office of Prime Minister during
World War I. There are multiple members of the Korean Mission to the Conference on
Limitation of Armament. Their names can be found in the beginning of the document;
one is Syngman Rhee, the eventual first President of South Korea. Also, the conference
that the group was appealing to was the infamous Conference on Limitation of
Armaments held in Washington, D.C. from 1921-1922. It is also known simply as the
Washington Naval Conference.
Body (35 minutes):
• Concept Map activity (20 minutes): Students will be creating a concept map on the
whiteboard detailing what they view as important points or moments in the transition of
Korea from protectorate to colony of Japan. Each student will receive a dry-erase marker
with which to write on the whiteboard. The teacher should separate the board
horizontally, with the top half labeled as being dedicated to the Japanese view, and the
bottom half labeled as being dedicated to the Korean view. During the activity, students
will go up to the board and leave answers as they please – each student must answer
once, but there is no limit. Students may write their own “independent” points or respond
to/build off of other students’ points, showing the connection via arrows. Students could
also link two points from other students and provide their own personal commentaries.
• Large group debrief (10 minutes): All students will return to their individual seats. The
teacher will first circle/star points he or she finds especially important. The teacher will
pose the following to students: “If you could narrow down the transition from
protectorate to colony to 3 main points per side (Korean/Japanese), what would those
points be?” Students will raise their hands to provide answers. As students provide
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answers, the teacher will write them on the board. Finally, once all answers have been
provided and written the teacher should briefly verbally review them.
• Response groups (5 minutes): The teacher should pose questions along the following
lines: “What accounts for the differences between the Korean and Japanese accounts of
events? Is one side right or wrong? Can these accounts be said to complement each
other? Conflict with each other? Both? What is each side’s agenda?” Students will
voluntarily provide answers.
Closure (10 minutes):
• Exit ticket and homework (10 minutes): Students will complete an exit ticket by
writing or typing and submitting answers via an online learning platform like Google
Classroom. Students will summarize in 3 bullet points the transition from protectorate to
colony. Students should respond with what they personally view as the 3 main takeaways
from this time period.
• While students complete the exit ticket, the teacher should also assign homework for the
next day. Students should review MOTU sheets from all sources thus far. The teacher
should also tell students the following day will be a mock townhall argument. All
students should prepare a brief argument either for or against the annexation of Korea by
Japan. Students should be prepared to verbally defend their positions using specific
evidence from sources used thus far.
Sources:
Source A:
Terauchi, M. (1910). The Relations of Korea with Japan. In Korea: its history, its people, and its
commerce. (pp. 217-232). J.B. Millet Company.
Excerpt taken from pp. 220 - 224
“Japan was again compelled to engage in a costly war, this time with Russia, largely on
account of Korean affairs. But Japan had now realised that Korea was not capable of governing
herself, and that the policy of maintaining her independence could not be pursued without certain
modifications. Indeed, as the Resident-General declared in a speech made in July 1907,
‘The identity of Korean and Japanese interests in the Far East and the paramount character of
Japanese interests in Korea will not permit Japan to leave Korea to the care of any other foreign
country: she must assume the charge herself.’
Thus Japan took the responsibility of intervention in Korean affairs, after having given
the Koreans ample opportunity to prove their fitness for self-government, and after having found
them wholly unprepared for the task. Subsequently to the outbreak of war with Russia, Japan, by
successive agreements, obtained entire control of Korea’s foreign affairs. This fact being
afterwards recognised by the other Treaty Powers, they duly withdrew their diplomatic
representatives from Seoul. With respect to domestic affairs, Japan has assumed advisory
supervision of the general administration, but, in military matters, if ‘the welfare of the Imperial
House or the territorial integrity of Korea’ is endangered by the aggression of a third Power, or
by internal disturbances, Japan is to have direct control…
In addition to assuming direct control of Korean affairs, the Resident-General,
representing the Japanese Government, commenced faithfully to exercise his advisory functions
in the general administration. As to the details of his procedure, he caused the Korean
Government to engage a number of Japanese advisers, councillors, or assistant-councillors, both
for the Imperial Household and for the various Departments of State, in addition to a financial
adviser and a diplomatic adviser, who had been engaged before the establishment of the
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Residency-General. Technical experts were also engaged for the public works and for the model
experimental farms where instruction was given in industry, agriculture, and forestry. In matters
relating to the reform of local administration, it was arranged that the Vice-Residents of the
Japanese local Residencies should act as councillors to Provincial Governors; and Finance
Councillors were distributed among the thirteen provinces to act as advisers to the Provincial Tax
Supervisors...For the administration of justice, a Japanese legal councillor, or assistantcouncillor, was attached to each of the courts, local and high, in Seoul and to each of the courts
in the Provincial Governments as well as to magistracies of prefectures and districts. Thus no
radical changes were introduced into the old Korean administrative organisation. On the
contrary, the Resident-General tried to improve the existing Korean administration by general
guidance under the various Japanese advisory bodies. The Central Government had competence
to enact any necessary laws and ordinances for reform measures, and to instruct Local
Governments to act in accordance with advice, while local officials were expected to pay due
attention to advice given by the Japanese councillors.
But the operation of this system proved unsatisfactory, owing to the fact that the Korean
officials paid little respect to the advice given, so long as they were free to adopt or reject it at
will. Moreover, the incapacity of Korean officials and the habitually crooked methods of the
Korean Government greatly handicapped the success of the projected programme. Thus it
resulted that advisory guidance had practically little or no effect in bringing about the desired
changes in the old-time maladministration of affairs. So many evils and abuses had taken root
that more direct management on the part of the Resident-General, together with some
modifications in the Government organisation and the employment of capable officials, became
vitally important, since otherwise the welfare and prosperity of the Korean people could not be
promoted. These experiences and considerations compelled the conclusion of a new Agreement.
It was signed on July 24, 1907. By it the Resident-General was given more direct participative
power in the general administration. He acquired initiative as well as consultory competence to
enact and enforce laws and ordinances, to appoint and remove Korean officials, and to place
capable Japanese subjects in the ranks of Korean officialdom. The Agreement provided specially
for differentiation of the Judiciary and the Executive, as much corruption existed under the old
system which invested both the provincial governors and the district magistrates with judicial
functions.”
Source B:
Korean Mission to the Conference on Limitation of Armament. (1921). Korea’s appeal to the
conference on limitation of armament. Washington Government Printing Office.
https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=9OdAAAAAYAAJ&pg=GBS.PA1.
Excerpt taken from pp. 22 – 25
“The treaty terminating the war with Russia was consummated at Portsmouth in
September, 1905, and its was no sooner signed and out of the way than Japan began her
aggressive activities in Korea. A treaty establishing a protectorate by Japan over Korea was
prepared and Marquis Ito was sent to Seoul to secure its signature. For days he importuned the
Emperor and the cabinet ministers to carry out the will of his imperial autocratic master, but they
flatly refused. There were stormy sessions. Threats and cajolery were used to no avail; finally it
was apparent that more vigorous methods must be adopted.
The palace was a second time surrounded by Japanese troops and was invaded with
swaggering officers and their conspicuously armed guards. The Emperor and the ministers had
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been assembled at the peremptory order of Marquis Ito. They were argued with en masse with no
result, and then the three ministers who were the most outspoken in their condemnation were
taken out, one by one. Japanese officers returned, sheathing swords and buckling holsters, saying
to those who still sat in council, ‘Now will you sign?’ The Emperor and his remaining ministers
had every reason to believe that their absent colleagues had become martyrs to Korean freedom
as had their beloved Queen Min. Still they stubbornly refused.
The details of this conference have been recorded in numerous historical works. They are
common knowledge. The protectorate treaty never was signed or legally executed, although
Japan announced to the world that it had been. Even if actually signed, it would still be invalid
because of personal duress.
There were present at the opening of this conference on behalf of Korea the Emperor and
his eight ministers: Hahn Kin-sul, premier; Park Chee-soon, vice premier and minister of foreign
affairs; Min Young-kee; Lee Ha-young; Yi Won-yong; Yi Kun-tak; Yi She-yong; and Kwon
Choong-hyun. The status of the ministers was, of course, advisory. The final decision and the
execution of the document was rested with the Emperor. The Emperor did not sign, nor was he
ever advised to sign by a majority of his ministry.
The Three Yi’s did sign. One of their rewards for this act of treachery to Korea was that
Yi Won-yong was given the title of count, with a bribe of 1,000,000 yen ($500,000). It is
claimed that Lee and Kwon consented without signing. Others claim that these two simply
refused to participate. In any event, the Emperor, the premier, the minister of foreign affairs, and
Minister Min did not sign or acquiesce in the protectorate in any manner or form, but were all
outspoken and courageous in their denunciation and repudiation of the acts of the Japanese.
The Imperial Government of Japan reported this thing consummated on November 17,
1905, and the world for the time being accepted this misstatement as the truth. It was plausible
enough, for the traitor, Yi Won-yong, fraudulently signing himself as acting minister of foreign
affairs, although Park Che-soon was the minister, instructed Kim Yun-chung, another Korean
traitor, then stationed at Washington as charge de affaires for Korea, to announce the treaty to the
United States and to turn the legation over to the Japanese. This Kim did, and returning to Korea
was rewarded by Japanese for his treachery by being made prefect of Chemulpo, later counsellor
in Chula Province, and was given a vast estate of several thousand acres.
Secretary of State Root had no means of knowing , at the time, that Japan’s statement of
the signing of the protectorate treaty was untrue, nor that Yi Won-yong and Kim Yun-chung had
been bribed to misrepresent the facts to him, and accordingly recognized the Japanese
protectorate of Korea and withdrew the diplomatic representatives of the United States to Korea.
In the meantime the Emperor had become convinced by the attitude of Japan of its ultimate
purposes and in October, 1905, had dis patched his faithful friend and confidant, Prof. Homer B.
Hulbert, an American, to Washington with a protest to the United States and asking its aid and
‘good offices.’ Prof. Hulbert arrived in Washington almost on the very day it is alleged the treaty
was signed. It was useless for him to attempt to get Kim Yun-chung, the acting chargé de affaires
for Korea, to present the protest, because the chargé was in Japan’s pay, and he was delayed in
seeing Secretary Root until after the formal recognition of the Japanese protectorate had taken
place. He did finally see Secretary Root, however, but under the circumstances was not formally
received as a representative of Korea. The protest of the Emperor was delivered to the State
Department and simply became a part of its confidential files. The next day Prof. Hulbert
received a cable from the Emperor denying the execution of the protectorate treaty and it was
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promptly delivered to the State Department and it, too, became a part of the files of the
department
After the announcement of the protectorate the Emperor for all practical purposes was a
Japanese prisoner, confined in his own country. No one, except that he was a pronounced proJapanese, was allowed to see him. Seasoned and experienced correspondents from the leading
world’s newspapers were sent to interview him, but without success. Prof. Hulbert, his faithful
friend, did manage to see him in spite of Japanese espionage, and the Emperor delivered to him
credentials to the powers with which Korea had made treaties, reciting the fraudulent character
of the protectorate and asking the ‘good offices’ of those nations to assist Korea in her
predicament. However, Prof. Hulbert, alone and unaided, could not accomplish a great deal,
except to persist in his efforts to inform the world, in season and out, of the fraudulent character
of Japanese usurpation in Korea. This he did with a faithfulness and self - sacrifice that we may
expect from a red - blooded American, fighting for the weak and oppressed.
Japan sought to, and for all practical purposes did, vitiate the credentials issued to Prof.
Hulbert and the envoys to The Hague conference, by announcing the abdication of the Emperor
who had signed the credentials. Those who believed the announcement, of course, considered the
credentials automatically canceled. This announcement was made July 19, 1907, and five days
later, on the 24th, the subsidized Korean traitor, Yi Won-yong, purporting to act for Korea,
signed a treaty with Marquis Ito, representing Japan, turning over to Marquis Ito, as Japanese
resident general the entire governmental functions of Korea, internal and otherwise.
It is impossible to believe, in view of the Emperor’s attitude and many public protests,
that the Emperor ever actually and of his own volition consented to any of these acts that Japan
announced that he had promulgated. In any event, on the theory that ‘dead men tell no tales,’ he
was poisoned on January 24, 1919. His death was kept a secret or some days and finally it was
officially announced that he had died of apoplexy.
The crown prince was an unfortunate - a mental deficient — and being born of Queen
Min in those troublesome times preceding her murder he came into the world with no chance.
The very terrors and ordeals through which his mother had passed were to shield him. He was
born without means of ordinary comprehension and he believes to - day the irrefutable proof
before the world by which it will condemn Japan's duplicity.
Japan did not balk at making use of this unfortunate to further her purposes. Late in
August, 1907, after the Japanese had announced the abdication of Emperor Yi, the crown prince
was crowned Emperor, ‘amid the sullen silence of a resentful people.’…
He was known throughout the world as the ‘puppet Emperor,’ and, of course, the
Japanese did with him as they willed. Edicts were issued in his name that probably never saw, or,
seeing them, could not comprehend beyond the bright red seals and yellow ribbon.
The first order was to disband the Korean army, small as it was and as helpless as it was,
with the more numerous Japanese troops occupying all places of vantage. The different
detachments were ordered to report at a given point ‘without arms,’ and the order of disbandment
was read to them. Many of them refused and fought with bare hands. They were shot down,
dying as a final protest against this usurpation of their country's freedom.
Eventually the Japanese tired of the red tape necessary to continue the form and pretense
of a Korean Government with this unfortunate puppet Emperor and in 1910 came out boldly with
their rescript of annexation.
Of course, this was their objective and their intention from the beginning. Yet up to the
very day of annexation they had always denied it to the world. At each aggressive step plausible
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excuses were give, and the nations of the world were reassured time and again that Japan had no
intention of finally annexing Korea. Marquis Ito, the first governor general, characterized ‘all
annexation talk as absurd’ and this cry was taken up and reiterated by all Japanese officials and
diplomats with a perfect hypocrisy that misled the world.”
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Unit 1, Lesson 2, Day 2
Note: Designed for use in a standard 50-minute class period
Objectives:
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and
secondary sources.
• SWBAT evaluate the validity of arguments based on evidence cited and logical strength.
Standards: MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute
positions.”
MWH.9-12.9: “Imperial expansion had political, economic, and social roots.”
MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of
Western values and direct political control.”
Lesson compelling question: How did Korea transition from a protectorate of Japan to a
colony? Was it logical for Japan to directly annex Korea as a colony?
Hook (5-8 minutes):
• You-are-there/simulation (5 -8 minutes): The teacher will ask students to imagine the
following situation: They are in the year 1909 and are thoroughly informed of Japan’s
activities in Korea over the past 15 years. Japanese officials are unsure whether Korea’s
status as a protectorate will be adequate enough to ensure geopolitical security. As such,
top officials have decided to host a townhall. Students will present arguments for or
against Korea’s annexation as if they were presenting them to Prime Minister Katsura
Taro, Korea’s resident-general Ito Hirobumi, or any grouping of high-ranking Japanese
officials. The teacher will split students into two groups – group A will present arguments
for either position, and group B will carefully listen and decide on a “wining” side. Group
B will vote on whether or not they would annex Korea if they were Japanese officials, on
the basis of their peers’ arguments. Students presenting in Group A must cite specific
evidence from sources presented in lessons 1 and 2. The teacher should initially ask for
volunteers for group A, but if too few students volunteer then he or she should choose
students at random to even out the group numbers.
Body (30-35 minutes):
• Mock townhall discussion (30-35 minutes):
• The teacher should have a podium, stand, or designated spot for each student in group A
to stand while arguing their positions. Each student should be granted roughly an equal
amount of time. If there are, for example, 10 students in group A then each student
should receive approximately 3-4 minutes to make their cases. Regardless, students
should have enough time to thoroughly develop a point but must do so concisely.
Students in group A must inform the teacher in advance of which side they plan to argue.
• Students in group A will present their arguments, and the teacher will act as timekeeper.
If possible, the arguments presented should alternate sides each time. When a student
presents an argument against annexation, it should be followed by an argument for
annexation, and so on.
• While group A presents arguments, students in group B should be taking careful notes.
They should note evidence cited, logical fallacies, strengths of students’ arguments, and
the “bottom line” of why each presenter believes his or her position is correct.
• After all students in group A have presented, students in group B should receive
approximately 5 minutes to confer with one another and discuss a winner. The vote does
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not need to be unanimous, but students do need at least a 2/3 majority (or similar
appropriate ratio, depending on the number of group members).
Closure (10 minutes):
•

•

Large group debrief (10 minutes): Students in group B will share their decision with
the class. The group should have one spokesperson share the vote either for or against
annexation. After sharing, the teacher should ask other students in group B to share why
they chose to vote that way. If any students from group B did not vote in the same
manner as the majority, they should also verbally share why.
Finally, the teacher should ask students what they felt the strongest argument points were.
Teachers should also ask students if and how any arguments presented changed or altered
their personal opinions. Students should elaborate on how their opinions were altered
(contrast between old and new) and what specifically in the argument altered their
opinions.

37

Unit 1, Lesson 3
Note: Designed for use in a standard 50-minute class period
Objectives:
• SWBAT describe the main political, social, and economic characteristics of the first
decade of Japanese rule in Korea.
• SWBAT explain the difference in treatment of Koreans and Japanese during the first
decade of Japanese rule in Korea.
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and
secondary sources.
• SWBAT analyze primary sources to evaluate the bias, reliability, and value of a source.
Standards:
MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of
Western values and direct political control.”
D2.His.4.9-12: “Analyze complex and interacting factors that influenced the perspectives of
people during different historical eras.”
Lesson compelling question: What were the political, social, and economic characteristics of
the first decade of Japanese rule in Korea?
Hook (5-10 minutes):
• Post-it/whiteboard activity (5-10 minutes): Prior to class, students should have read all
featured sources for the lesson and underlined/noted important points. At the beginning
of class, each student will receive a dry-erase marker or write their answers on a Post-It
note. Students should write directly on the board or on a Post-It one major point from the
reading they found important. Students may write as many answers as they wish, but
every student must supply at least one response.
Body (30-35 minutes):
• MOTU source analysis review (5 minutes): The teacher will briefly review each source
with students using the MOTU method. The teacher will project a copy of the MOTU
worksheet on the board, an annotate it either by typing on the document or writing using
SmartBoard electronic pens. The teacher will review each letter of the MOTU acronym,
and ask students for voluntary responses.
• Fishbowl discussion (25-30 minutes): Students will be split into two groups, and desks
or chairs should be arranged so that one group of students can sit in the “in” circle that is
actively discussing and the other group can sit in the “out” circle or group that is actively
listening. To prepare for this discussion, the teacher should ask students to review
important points they found in the readings. Students might also think of discussion
questions they wish to pose. The teacher should begin the discussion by posing the
question, “How competently was Korea ruled by Japan during the first decade?” Students
must point to specific evidence in the sources during the discussion, and ensure that they
cover political, social, and economic factors during the conversation. Finally, students
should keep in mind the previous MOTU analysis activity just completed. Round 1 will
consist of group 1 actively discussing for 8 minutes, then group 2. For round 2, the
teacher should begin by posing the questions, “How does the first decade of Japanese rule
of Korea compare and contrast with traditional examples of imperialism? How does it
contrast with typical notions of race and discrimination?” Discussion of topics from the
previous round may continue into this round as well. Each group will receive 5 minutes
for discussion in round 2.

38

Closure (5 minutes):
• Large group response (2-3 minutes): The teacher will ask for brief student responses on
the “main takeaway” from the lesson.
• Exit ticket (remainder of class period): Students will write a 3-4 sentence argument in
response to the supporting question, making sure to address political, social, and
economic aspects of Japanese rule in Korea. These will be turned in to the teacher before
the class period ends, either on paper or digitally.
Sources:
Source 1:
Chung, H. (1921). The case of Korea: A collection of evidence on the Japanese domination of
Korea, and on the development of the Korean independence movement. Fleming H. Revell
Company.
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 64:
“Habeas corpus is unknown in Korea, and every man is considered guilty until he proves
his innocence. The law courts in Korea are part of the administrative system under the GovernorGeneral. The judiciary, instead of being independent and a bulwark of liberty for those oppressed
by other branches of the administration, as it is in America and Great Britain, forms a part and
parcel of the system. The judges, the nominees of the Governor-General, cannot be expected,
under the circumstances, to be unbiased. They have the absolute authority to select the evidence
they will admit. The defendant has no right to call witnesses on his own behalf. He may have a
complete defense and not be allowed to present it. He can only make request that witnesses be
called, and the judges grant the application or not as they see fit. The judges’ action is not subject
to review by a higher court.”
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 67-71
“A most serious phase in the matter of judicial administration in Korea is the fact that the
system gives no assurance for justice to any one who may be caught in its toils. Nowhere in the
whole process has there been any attempt to safeguard the innocent, but, on the other hand, there
are six things that make it practically impossible to clear a person against whom a case has been
made. They are as follows:
1. The right of the police to arrest without due process of law. No warrant is required for
arrest. Neither the prisoner, his attorney, his family, nor his friends have any way of
ascertaining the charge, if any, on which the arrest and detention is made. Bail is
often not allowed, and not at all during the preliminary investigation. The right of
habeas corpus is unknown.
2. Presumption of guilt. Instead of following the true legal maxim that ‘every man is
considered innocent until proven guilt,’ the official and popular attitude is the very
reverse of this, and the Japanese newspapers refer to the accused as criminals. The
expression ‘proving the guilt’ of the accused is never heard. In case of acquittal, it is
said that he ‘proved his innocence’ or was pardoned.
3. Right of counsel is denied. An accused person is not allowed to talk with a lawyer or
with others about his defense until after the police investigation and the hearing
before the procurator (prosecuting attorney) has been concluded. During this period
of investigation the accused is in the hands of the police with all access to the outside
world completely cut off, and the sole object of the police is to make a case that will
insure conviction…
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4. Secret police investigation. Here is the very citadel of this iniquitous system. It is
beyond dispute that the police use threats, deception and all forms of physical and
mental torture to secure admissions of guilt or in their efforts to gain incriminating
evidence against others. When such admission or evidence is obtained, it is reduced
to writing, signed by the accused, and becomes the basis for inquiry both before the
procurator and the trial judge. One would expect that the court would look upon such
testimony with suspicion, and that unless it was confirmed or corroborated in open
court, it would be thought and insufficient basis for conviction. On the contrary
experience shows that it is almost impossible to get the judges to give credence to
evidence tending to overthrow false admissions made under the pressure of the secret
police investigation…
5. Collusion between police and procurator. The procurator acts as prosecuting attorney
when the case is tried, but in advance of this the prisoners are brought before him for
preliminary examination. After this examination he has the authority to reverse the
police findings. However, the police report quoted above is authority for the
statement that the police often serve as procurators. In such cases the hearing must be
mere empty form. A Japanese lawyer in the course of his argument on a very
important case said: ‘This case convinces me that the police and procurators are one
and the same.’…
6. Biased judges. The process verbal from the police court and procurator is used as
evidence on the trial before the judges. Judges are required to familiarize themselves
with this record before the hearing begins. Thus they form their opinions before the
defendant or his counsel can be heard…
To this must be added the fact that the accused has no right to set up and develop his
defense in open court as has been referred to. We already have a fairly good outline of the
Japanese legal system in Korea. If the whole system is thus deficient in theory, what
could be expected in the way of practical results? Is it any wonder that the Koreans look
upon the courts as machinery of oppression? The judicial power given to the police to
execute judgments without trial on minor offenses is known as ‘Summary Judgment.’
The following table will indicate the proportion of the number of cases handled by the
police in this fashion.
In 1913 there were 21, 483 convictions without a trial out of 36, 953.
In 1914 there were 32,333 convictions without a trial out of 48, 763.
In 1915 there were 41,236 convictions without a trial out of 59,436.
In 1916 there were 56,013 convictions without a trial out of 81,139.”
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 125 – 127:
“With this policy in view, the intellectual suppression of the Korean people has been as
systematically carried out as political or economic subjugation. One of the first things the
Terauchi administration did after the annexation was to collect all books of Korean history and
biographies of illustrious Koreans from schools, libraries, and private homes and to burn them.
Priceless treasures of historical records were thus destroyed by this needless vandalism of the
Japanese. All Korean periodical literature – from local newspapers to scientific journals – has
been completely stamped out. In true Japanese fashion the Government does not say that the
Koreans shall not publish anything for themselves. But they lay down such rules and regulations
as make it impossible for a Korean to start a publication of any kind. To start a publication,

40

whether a newspaper, magazine or book, one must obtain permission from the censor, which is
next to impossible. If this difficulty is overcome, the publisher must deposit a certain sum of
money with the police to meet the contingency of a fine. When an issue of a magazine is to be
printed, two galley proofs must be sent to the censor and his stamp of approval obtained on each
page before it can finally go to the press. If the censor has overlooked anything, the entire issue,
after printing, is suppressed. Every attempt made by Koreans at publication fails because of this
official control.”
Source 2:
Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. (2011). Assimilation and segregation of imperial subjects: “educating” the
colonized during the 1910-1945 Japanese colonial rule of Korea. Paedagogica HIstorica
47(3), 377-397.
Excerpted from p. 382:
“The reality was an education based on segregation between the Japanese and the
Koreans, with the latter being denied access to quality educational opportunities and postsecondary education. In August 1911, following the example of the colonial education policy in
Taiwan, an educational ordinance established separate school systems for Koreans and Japanese
on the peninsula, with Korean common and higher common schools the equivalent respectively
of primary and junior high schools in Japan. Unlike the six-year elementary schools of Japan, the
‘common’ (elementary) schools in Korea provided only four or five years of schooling. Also,
whereas Japan’s secondary schools offered five years of training, Korea’s secondary schools,
called ‘higher common schools’, offered only four years for boys and three years for girls.15
The purpose of colonial education in Korea is also reflected in the type of schools
offered to Koreans: common schools focused on Japanese language training and the inculcation
of duty as colonial subjects; vocational education in the secondary schools aimed at the creation
of semi-skilled employees in the agricultural, commercial and industrial sectors; two-year
technical colleges (senmon gakko) trained persons to acquire limited technical skills to occupy
middle-management positions. University education was not accessible to Koreans initially, until
Keijo Imperial University opened in Seoul in 1924. As the only four-year institute of higher
education in the colony catering mostly to Japanese nationals, it also accommodated Koreans.
However, the admission of Korean students was strongly restricted to between onequarter and
one-third of the total number of students. For example, the total enrolment of the Imperial
University in 1934 in the 10 years since its establishment was 930, of which Koreans comprised
only 32%.16
Segregated schools underscored the difference in status between the colonisers and the
colonised. Educational policy considered advanced training unsuitable for colonial subjects and
stressed primary Japanese language and vocational skills, thus supporting an economic policy
that required a skilled workforce.17 At the same time, Japanese language education became
compulsory in all the schools, while Korean language and literature classes were deliberately
reduced or abolished. All schools in Korea also required students to take ethics courses that
taught the ‘concept of loyalty to the Emperor and the state’ in order to turn Koreans into loyal
subjects of the Japanese empire.
16

Sungho H. Lee, Korean Higher Education: Its Emergence, Development & Future Challenges
(Seoul, Korea: Hakjisa, 2006), 127–28.
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Michael E. Robinson, Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920–1925 (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1988), 40.”
Source 3:
Caprio, M. (2009). Forming Korean assimilation policy. In Japanese assimilation policies in
colonial Korea, 1910-1945. (pp. 81-110). University of Washington Press.
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 82-83
“The idea that Korean assimilation would be easy gained a strong following at this time.
Ukita Kazutami, editor of the magazine Taiyō (The Sun) who was a leading voice on Japanese
imperialism, wrote that the differences in religion, race, customs, and habits prevented the Irish
from assimilating with the English; the people of Posen (Poznan, in present-day Poland), Alsace,
and Lorraine from assimilating with the Germans; and the Poles and Finns from assimilating
with the Russians. The case of the Japanese and the Koreans, he asserted, was different, as the
two peoples have been of the same race and of the same culture for centuries. He predicted that
the Japanese would have relatively few problems in assimilating the Korean people, and that the
relationship would evolve peacefully, like the relationship between England and Scotland, rather
than become estranged, as with England and Ireland.3
Some observers noted resemblances between Japan’s tasks in Korea and those the Meiji
government faced after it replaced the Tokugawa regime. Count Hayashi Tadasu, an active
participant in the Meiji government’s diplomatic circles, put forth one such argument. Hayashi
recalled the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji, a process he witnessed from its inception. Both
situations, he began, required people to upgrade their dress, their living styles, and their eating
habits. The inferior Korean people, he cautioned, also faced the challenge of assuming a
‘Japanese style’—they must adopt ‘Japanese spirit and thought.’ The historic similarities that the
Korean and Japanese shared strengthened Japan’s chances of success with assimilation. Hayashi
concluded, ‘If the Japanese failed to assimilate the Koreans there must be something particularly
inferior with our political skills.’4
Others argued the merits of assimilation by drawing on the historical roots that the two
peoples allegedly shared. Kita Sadakichi, employed by the Education Ministry, justified Korean
assimilation by claiming Japan’s success in assimilating the Ainu, a people he argued to be now
‘almost indistinguishable’ from Yamato Japanese. This experience, he predicted, would be
valuable to Japanese assimilation of Koreans. Kita’s most important work, however, traced the
shared origins of the Japanese and Korean peoples. He explained that assimilation was
appropriate because it represented a return to the historical, and natural, relationship that the two
peoples once shared. Writing for the journal Minzoku to rekishi (Ethos and History) he argued
the Yamato people’s origins to be a result of the ‘fusion’ (yūgō) of several lesser peoples.5 These
peoples were absorbed by the Tenson people, the alleged descendents of Japan’s sun-goddess
(Amaterasu Ōmikami). The Japanese and Korean peoples, Kita reported, evolved from these
roots: their differences were a ‘small branch’ rather than a ‘large branch’ division; they were
ethnic rather than racial. He estimated that no two peoples shared as close a relationship as the
Koreans and the Japanese. In fact, he surmised, it would not be incorrect to consider them the
same people.
Ukita Kazutami, “Kankoku heigō no kōka ikan” (What Are the Effects of Korean
Annexation?), Taiyō (October 1, 1910). Marius B. Jansen offers biographical information on
Ukita in his “Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire,
3
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ed. Myers and Peattie (61–79), 73. Nitobe Inazō offered a similar comparison in December 1919
by writing “to an English student of colonization it will be highly interesting to watch the
development of Korea to a Wales or— to an Ireland.” Nitobe Inazō, “Japanese Colonization,”
Nitobe Inazō zenshū, vol. 23, 120.
4
Hayashi’s comments were included in a longer article titled “Heigō go no Chōsen tōchi
mondai” (Korean Administration Issues Following Annexation), Taiyō (October 1, 1910): 77–
78.
5
Kita Sadakichi, “Kankoku no heigō to kokushi” (National History and Korean Annexation)
(Tokyo: Sanseido, 1910); “Chōsen minzoku to wa nan zoya” (What Is the Korean Race),
Minzoku to rekishi (June 1919): 1–13; and “Nissen ryōminzoku dōgenron” (The Same Origin
Theory of the Korean and Japanese Races), Minzoku to rekishi (January 1921): 3–39. See also
Duus, The Abacas and the Sword, 415–17.”
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 90-91
“Japanese residents in Korea offered similar images of the Korean as primitive. Kubo
Takeshi, who taught at Keijō medical school, contributed more than three hundred pages of
medical research on Koreans to the Korean Medical Journal (Chōsen igakkai zasshi), the organ
of the Korean Medical Association (Chōsen igakkai) founded in 1911. Kubo’s research on the
Korean anatomy depicted the people as weak in the physiological characteristics of the civilized,
yet strong in those of the uncivilized. While their development in “expressive movement” (hyōjō
undō) muscles remained inferior, the muscles required for basic survival—those for hearing and
smelling—remained superior, when compared to those of the Japanese.26 Many of his results
boldly generalized the physiological construction of the Korean people based on autopsies
performed on the limited number of cadavers that a local prison provided him. His attempt to
characterize his Korean students accordingly—he accused them of stealing a skull bone based on
his theory that the Korean head shape made them more prone to criminal activity—led to their
boycott of his class.27
The Koreans’ backwardness was reflected in their daily life. Nakajima Motojirō, also
writing for the Korean Medical Journal, attributed the habit of Korean women carrying heavy
loads on their heads to their pelvic bone being smaller in diameter than that expected for women
their size.28 Koreans also lacked the standards of hygiene and cleanliness acceptable to civilized
people. Toriga Ramon, who authored a 1914 guidebook for potential Japanese migrants to Korea
titled Chōsen e iku hito ni (To People Going to Korea), advised his readers to expect Korean
inns, like Korean houses, to be ‘dirty.’29 Hara Sōichirō criticized Korean houses as “narrow and
suffering” (semakurushii). He added: ‘Japanese houses are small when compared to European
houses. But when I see Korean houses I have to sink to another level in poverty [binjyaku].’30
Both Toriga and Hara cited the Korean lack of spirit (tamashii). Toriga believed this to be
a characteristic shared by other underdeveloped peoples: in Japan there is a Japanese spirit, in
Russia a Russian spirit, and in America an American spirit. It would sound strange (hibiki ga
warui) to consider an Egyptian, Indian, or Chinese spirit. He then questioned whether there was a
Korean spirit.
Both studies appeared in Kubo Takeshi, “Chōsenjin no jinshu kaibōgakuteki kenkyū”
(Research on the Korean Racial Anatomy), Chōsen igakkai zasshi 22 (July 1918): 52–86, 146–
53. His research was also published in Chōsen oyobi Manshū, giving him a larger reader
audience.
26
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Sŏul taehakkyo ŭikkwa taehak, Sŏul taehakkyo ŭikkwa taehaksa (The History of the College
of Medicine, Seoul National University) (Seoul: Sŏul taehakkyo ŭikkwa taehak, 1978), 46–49.
28
Nakajima Motojirō, “Chōsen fujin no kotsuban gaikei keizokusu ni oite” (On the Outer
Diameter Measurements of the Korean Women’s Pelvic Bone), Chōsen igakkai zasshi (January
1913): 125–26.
29
Toriga Ramon, Chōsen e iku hito ni (To People Going to Korea) (Osaka: Hakuaisha
joseikappan, 1914).
30
Hara Sōchiro, Chōsen no tabi (A Korean Trip) (Tokyo: Iwamatsudō Shoten, 1917), 69–70.”
27

Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 16-17
“Japanese discussion on assimilation, often incorrectly associated with Japan’s wartime
imperialization (kōminka) policies, preceded Korean annexation. Japanese debated the policy’s
merits and demerits in 1895 after Taiwan was absorbed into the empire; discussion in 1910
considered the pace and direction to which the colonial administration would push Korean
assimilation. Japan’s ‘uniqueness’ as a colonial power was in its attempts to assimilate an
ethnically similar people amid the unbridled land grabbing that characterized the period that Eric
Hobsbawm famously dubbed the ‘Age of Empire’ (1875–1914).45 Yet, Japanese were inspired
by British, Prussian, and French efforts in their peripheral territories, rather than these states’
efforts in their external possessions. A survey of Meiji-era discourse on assimilation policy
reveals Japan’s views of ‘colonized’ to consist of a rather broad set of examples, with the
English formation of the United Kingdom, the French annexation of Algeria, and the Prussian
incorporation of Alsace and Lorraine serving as the most popular examples. The Japanese
recognized assimilation to be the governing policy in territories such as Scotland and Wales,
territories generally not treated in the contemporary literature as ‘colonies.’ They revised preannexation images that saw Koreans as foreign to argue that the similarities shared by the two
peoples made assimilation more appropriate in Korea than in other European situations.46 Such
discussions were required to address the more difficult question of whether assimilation was
indeed the most appropriate policy for the Korean situation.
45

Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875–1914 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987).
For examples of Tokugawa-era Japanese seeing Koreans as foreigners, see Ronald P. Toby,
“Carnival of the Aliens: Korean Embassies in Edo-Period Art and Popular Culture,” Monumenta
Nipponica 41, no. 4 (1986): 415–56; and Ikeuchi Satoshi, Kinsei Nihon to Chōsen hyōryūmin
(Modern Japan and Korean castaways) (Tokyo: Sanseisha, 1998).”
46
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Unit Two
Inquiry Design Model (IDM) Blueprint™
Compelling
Question

Can freedom exist under an oppressive regime?

Standards and
Practices

Staging the
Question

MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of Western
values and direct political control.”
MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the colonizers and the
colonized.”
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an examination of the
credibility of each source.”
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.”
MWH.9-12.3: “Historians analyze cause, effect, sequence, and correlation in historical events, including
multiple causation and long- and short-term causal relations.”
D2.His.4.9-12. “Analyze complex and interacting factors that influenced the perspectives of people during
different historical eras.”
The teacher will play a news clip on the centennial celebration of the March 1st movement and explain that
clearly this day is important to Korea’s current national identity. Koreans view it as a pivotal moment and
significant first step toward eventual liberation in 1945. The teacher will tell students that the March 1 st
movement was important, and did lead to freedoms. The teacher will explain to students that the new unit
will focus on the extent of such freedoms, and whether freedom can truly exist for people governed by an
oppressive regime like Imperial Japan.

Supporting

Supporting

Supporting

Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

Why did Japan implement the cultural rule
policy (bunka seiji)?

Did freedom and oppression coexist
under cultural rule?

Formative

Formative

Formative

Performance Task

Performance Task

Performance Task

Students will participate in jigsaw groups
to perform MOTU analysis on the
featured sources. Depending on class size,
there should be two groups (or any even
number). Group 1’s sources (A and B)
focus on the events of the March 1st
movement and its purpose. Group 2’s
sources (C and D) focus on the Japanese
government’s initial reactions to the
movement.

Students will individually read the
sources and perform MOTU analysis in a
manner of their choosing. Students will
then participate in a writing for
understanding exercise, during which
they will use evidence from the sources
to answer the lesson supporting
question: Why did Japan implement the
cultural rule policy (bunka seiji)?

Students will argue one of two
assigned positions in small groups of 4.
The activity consists of two rounds;
round 1 is two students arguing their
positions and debating while the other
two group members take notes. In
round 2, students will switch roles.
Position A is that the cultural rule
period represented an overall increase
in freedoms for Koreans which
outweighed any limitations. Position B

What was the March 1st movement?
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is that the cultural rule period was
overall more oppressive than it was
liberating.
Featured Sources

Featured Sources

Featured Sources
Source A:
Excerpt from Gordon, A. (2020).
Democracy and Empire Between the
World Wars. In A modern history of
Japan: From Tokugawa times to the
present (4th edition). (pp. 166-187).

Source A:

Source A:
What March First Means to Koreans, by
Soon Hyun, the original representative of
thirty-three Korean leaders who signed
the Declaration of Independence, 1919.
Source B:
Korean Declaration of Independence,
1919.
Source C:
Excerpt from Chung, H. (1921). The case
of Korea: A collection of evidence on the
Japanese domination of Korea, and on the
development of the Korean independence
movement. Fleming H. Revell Company.
Source D:
Red Cross Pamphlet on March 1st
Movement, 1919.

3 excerpts from
Caprio, M. (2009). Japanese assimilation
policies in colonial Korea, 1910-1945.
University of Washington Press.
Source B:
Excerpt from Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. (2011).
Assimilation and segregation of imperial
subjects: “educating” the colonized
during the 1910-1945 Japanese colonial
rule of Korea. Paedagogica HIstorica
47(3), 377-397.
Source C:
Devine, R. (1997). Japanese Rule in
Korea after the March First Uprising.
Governor General Hasegawa’s
Recommendations. Monumenta
Nipponica 52(4), 523-540.

Source B:
Excerpt from Chung, H. (1921). The
case of Korea: A collection of evidence
on the Japanese domination of Korea,
and on the development of the Korean
independence movement. Fleming H.
Revell Company.
Source C:
3 excerpts from Kim, Y.J. (2013).
Politics of Communication and the
Colonial Public Sphere in 1920s Korea.
In Colonial Rule and Social Change in
Korea (pp. 76-113). University of
Washington Press.
Source D:
4 excerpts from Kwon, I. (1998). “The
New Women’s movement” in 1920s
Korea: rethinking the relationship
between imperialism and women.
Gender & History, 10(3), 381-405.
Source E:
3 excerpts from Uchida, J. (2013). The
public sphere in colonial life: residents’
movements in Korea under Japanese
rule. Past & Present 22, 217-248.

Summative
Performance Task

Argument

Students will construct a short-written essay (400-700 words) answering the unit compelling
question: Can freedom exist under an oppressive regime? Students should cite specific
evidence from the sources in their essays.
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Extension

Taking Informed
Action

Students will write a letter to the editor as if they were an ethnic Korean living in Korea
during the cultural rule period. Students will express their viewpoint on whether cultural rule
has been more liberating or restricting for Koreans, as if from a contemporary Korean
perspective. Within the letter, students should answer the compelling question and cite
specific evidence from the unit featured sources. This letter should be 400-700 words in
length.

As a class, students will design, film, and edit a video (5-10 minutes in length) designed to inform the
general public about the March 1st movement and to commemorate it. This video should consist of general
information and facts, but also student commentary on the movement. Once completed, the video should
be posted to YouTube by the teacher. The purpose is to give students an opportunity to responsibly use
their digital platform as well as attempt to make the March 1st movement more widely known outside of
South Korea, where it is a national holiday.

The unit design template is by Grant, Swan, and Lee (2014) from the C3 Teachers.
Grant, Swan, & Lee (2014). IDM Working Blueprint Template. C3 Teachers.
https://c3teachers.org/inquiry-design-model/.
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Staging the Question
The teacher will show the video clip linked below:
Arirang News. (2019, March 1). March 1 movement marks centennial anniversary [Video].
YouTube. https://youtu.be/E083JLOB0Gk.
The teacher and the class will also read the following article, to contrast with how South Koreans
view the movement. The teacher may elect to have students individually read the article, and
then as a class discuss how it contrasts with the modern South Korean view of the day.
Fretwell, J. (2020, February 29). “The 3.1 people’s uprising”: how North Korea sees the March
First Movement. NK News. https://www.nknews.org/2020/02/the-3-1-peoples-uprising-hownorth-korea-sees-the-march-first-movement/.
If desired, the teacher may also display the images in this USA Today article for more examples
of how South Koreans today celebrate the March 1st Movement.
USA Today. (2019, March 1). South Korea celebrates 100th anniversary of March 1st
independence movement. USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/picturegallery/news/world/2019/03/01/festivities-and-protest-during-the-anniversary-of-the-koreanindependence-movement/3026178002/.
Finally, the teacher will say/pose the following to students (use this as a general outline or
guide):
• The March 1st Movement is clearly an important piece to South Korea’s national identity
today. The video made it clear that it is a source of pride, and South Koreans today view
it as a pivotal moment and a significant first step toward eventual liberation in 1945.
Modern North Koreans have a contrasting view, but clearly it was a significant event.
The movement it started did lead to some changes that involved freedoms. We will be
studying the extent of these freedoms, and asking ourselves: how free can a people be
under an oppressive regime like Imperial Japan?
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Unit 2, Lesson 1
Objectives
• SWBAT explain why the first decade of Japanese colonial rule in Korea resulted in the
March 1st movement.
• SWBAT describe the events of the March 1st movement as well as the Japanese
government’s initial reaction.
Standards:
• MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the
colonizers and the colonized.”
• MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an
examination of the credibility of each source.”
• D2.His.4.9-12. “Analyze complex and interacting factors that influenced the perspectives
of people during different historical eras.”
• D2.His.5.9-12. “Analyze how historical contexts shaped and continue to shape people’s
perspectives.”
Lesson compelling question: What was the March 1st (Sam-il) Movement?
Hook (5-10 minutes):
• Provocative proposition/simulation (5-10 minutes): The teacher will pose the
following question to students: How far would you be willing to go for freedom?
• Then, the teacher will pose the following scenario to students:
o Imagine you are a Korean teenager living in Seoul, renamed Keijo, in 1919.
During all of your adolescence, the Governor-General of Korea has been Terauchi
Masatake. You are frustrated with the Terauchi administration’s military rule, the
hypocrisy of Japan, and the apathy of foreign powers. The Japanese government
was insulted by the rejection of the racial equality clause at the League of Nations
yet they treat your people as subhuman. The Americans have refused to help
Korea. There seems to be no foreseeable end in sight to Japanese rule if things
continue as they are. One day in February, you hear that a group of people are
planning a large protest against Japanese rule and will be demanding Korean
independence. This will take place in Seoul, not far from where you live. With the
knowledge and understanding you gained from the previous unit in mind, what
might motivate you to participate in such a moment? What might stop you?
Would you attend the protest, if you were in this situation?
• The teacher will pause to give students a few moments to collect their thoughts, and then
take student responses. Students should verbally share their answers with the class. After
listening to several student responses, the teacher should follow up with the following
statement, or one similar: “Clearly you all have a wide variety of ideas on what actions
you would take. Some of you indicated you would attend the protest, despite the possible
consequences of torture or jail. If your entire life was spent under harsh military rule, you
might have had enough and wanted to take action. Well, some Koreans actually did
exactly this on March 1, 1919.”
Body (30-35 minutes):
• Jigsaw groups (30-35 minutes): The teacher will split students into two groups of
roughly equal size. Students in the same group should move their chairs or change desks
to sit near one another. If the class is large, students should be split into any even number
of groups. Group 1 (or half the total groups) will be responsible for performing MOTU
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analysis for sources A and B. Group 2 (or the other half of the total groups) will be
responsible for performing MOTU analysis four sources B and C. The teacher should
inform students that the main theme of Group 1’s sources is the events of the March 1st
movement in Korea, while the main theme of Group 2’s sources is Japan’s initial
response to the protests.
• Students will receive ten minutes to read their sources and begin MOTU analysis
individually. The teacher may project a timer onto the whiteboard so students are aware
of how much time remains for individual work. Students should complete as much
MOTU analysis for each source as they are able in the ten minutes.
• When the ten minutes are up, the teacher should verbally alert the students and refresh
them on directions. Students will work with their group members to complete the rest of
the MOTU analysis for each source. Students should fill in worksheets either physically
or digitally. Students will receive ten to fifteen minutes (depending on student progress)
to complete MOTU analysis for each assigned source with their group members. Students
should be made aware that the MOTU sheets they complete with their group members
will be turned in for a grade on accuracy and attention to detail. Students should be
prepared to share out/peer teach. Group members should pick one spokesperson per
source.
• Once the ten (or fifteen) minutes are up, the teacher should once again verbally alert
students. Students will move on to sharing the findings of their group/peer teaching.
Teachers should allot approximately ten minutes for this portion of the activity. Group 1
should start with the peer-teaching of MOTU analysis for source A, then move on to
source B. Students taking on the role of peer-teacher should move to the front of the
classroom and the teacher should project a blank MOTU analysis sheet on the
whiteboard. The student should fill in main points of each section of MOTU analysis they
share by writing on the whiteboard with a dry-erase marker, or using a stylus pen if the
whiteboard is interactive.
Closure (5 minutes):
• Exit ticket (5 minutes): Students will fill out an exit ticket, answering the following:
Briefly summarize the events and purpose of the March 1st movement, as well as Japan’s
initial response. If possible, this can be typed and turned in on a digital learning
management system such as Google Classroom. If not, students may write this on a sheet
of paper and turn it into the teacher.
• Final wrap up/preview for tomorrow (remainder of class period/while students
complete exit tickets): As students are finishing their exit tickets and final details of
MOTU analysis sheets, the teacher will verbally summarize the day. Students examined
the March 1st movement, which began as a protest in Seoul against the Japanese rule of
Korea. Participants advocated for Korean national self-determination. Students also
examined the short-term Japanese response to the March 1st movement, which included
arresting protestors, beating protestors, and burning villages suspected of being involved
in independence activity. The teacher will tell students that they have examined Japan’s
short-term response, and the cruelty of it. However, tomorrow the class will be looking at
Japan’s long-term response, which differed quite significantly from the short-term.
• Before exiting the room, students should turn in their exit slips, either on a digital
platform or by handing their physical exit slips to the teacher. Also, students should turn
in their MOTU analysis sheets. Again, these can be physically handed to the teacher if
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paper copies are utilized. If not, students should turn them in on a digital learning
management system, such as Google Classroom.
Sources:
Source A:
Hyun, S. What March First means to Koreans, by Soon Hyun, the original representative of
thirty three Korean leaders who signed the Declaration of Independence. 1919. Kadam2075. The Reverend Soon Hyun Collected Works. Korean American Digital Archive,
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA.
http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/p15799coll126/id/14684/rec/1
“Never has men’s merit toward the progress of democratic principles and against brutal
force of militaristic aggression failed in the human history. It is so with the assurance of the
Allied Victory against defeating forces of Germany and Japan. It is so with the belief of Koreans
for the achievement of their long fight for regaining freedom from the Japanese.
After ten year bitter experience of two-fold pressure, political and economic, under the
subjugation of Japan by her treacheries of protectorate and annexation in 1905 and 1910
respectiely, 25 million Koreans were united as one men in expressing their aspiration for the
national independence of Korea on March First 1919/
On that day, thirty three leaders chosen from three principal religions – Christian
Churches, Chuntokio Sect and Buddhist Temples met together at Myung Wall Kwan a Korean
restaurant in the heart of Seoul, the capital of Korea, and signed the Declaration of
Independence. Mr. Son pyung Hee read this historical document before them, and they shouted
“Mansei” three times for the independence of Korea. Mr. Son bravely announced to General
Terauchi, then Governor – General of Korea through telephone about what they had done.
Afterwar thirty three were arrested by the Japanese police and thrown into prison.
Simultaneously, at the Pagoda Park, a croud [sic] of 100000 people gathered together
under the leadership of young leaders. A musical concert was opened with singing of Korean
anthem. When the music came to its end, a large Korean national flag was unfurled at the top of
musical hall, and shower of leaflets on which was printed the Declaration of Independence fell
on the croud [sic]. The people received these leaflets with thundering cheers. Then the whole
croud [sic] marched up to the Union Square of Chongo where they devided [sic] into five groups
in a most orderly manner.
First group proceeded toward the Tuksoo Palace to pay their last homage to the Exemperor whose remains were then lying in state. At the palace gate, patriotic speeches were
delivered to mass. Another group went eastward to the Changtuk Palace where Emperor Yung
Hee or the son of Ex-Emperor lived. They informed him what the movement ment [sic]. One
group marched to the old Legation Quarters, where copies of Declaration of Independence were
delivered to the American, French, Russian, and British Consul – Generals with compliments of
Korean people. One group proceeded northward to the Kyungpok Palace where a new
magnificent building was being built for the Japanese government. At the front of this Palace, the
leaders also delivered patriotic speeches in the sense of protesting the Japanese rule and
reminding the people of their old free days. Another group or the last group took their course
southward toward the office of the Japanese Governor-General. When they reached the edge of
the old Japanese concession, they were received by the Japanese troops who were waiting for
them with brutal treatment.
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Practically, all the processions were headed by school boys and girls who did nothing but
singing their songs of independence, hoisting the Korean flags and shouting “Mansei”. Yet they
were attacked by the Japanese police and soldiers and treated with most inhuman brutality.
Hunders of boys and girls were arrested and thrown into prison and underwent unspeakable
tortures. In their savage manner of the Japanese authorities, young girls were undressed and
lashed to the utmost sense of shamefulness. Many of leaders were killed instantly at the points of
Japanese soward [sic] and bayonet. This was the first scene of March First at Seoul, and similar
demonstrations and programs were held on the same day at defferent [sic] cities, towns and
villages throughout Korea. Later Koreans in Manchuria and Siberia held such demonstrations in
the sense of showing their sympathy to their kindreds in Korea. So March First means to
Koreans the rebirth of national spirit, the rebuilding of national unity and the resourceful force of
justice against brutality and inhumanity done to them by the Japanese war-lords.”
Source B:
Declaration of Independence: English translation. 1919. Kada-m2042. The Reverend Soon Hyun
Collected Works. Korean American Digital Archive, University of Southern California, Los
Angeles, CA. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p15799coll126/id/14680.
“We herewith proclaim the independence of Korea and the liberty of the Korean people.
We tell it to the world in witness of the equality of all nations and we pass it on to our posterity
as their inherent right.
We make this proclamation, having back of us our 5000 years of history, and 20,000,000
of a united loyal people. We take this step to insure our children for all time to come, personal
liberty in accord with the awakening consciousness of the new era. This is the clear leading of
God, the moving principle of the present age, the whole human race’s just claim. It is something
that cannot be stamped out, or stifled, or gagged, or suppressed by any means.
Victims of an older age, when brute force and the spirit of plunder ruled, we have come
after these long thousands of years to experience the agony of ten years of foreign oppression,
with every loss to the right to live, every restriction of freedom of thought, every damage done to
the dignity of life, every opportunity lost for a share in the intelligent advance of the age in
which we live.
Assuredly, if the defects of the past are to be rectified, if the agony of the present is to be
unloosed, if the future oppression is to be avoided, if thought is to be set free, if right of action is
to be given a place, if we are to attain any way of progress, if we are to deliver our children from
the painful, shameful heritage, if we are to leave blessing and happiness intact for those who
succeed us, the first of all necessary things is the clear-cut independence of our people. What
cannot our twenty millions do, every man with sword in heart, in this day when human nature
and conscience are making a stand for truth and right? What barrier can we not beak, what
purpose can we not accomplish?
We have no desire to accuse Japan of breaking many solemn treaties since 1636, nor to
single out specially the teachers in the schools or government officials who treat the heritage of
our ancestors as a colony of their own, and our people and their civilization as a nation of
savages, finding delight only in beating us down and bringing us under their heel.
We have no wish to find special fault with Japan’s lack of fairness or her contempt of our
civilization and the principles on which her state rests; we, who have a greater cause to
reprimand ourselves, need not spend precious time in finding fault with others; neither need we,
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who require so urgently to build for the future, spend useless hours over what is past and gone.
Our urgent need today is the settling up of this house of ours and not a discussion of who has
broken it down, or what has caused its ruin. Our work is to clear the future of defects in accord
with the earnest dictates of conscience. Let us not be filled with bitterness or resentment over
past agonies or past occasions for anger.
Our part is to influence the Japanese Government, dominated as it is by the old idea of
brute force which thinks to run counter to reason and universal law, so that it will change, act
honestly and in accord with the principles of right and truth.
The result of annexation, brought about without any conference with the Korean people,
is that the Japanese, indifferent to us, use every kind of partiality for their own, and by a false set
of figures show a profit and loss account between us two peoples most untrue, digging a trench
of everlasting resentment deeper and deeper the farther they go.
Ought not the way of enlightened courage to be to correct the evils of the past by ways
that are sincere, and by true sympathy and friendly feeling make a new world in which the two
peoples will be equally blessed?
To bind by force twenty millions of resentful Koreans will mean not only loss of peace
forever for this part of the Far East, but will also increase the ever-growing suspicion of four
hundred millions of Chinese – upon whom depends the anger or safety of the Far East – besides
strengthening the hatred of Japan. From this all the rest of the East will suffer. Today Korean
independence will mean not only daily life and happiness for us, but also it would mean Japan’s
departure from an evil way and exaltation to the place of true protector of the East, so that China,
too, even in her dreams, would put all fear of Japan aside. This thought comes form no minor
resentment, but from a large hope for the future welfare and blessing of mankind.
A new era wakes before our eyes, the old world of force is gone, and the new world of
righteousness and truth is here. Out of the experience and travail of the old world arises this light
on life’s affairs. The insects stifled by the foe and snow of winter awake at this time with the
breezes of spring and the soft light of the sun upon them.
It is the day of the restoration of all things on the full tide of which we set forth, without
delay or fear. We desire a full measure of satisfaction in the way of liberty and the pursuit of
happiness, and an opportunity to develop what is in us for the glory of our people.
We awake now from the old world with its darkened conditions in full determination and
one heart and one mind, with right on our side, along with the forces of nature, to a new life.
May all the ancestors to the thousands and ten thousand generations aid us from within and all
the force of the world aid us from without, and let the day we take hold be the day of our
attainment. In this hope we go forward.
THREE ITEMS OF AGREEMENT
1. THIS WORK OF HOURS IS IN BEHALF OF TRUTH, RELIGION AND LIFE,
UNDERTAKEN AT THE REQUEST OF OUR PEOPLE, IN ORDER TO MAKE
KNOWN THEIR DESIRE FOR LIERTY. LET NO VIOLENCE BE DONE TO
ANYONE.
2. LET THOSE WHO FOLLOW US, EVERY MAN, ALL THE TIME, EVERY HOUR,
SHOW FORTH WITH GLADNESS THIS SAME MIND.
3. LET ALL THINGS BE DONE DECENTLY AND IN ORDER, SO THAT OUR
BEHAVIOUR TO THE VERY END MAY BE HONORABLE AND UPRIGHT.
The 4252nd Year of the Kingdom of Korea, 3rd Month.
Representatives of the People.
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The signatures attached to the document are:
Son Byung Hi, Kil Sun Chu, Yi Pil Chu, Paik Long Sung, Kim Won Kyu, Kim
Pyun Cho, Kim Chang Choon, Kwon Dong Chin, Kwon Byung Duk, Na Long Whan, Na
In Hup, Yang Chun Paik, Yang Han Mook, Lew Yer Dai, Yi Kop Sung, Yi Mung Yong,
Yi Seung Hoon, Yi Chong Hoon, Yi Chong Il, Lim Yei Whan, Pak Choon Seung, Pak Hi
Do, Pak Tong Wan, Sin Hong Sik, Sin Suk Ku, Oh Sei Chang, Oh Wha Young, Chugn
Choon Su, Choi Sung Mo, Choi In, Han Yong Woon, Hong Byung Ki, Hong Ki Cho”
Source C:
Chung, H. (1921). The case of Korea: A collection of evidence on the Japanese domination of
Korea, and on the development of the Korean independence movement. Fleming H. Revell
Company.
Excerpt taken from pp. 233-238
“The following description of three devastated villages in the Suwon district, given by an
American who visited them, furnishes a vivid picture of what has been going on in the remote
parts of Korea ever since March 1, 1919.
Chai-Amm-Ni
On Thursday, April 17, news was brought to Seoul by a foreigner that a most terrible
tragedy had occurred in a small village some fifty li (seventeen miles) south of Suwon. The story
was that a number of Christians had been shut up in a church, then fired upon by the soldiers,
and when all were either wounded or dead, the church was set on fire insuring their complete
destruction. Such a story seemed almost too terrible to be true, and being of such a serious
nature, I determined to verify it by a personal visit. On the following day I took the train to
Suwon, and from there cycled to within a few miles of the village; knowing the strenuous
objections that would be made to my visit, I made a detour of several miles over a mountain
pass, to avoid the police and gendarme station which I knew was near the village…
The appearance of the village was one of absolute desolation; about eight houses
remained; the rest (thirty-one) with the church had all been burned to the ground. All that
remained were the stone jars of pickles and other edibles; these stood in perfect order among the
ruins. The people were scattered about sitting on mats, or straw; some had already improvised
little shelters on the adjoining hillside, where they sat in silence looking down in bewilderment at
the remains of their happy homes. They seemed bereft of speech; they were probably trying to
fathom why this terrible judgment should overtake them, and why they should suddenly become
widows and their children orphans. There they sat, helpless and forlorn, entirely overcome by the
calamity that had overtaken them.
Before the long the Government party left the village, and when the officers were well
out of sight, the tongues of some of these poor frightened people loosened, and they revealed to
me the story of the outrage, which follows:
On Thursday, April 15, early in the afternoon, some soldiers had entered the village and
had given orders that all adult male Christians and members of the Chuntokyo (Heavenly Way
Society) were to assemble in the church as a lecture was to be given. In all some twenty-nine
men went to the church as ordered and sat down wondering what was to happen. They soon
found out the nature of the plot as the soldiers immediately surrounded the church and fired into
it through the paper windows. When most of the Koreans had been either killed or wounded, the
Japanese soldiers cold-bloodedly set fire to the thatch and wooden building which readily blazed.
Some tried to make their escape by rushing out, but were immediately bayoneted or shot. Six
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bodies were found outside the church, having tried in vain to escape. Two women, whose
husbands had been ordered to the church, being alarmed at the sound of firing, went to see what
was happening to their husbands, and tried to get through the soldiers to the church. Both were
brutally murdered. One was a young woman of nineteen – she was bayoneted to death; the other
was a woman of over forty – she was shot. Both were Christians. The soldiers then set the village
on fire and left…
Su-Chon
The hamlet of Su-chon is beautifully situated in a pretty valley some four or five miles
from Chai-amm-ni, where the previously reported massacre occurred. But the hand of the
despoiler had been there, and his finger prints, black and brutal, lay heavily upon the landscape.
The narrow streets were lined with ash heaps; out of forty-two cottages eight alone remained.
Little attempts had been made to clear away the debris by the survivors, for they had no sense of
security of life and property, and they apparently feared that any attempt to gather their things
together would only bring fresh disasters…
The following is the story of the destruction of the village:
On April 6, before daybreak, while all were sleeping, some soldiers had entered the
village and had gone from house to house firing the thatched roofs, which quickly caught and
destroyed the houses. The people rushed out and found the whole village blazing. Some tried to
put out the fire, but were soon stopped by the soldiers who shot at them, stabbed them with their
bayonets or beat them. They were compelled to stand by and watch their village burn to ashes.
After completing this nefarious work, the soldiers left them to their fate. I was informed that only
one man was killed, but that many were seriously injured. I inquired if the wind had spread the
fire from house to house. The reply was that the village was on fire at several places at the same
time, and that the soldiers carried matches and set fire to the thatch of many houses…
Wha-Su-Ri
Wha-su-ri must have been a picturesque village before the barbarous troops of His
Majesty’s Government transformed it into an ash-heap. The village is surrounded by wooded
hills, which slope towards the valley of fertile paddy fields. In the center of the village there had
been a lovely ‘country residence,’ which had a tiled roof and gateway. Now it is nothing but a
huge heap of broken tile, dirt and brick…Out of some forty odd houses eighteen remained. No
wind had spread the fire; something more sure, more definite, more cruel – the hands of Japanese
troops whose hearts must have been filled with murder…
The following is the story of the burning of the village:
On April 11, some time before daybreak, the villages were suddenly aroused out of their
sleep by the sound of firing and the smell of burning. Running into the open they found soldiers
and police firing the houses and shooting and beating the people. Leaving everything, they fled
for their lives, old and young, the mothers with their babies at their breasts, and the fathers with
the younger children – all of them fled to the hills. But before they could make good their escape,
many were murdered, shot by the soldiers, wounded and beaten, while a number were arrested
and taken to jail.”
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Source D:
Red cross pamphlet on March 1st Movement. 1919. kada-m1895.The Reverend Soon Hyun
Collected Works. Korean American Digital Archive, University of Southern California, Los
Angeles, CA. http://digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p15799coll126/id/5245, 20
September 2020.
Students should analyze the images on pp. 15-19 and pp. 24-37.
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Unit 2, Lesson 2
Objectives:
• SWBAT explain why Japan implemented the cultural rule policy in Korea.
• SWBAT evaluate the appropriateness of cultural rule as a policy in Japanese occupied
Korea.
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and
secondary sources.
Standards:
• MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials,
spread of Western values and direct political control.”
• MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the
colonizers and the colonized.”
• MWH.9-12.3: “Historians analyze cause, effect, sequence, and correlation in historical
events, including multiple causation and long- and short-term causal relations.”
Lesson compelling question: Why did Japan implement the cultural rule policy?
Hook (5 minutes):
• Review for preview (5 minutes): The teacher will ask the students what the main focus
of the previous day was, using the following prompts:
o In just a few sentences, can anyone summarize what we learned yesterday?
(Looking for answers similar to/containing: We learned about the March 1st
movement, when thousands of Koreans protested Japanese rule in Seoul and
demanded independence. The movement spread throughout the country and was a
result primarily of the harsh militaristic rule of the first decade of Japanese rule.
Japan initially responded with brutality.)
o Why might the March 1st movement be a major problem for the Japanese
government? (Looking for answers similar to/containing: The March 1st
movement showed very clearly to Japan that their current approach to ruling
Korea was not working. Koreans were clearly very unhappy. While Japan could
have continued in their previous manner, they would have run the risk of
increasing Korean frustration and resistance.)
o The teacher should share with students that the bottom line for the Japanese
government after the March 1st movement is that Korean policy clearly needs to
change. Continuing military rule was simply not an option; they very much
needed to change course. So today, the class will look at how that happened.
Body (35-40 minutes):
• Instructions: The teacher should begin by previewing the day verbally and giving
students instructions. The teacher will tell students that they will be reading the sources
individually and performing MOTU analysis individually. Students will receive 15
minutes to read individually and perform MOTU analysis as they read. Students will have
a choice of how to perform MOTU analysis – they can either fill in a MOTU worksheet
from the National Archives and Records Administration or annotate the document with
notes on MOTU components. This can be done either physically or digitally using a
highlighting and annotating Chrome extension such as Weava. After receiving time to
read and perform MOTU analysis, students will receive 20-25 minutes to write a brief
essay.
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•

Independent reading/MOTU source analysis (15 minutes): Students will receive 15
minutes to read the sources and perform MOTU analysis in a manner of their choosing.
The teacher should project a timer onto the whiteboard/SmartBoard to assist students
with pacing. The teacher should tell students that once they finish reading, they will be
writing an extended response/brief essay answering the lesson compelling question. The
lesson compelling question is: Why did Japan implement the cultural rule policy?
• Writing for understanding (20-25 minutes): Students will write a brief essay (~300500 words) in response to the lesson compelling question. Students should cite specific
evidence from the sources and aim for quality over quantity when developing supporting
points to their arguments.
Closure (5 minutes):
• Students should finish writing their final thoughts and submit them, if completed
digitally. If written physically, the teacher should collect them.
• The teacher should verbally summarize the day. Students read sources independently on
various reasons and motivations Imperial Japan had for implementing the cultural rule
policy in Korea. The teacher should reassure students that despite not verbally discussing
sources, they will remain important throughout the remainder of the unit. The teacher
should tell students that the following day’s lesson will focus on freedoms and limitations
Koreans experienced under cultural rule. Students will want to keep in mind Japanese
motivations as they read about and discuss the next day’s topic.
• The teacher should assign homework for the following day: Students should read the
sources for lesson 3, and perform MOTU analysis as they see fit (annotating, filling out a
worksheet, etc.). When reading, students should keep in mind lesson three’s compelling
question: Did freedom and oppression coexist under cultural rule?
Sources:
Source A:
Caprio, M. (2009). Post-March first policy reform and assimilation. In Japanese assimilation
policies in colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (pp. 112-113). University of Washington Press.
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 112-113
“News of the government-general’s harsh reaction to the Korean independence
movement quickly spread throughout the empire and beyond. Criticism from abroad took a
number of forms. Some critics specifically targeted Japan’s colonial policy; others equated the
harsh reaction by the Japanese to their uncivilized nature as a people. Criticism by Japanese also
focused on their country’s assimilation policy. While some faulted contradictions in the
approach—assimilation rhetoric and segregation practice—others cast blame on the Korean
people. Their “cacophony” (sōjō) demonstrations proved them to be unworthy of assimilation as
Japanese. Dissention appeared even among Koreans who used the Japanese media to criticize
Koreans who had
encouraged an activity that held so little promise of success.3
Criticism by acting British consul in Korea, General William M. Royds, faulted Japanese
assimilation rhetoric rather than Japanese effort:
The Japanese policy at present openly aims at depriving the Coreans of even their own
language and customs, and their total assimilation by Japan, and their deliberate attempt
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to enforce this policy by every available means is the cause of the universal hatred in
which the Japanese are held throughout the land.
Royds’s advice reflected disdain for the brutal administration to which Japan
subjected Koreans during its initial decade of colonial rule: ‘It seems evident that a few
reasonable concessions and a more sympathetic attitude would do more to restore quiet and
contentment than an attempt to stamp out the dissatisfaction by force.’4
Some in the United States Congress believed that Japanese behavior demonstrated this
people to be racially inferior, particularly after receiving news that Japanese had burned Koreans
in Christian churches. George W. Norris, a senator from Nebraska, used Japan’s barbaric
behavior to justify attitudes against the United States joining the League of Nations. After
reviewing Japan’s history of deception in Korea that led to annexation, he presented an
incriminating account of Japan’s handling of the March First Movement. Norris characterized
the plight of Korea—a country ‘on the eve of a great upheaval for Christianity and civilization
when the Japanese took
possession’—as a case of pagan Japanese persecution of Korean Christians. This alone, he
claimed, made Japan’s crimes much more heinous than the other atrocities conducted by other
colonial powers at this time. The Korean case, claimed Norris, illustrated why the League of
Nations treaty needed amendment before the United States could join. To accept the treaty as
proposed would ‘put the clock of civilization back a thousand years,’ as was now happening in
Korea.
Yun Ch’iho notes his interview with the Osaka Mainichi shinbun on why he refused to
participate in the March First Movement in his Yun Ch’iho ilgi, vol. 7 (March 2, 1919).
4
Quoted in Ku, Korea Under Colonialism, 138. See also Nagata, Nihon no Chōsen kankei to
kokusai kankei, chapter 7, for a review of the U.S. response to Japan’s handling of the Korean
independence movement.”
3

Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 123- 125
“As Japanese adjusted their images of the Korean people, the government-general
gradually introduced policy revisions. Discussion on reforms began soon after the March First
Movement was quelled. Prime Minister Hara Takashi, one of Japan’s foremost advocates of
assimilation, took the lead in pushing these reforms.32 His statements blurred divisions between
Japan’s homeland and colonial subjects, whom he felt should be accorded equal positions in
Japan’s extended community.
Hara contributed one of his earliest public statements on assimilation to Itō Hirobumi’s
‘secret papers’ (discussed in chapter 2). The deputy foreign minister made generous use of the
European example in his arguments. Taiwan should be incorporated not as a ‘colony’ in the
British model, but as an extension of the homeland. Japanese administration policy should
assimilate the Taiwanese as Japanese, as seen in German-controlled Alsace and Lorraine and in
French Algeria. The cultural heritage shared by the Japanese and the Taiwanese rendered this
policy appropriate. To implement this policy, Hara advised as follows: Japan’s legal system
being extended to the island, its governor general receiving orders from a Tokyo-based Taiwan
administrative minister (Taiwan jimu daijin), and Japanese institutions holding jurisdiction over
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their respective counterparts in the colony. He thus advised that Taiwan’s administration be
organized as extensions of the capital, just like Japan’s other prefectures.33…
Hara placed blame for the March First disturbances squarely on military rule and,
specifically, the barriers it erected to block integration of Korean and Japanese. In a 1919
opinion paper (ikensho), the prime minister defined the government-general’s role as promoting
integration not only in schools and workplaces, but also in the two people’s living
arrangements…
Hara specifically targeted the education system that segregated Koreans from Japanese.
One cannot expect a people to change, he stressed, while administering them as fools.
Differences that the government-general had created in the two systems nurtured the
discriminative attitude to which Japanese stubbornly clung. Hara further recommended that
Koreans be taught their history to allow them to understand the progress made by the Japanese,
and to be able to compare the past decade to the centuries of stagnation that their ancestors
endured under Korean rule.37
The prime minister’s most difficult decision rested on his choice of Hasegawa’s
replacement. The anti-Japanese demonstrations eliminated any chance of a civilian assuming this
post—his first choice had been the present vice governor general and adopted son of Yamagata
Aritomo, Yosaburō—as his selection required the army faction (Yamagata, Terauchi, Hasegawa,
and Tanaka)’s backing. The new governor general also had to be distanced from this group to
signal to Koreans and the critical international community Japan’s willingness to push reform.
His ultimate selection, Saitō Makoto, was different in a number of ways from other governor
generals. First, Saitō was from the navy rather than the army. Also, Saitō was retired at the time
of his appointment and thus technically civilian. However, after the appointment Hara had the
admiral’s name returned to the active roster to conform to the existing Organic Regulation of the
Korean Government-General.38
Saitō also spoke excellent English, a talent that proved indispensable. It opened a direct
line of communication with Korea’s foreign residents, and thus an indirect line with their
governments, to sell his reforms.
32

Governor General Hasegawa Yoshimichi outlined a similar set of reform measures before
leaving office in August 1919. “Sōjō zengosaku shaken” (A Personal Opinion of Better Strategy
after the Disturbances), Saitō Makoto monjo, vol. 1, 77–227. See Richard Devine’s English
translation and commentary in his “Japanese Rule in Korea after the March First Uprising:
Governor General Hasegawa’s Recommendations,” Monumenta Nipponica 52, no. 4 (Winter
1997): 523–40
33
Hara Takashi, “Taiwan mondai futa an” (Two Proposals for the Taiwan Problem), in Hisho
ruisan, ed. Itō et al., 32–34.
Hara Takashi, “Chōsen tōchi shaken” (A Personal Opinion on Korean Administration), in
Saitō Makoto kankei monjo, reel 104 (1919), Japanese Diet Library, 1998.
38
Hara changed this legislation to allow for a civilian governor general a week later. However,
army generals dominated this post until Japan’s retreat from the peninsula in 1945. See Dong,
“Japanese Colonial Policy in Korea,” 248–49.”
37

Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 126-128
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“From his first days in office, Saitō maintained that he intended to honor the initial
intention of annexation as articulated in the Rescript issued by the Meiji Emperor in 1910. In his
1921 New Year’s address Saitō vowed that his administration would
continue with the fundamental plan of Korean administration that remains unchanged,
namely to honor the imperial words of ‘impartial humaneness (isshi dōjin), to integrate
Korea into the general world situation, and to imperialize our 20 million brethren (dōhō)
while constructing a paradise of peace over the 3,000 ri of rivers and mountains.45
He anchored his reforms with what came to be known as ‘cultural policy’ (bunka seiji), a
policy with five fundamental goals: the maintenance of public peace, the spread of education, the
promotion of local rule, the development of industry and transportation, and the improvement of
health. These goals sought to enhance the development of the peninsula and the prosperity of its
people, both prerequisites to the Korean people assuming a status of equality with their Japanese
counterparts in preparation for assimilation.46…
Publication legislation reforms constituted just one of the many reforms that the
government-general would introduce in the years that followed the March First demonstrations.
A 1920 report summarized the twenty-four reforms that it had enacted to date, and eight new
reforms planned for implementation in the near future.50 Many suggested the influence of Prime
Minister Hara Takashi’s opinion paper, but few reached the level of integration that Hara had
recommended at this time. The reforms first eliminated important physical symbols of Japanese
power that distinguished Japanese from Korean. They banned uniforms for most Japanese
government-general officials. Although it was not specifically stated, these officials would
presumably be disarmed of their swords, as well. The hated kenpeitai, the gendarmes who were
most responsible for Japan’s botched handling of the independence movement, were exiled to
northern border patrol. A second round of reforms encouraged Japanese with pay incentives to
learn Korean. These developments relaxed two barriers—power symbols and language—to
encourage greater interaction between Koreans and Japanese. By revising the nationality laws
(minsekihō) the administration also hoped to make it easier for Koreans and Japanese to
intermarry. Other measures sought to erase existing differences in the way colonized and
colonizers were treated.
Bureaucrats would now be paid under the same salary scale, regardless of ethnic origin. In its
revisions of the police department, the administration announced that Japanese had eliminated
the title of “Chōsenjin junsaho” (Korean patrol assistant) to erase Korean-Japanese distinction.
Finally, Japanese ended the whipping of Korean prisoners, a punishment originally believed by
the Japanese to be fitting to their cultural level (mindo); the ban would equalize Korean-Japanese
punishment.
The reforms also targeted Korean education, both classroom and social. We do not see
efforts made to integrate Koreans and Japanese. Rather, the reforms increased opportunity while
maintaining (and even fortifying) segregation. The high enthusiasm that Koreans showed for this
education encouraged the government-general to increase the number of elementary
schools (from 556 to 870) as well to strengthen male and female higher education. It also vowed
to add classes in the sciences and to upgrade English from an elective to a required class. Most
important, the administration promised to examine the possibility of extending Korean education
to six years, the number of years then required of Japanese children. The reforms also
emphasized social education. The most visible change was its reforming publication legislation
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to permit three new vernacular newspapers: the Tonga’ ilbo, the Chosŏn ilbo, and the Chungang
ilbo. This revision ignited an active print culture that oversaw publication of numerous journals
and magazines of various genres that lasted up into the outbreak of war in the late 1930s. The
Japanese headed a second element of social education as ‘Facilities to promote Japanese-Korean
harmony” (Naisen yūwa no tame no shisetsu), and listed four areas to be targeted to ‘gain
[Japanese] acceptance (ryōkai) of Koreans, and Korean understanding of Japan’: bringing
Korean
teachers and public officials to Japan, introducing Korea to Japanese people through movies,
organizing public seminars for Koreans on Japan, and promoting ways in which Japanese could
observe Korea and Koreans.
Saitō Makoto, “Chōsen tōchi ni tsuite” (Concerning Korean Administration), in Saitō Makoto
monjo, vol. 2 (January 1921), 424
46
Saitō Makoto, “Chōsen no tōchi” (Korean Administration), Chōsen (January 1921): 3–7. The
term culture was a buzzword frequently heard in the homeland, as well. Sugimori Kōjirō
contrasted it with militarism in his definition of the purpose of culturalism—freeing the people
from the sufferings of narrow-minded patriotism. Sugimori Kōjirō, “Gendai keimō undō no ichi
hyōgō” (The Slogan of the Contemporary Enlightenment Movement), which appeared in “Bunka
seisaku no kenkyū” (The Study of Culture Lifestyle), Fujin kōron (June 1922): 33. Komagame
Takeshi contends that bunka (culture) replaced bunmei (civilization) in textbooks with little
apparent change in meaning in his meaning in his Shokuminchi keikoku Nihon no bunka tōchi,
203.
50
For the text of the reforms see “Chōsen shisei no kaizen” (Reforms in Korean Administration),
Saitō Makoto monjo, vol. 1, 73–141.”
45

Source B:
Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. (2011). Assimilation and segregation of imperial subjects: “educating” the
colonized during the 1910-1945 Japanese colonial rule of Korea. Paedagogica HIstorica
47(3), 377-397.
Excerpt taken from pp. 385-387
“Rattled by the scale and intensity of the March First Uprising, Governors-General
Admiral Saito Makoto (1919–1927, 1929–1931), General Yamanashi Hanzo (1927– 1929) and
General Ugaki Kazushige (1927, 1931–1936) parcelled out limited freedoms to the Koreans in
education, print and political organisation, hoping to undercut the militancy of a growing
nationalist movement.27 The administrative policies known as Cultural Rule came into effect
after the nationwide uprising. The conciliatory policy implemented in the name of Cultural Rule
lasted until the late 1930s. The Japanese were especially disturbed by the fact that many Koreans
educated by the Japanese under their system had masterminded the uprising. Subtle policies were
implemented that aimed to deliberately dismantle the independence movement and thereby
undermine any effort by the Koreans to connect to their heritage. While physically this was
possible in the short term, the long-term goal of the Japanese colonial authorities was to utilise
Colonial education in order to water down any intellectual movement that might critically
evaluate the prevailing system of governance. In the end education in colonial Korea was
rendered subservient to political expedience and symbolic displays of power.
Amid the social and political climate born of Cultural Rule, the colonial authorities
acknowledged the continued demands for better education by the Koreans.28 Schools existed

62

prior to colonisation, but they did not always have the integrative function characteristic of
schools in the West. Missionaries introduced the kind of schooling that was a crucible of
common culture in nation-states in the West prior to Japanese colonisation, and such Westernstyle schooling would have fomented a popular demand eclipsing virtually all other traditional
forms of education on the Korean peninsula. The authorities saw it as an opportunity to use
expansion of modern schooling – symbolic of ushering in modernity on the Korean peninsula –
as justification for the enterprise of colonial subjugation and their presence in Korea. Schools
thus were an efficient means to convince the Koreans that it would be self-defeating to reject
Japanese colonial rule as long as Imperial Japan stood for modernity itself.29
In 1922 nominal equality was given by the educational ordinance, placing Korean
ordinary and higher common schools on the same level as Japanese elementary and secondary
schools. Thus six years of education in the common schools, five years in boys’ higher common
schools and four years in girls’ higher common schools were provided. Also, segregated schools
for Japanese and Koreans were restructured into a single school system from the secondary
school level. At the same time, educational facilities in Korea were expanded. Under the slogan
‘san-men ikko’ (one school for every three districts), the Government-General inaugurated a
programme of expanding the public common school system, particularly in rural areas.30
As noted earlier, prior to the March First Uprising in 1919, public schools had difficulty
in recruiting students. The situation quickly changed by the early 1920s, judging from a
multitude of sources. The most evident is the increased usage of the terms kyoyukyeol (education
fever), hakkyoyeol (school fever), hyanghakyeol (fervour to study) in public documents and
newspapers. These terms mainly reflect the sudden increase in enrolment. Noteworthy is the fact
that in the aftermath of the March First Uprising, the enrolment rate in the common schools
climbed sharply, from 17.7% in urban areas and 2.6% in rural areas in 1915 to 33.8% and 16.2%
respectively by 1926.31 By 1933 there were 680,000 students enrolled in 2271 elementary
schools, while 35,000 students attended 579 rudimentary village schools in rural areas.
Vocational education expanded as well from 21 schools with 1872 students in 1919 to 52 schools
with 9220 students in 1935.32 Also, in response to the indigenous movement to set up a national
university, the Japanese established Keijo Imperial University as a state-run university in 1924.33
The reason for the turnaround can be attributed to a couple of factors. First, in the
aftermath of the failed March First Uprising, the Koreans felt the need to be enlightened to face
up to the Japanese rulers. Koreans engaged in the independence movement at various levels saw
that nationalistic fervour alone was not sufficient in the fight for independence. Koreans had to
develop forms of social consciousness appropriate to their historical situation in which their
culture not only served to define them as distinct from and opposed to the Japanese but also
provided a potential basis for uniting in the struggle for independence. Schools, even under
Japanese management, were seen as necessary for educating the general public to eventually
become critical of the given situation and assess their position. Second, the schools became the
conduit through which Koreans climbed up the social ladder regardless of their class origin. For
instance, modern school education became a necessary means to becoming a civil servant, which
was regarded as a prestigious occupation. The modern school in effect dismantled the established
class system, opening the possibility of children of lower social strata gaining access to
occupations formerly denied to them through education. In short, the first factor diminished the
mental reluctance against public schools, while the second factor provided the practical
motivation. The most fundamental alteration underlying these specific changes is the shift of the
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central focus in social consciousness as a whole, from tenaciously clinging to Korean traditional
and cultural values based on the old order, to one that was both more pragmatic and realistic.
27

Lone and McCormack, Korea Since 1850, 50.
Miyazaki Kotaro, Chosen no kyoiku [Education in Korea] (Juyutokyusha[Juyutoku Publishing
Company], 1923).
29
Watanabe Tohiko, Chosen tochi no shomondai [General Problems in the Governance of
Chosun], in Bunkyo no chosen, 1933 [Educational Affairs of Chosun], 15–25.
30
Michael Weiner, Race and Migration in Imperial Japan (London and New York: Routledge,
1994), 99.
31
Educational administration sector of the Chosen Shotokufu. Chosenjin gakureijido no shugaku
jokyo [The enrollment rate of school-age children in Chosun], 1934.
32
Kang, A History of Contemporary Korea, 152.
33
Sun-Geun Baek, Ilje gangjumgi ui gyoyuk pyungga [Educational Evaluation during the
Japanese Occupation Era] (Seoul: Kyoyook Publishing Co., 2003), 61. In reality, despite the
expansion of education opportunities for the Koreans, the number of applicants always far
exceeded the number of students admitted to schools at every level.”
28

Source C:
Devine, R. (1997). Japanese Rule in Korea after the March First Uprising. Governor General
Hasegawa’s Recommendations. Monumenta Nipponica 52(4), 523-540.
Note: The following excerpt is Richard Devine’s translation of the Governor-General Hasegawa
Yoshimichi’s Personal Recommendations, written in 1919, found on pp. 532-540.
Personal Recommendations
“It is a source of great shame that the recent disturbances broke out while I occupied the
important post of governor general of Korea. The immediate cause of these riots lay in the fact
that dissident Koreans living abroad, influenced by the upheavals occurring in the world at large
and resurgent movements for liberation, fomented subversive activities overseas. Son Pyonghiui, the former head of Ch'ondogyo, took advantage of this situation to achieve his long-held
ambitions, and rallied followers of Ch'ondogyo, Christians, and students with a call for ethnic
self-determination. From various quarters people joined the movement, dazzled by beautifulsounding words such as ‘independence’ and carried along by the Korean tendency to follow the
crowd. Yet while the riots were due in substantial measure to such factors, the main reason is to
be found in the pent-up anger of the Koreans regarding the overly demanding and intrusive
nature of the new [colonial] government and the social discrimination they have experienced.
This is indeed deplorable. During the past eight years of [Japanese] rule in Korea, we have
pursued a policy of assimilation and have not willfully adopted policies that are unfair to the
Koreans. Nevertheless, should these troubles result in the general populace harboring the
conviction that the new government cannot be trusted, it will be a source of grave concern for
governance in the future. It is essential to investigate the situation and carry out reforms in
administration so that the anxieties of the people are relieved and they are led in a positive
direction. I here present my views for your perusal.
1. What we should strive to accomplish
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The policy of assimilation has been fixed since the time of annexation, and various measures
have been based on it. With the rise of the independence movement and student participation
therein, people have come to criticize this policy and call for change. But as the policy has been
in effect for only ten years, it would be overly hasty to judge it a success or failure at this point.
The relationship between Korea and Japan (naichi) differs from that between the powers
and their colonies. This situation must be considered from a political standpoint. Korea is Japan's
base for development on the continent and the perimeter of defense for the home islands. A firm
solidarity founded on harmonious unity is a prerequisite for the survival of the Empire. Even if
assimilation entails many difficulties, diligent effort will obtain the goal. Such effort will
redound to the honor of the Japanese people. Do not the accomplishments of the past nine years
offer cause for hope?
Obsequiousness and suspicious ingratitude are part of the traditional Korean character. If
we allow them a measure of self-government without checking this tendency, it is sure to be a
source of trouble for the Empire in the future. Nevertheless, they have several thousand years of
history and ethnic tradition. Even though we, Japanese and Koreans, may be of the same race
and culture, it is impossible to expect assimilation to be accomplished in one day even if we rely
on the authority of the new laws [promulgated by the Government General]. Thus, while basing
our administrative policy on the principle of assimilation, we should adopt a gradualist approach
rather than try to eradicate forcibly [the barriers to assimilation]. Although this may seem
abundantly clear, those people charged with the actual work of implementing assimilation are apt
to seek hasty results. Reflection on the past record deepens my conviction about this matter.
There are also many lessons to be learned from the recent uprising.
I believe that as an immediate step we should (1) strengthen the economic ties linking
Koreans and Japanese, making them indissoluble, and (2) promote schools and social education,
further opportunities for Koreans and Japanese to study together and the spread of the Japanese
language, encourage immigration from the home islands, and open the door to mixed marriages.
This will lead naturally to a unification of ways of thinking. Although we have made
considerable effort toward these objectives up to now, we have not given sufficient attention to
the problem of social education. Similarly the matter of immigration has been left up to the
Oriental Development Company, and the administration has not undertaken any specific action.14
But we should not leave immigration just to the Oriental Development Company. We should
facilitate investment in Korea by removing all barriers that may presently hinder it, encourage
the growth of business enterprises by expanding subsidies to them, and thereby have Korea lead
the way to the development of capitalist enterprise in the home islands. If, together with this we
encourage immigration of people of the educated class, it is sure to have a positive effect as
regards the policy of assimilation. Mixed marriages involve many problems, it is true, but as a
legal code common to both Korea and the home islands has been promulgated, revision of the
Family Registration Law should be undertaken so as to ease the conditions for such marriages.
(This matter is under discussion.)
14

The Oriental Development Company (Toyo Takushoku Kaisha i was a semi-governmental
agency established in 1908 with the purpose of acquiring and developingagricultural land in
Korea. As part of that policy it also fostered the immigration of Japanese
settlers.”
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Unit 2, Lesson 3
Objectives:
• SWBAT explain how the post-March 1st cultural rule (bunka seiji) in Korea resulted in
both new freedoms and continued oppression for Koreans.
• SWBAT evaluate, synthesize, and reconcile potentially conflicting views and
experiences. This includes both historians’ interpretations and the views of people who
experienced the events studied.
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and
secondary sources.
Standards:
• MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the
colonizers and the colonized.”
• MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an
examination of the credibility of each source.”
• MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute
positions.”
• D2.His.4.9-12. “Analyze complex and interacting factors that influenced the perspectives
of people during different historical eras.”
Lesson compelling question: Did freedom and oppression coexist under cultural rule?
Hook (5 minutes):
• Analogy/comparison to personal experiences (5 minutes): The teacher will ask
students to recall a moment or period in their life in which they felt both restricted and
free. Students may think of a time when freedom and oppression coexisted in the same
moment or time period. Potential student responses include: ability to do more as an older
teenager (later curfew, fewer rules, etc.) but more responsibility (pay own gas/bills),
ability to spend more personal time as they wish during quarantine but restriction on
overall movement, and freedom in applying to/going to college but now bound with
responsibility of paying loans and obtaining a degree. Student responses could involve a
broad range of experiences and topics. For all responses, though, the teacher should
emphasize that in those moments students were not entirely oppressed nor entirely free –
the two states coexisted. The same, in many ways, can be said for Korea under cultural
rule. Koreans experienced many freedoms but also continued restriction and oppression.
Body (40 minutes):
• The teacher should assign roles for the discussion. Students will need to argue one of two
positions. Position A is that the cultural rule period represented an overall increase in
freedoms for Koreans which outweighed any limitations. Position B is that the cultural
rule period was overall more oppressive than it was liberating. The teacher will assign
one half of the room to argue position A in small groups, and the other half to argue
position B. The teacher will then divide students into small groups of four students each;
each group should contain two students arguing position A and two position B.
• Individual review (5 minutes): Students will rearrange their seating, if necessary, to be
near their group members. Before discussing, students will receive 5 minutes to silently
review the sources and the MOTU analyses they performed for homework.
• Response groups (20 minutes): There will be two ten-minute rounds to the response
groups. The teacher should project a timer onto the board so students are aware of pacing.
During the first round, two students (out of the group of four) assigned opposing
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positions will argue their positions and debate. While two students are actively
discussing, the other two students should take careful notes on the discussion and
arguments. These notes should contain information about what was said, but also
students’ perceptions about the strength of arguments presented. When the first ten
minutes are over, the teacher should verbally announce this to the class. The teacher
should tell the class to switch positions. Then, the two students who were observing will
actively argue their assigned positions while the two students who already argued will
take notes.
• Debrief (5 minutes): In their small groups, students will discuss notes they took.
Students should focus on arguments made as well as the strength of them. If a student
believes that an argument was weak or strong, he or she should state specific reasons
why. Based on this discussion, the group will come up with a position in response to the
lesson compelling question. Students are no longer bound to their assigned positions.
Groups’ positions can be either A or B, discussed above, or one in-between. Groups
should be prepared to support their positions with evidence from the sources.
• Share out (10 minutes): One spokesperson from each group will verbally share their
group’s consensus with the class. The spokesperson should share the group’s position as
well as evidence the group discussed in support of that position. As students share, the
teacher should write responses on the whiteboard. Alternatively, the teacher might project
a document on the board and type students’ responses in as they speak. Once all groups
have shared their responses, the teacher should move on to the closure but leave the
responses either written or projected onto the whiteboard.
Closure (5 minutes):
• Large group response (5 minutes): The teacher should pose the following to students:
“Bottom line, what do you all think? Did Koreans find more freedoms than oppression
during the cultural rule period? Does any continued oppression cancel and outweigh the
freedoms?” Students will voluntarily share their answers. If students do not do so, the
teacher should ask those who share to explain why they believe what they do. During the
discussion, the teacher should emphasize the complexity of the time period and that there
are no right answers. Students are free to take whatever position they choose on any
issue, as long as it is supported by evidence.
Sources:
Source A:
Gordon, A. (2020). Democracy and Empire Between the World Wars. In A modern history of
Japan: From Tokugawa times to the present (4th edition). (pp. 166-187).
Excerpt taken from pp. 183-184
“Partly in response to these events in China, Japanese political leaders undertook
relatively conciliatory efforts to protect economic interest in China for much of the 1920s. In
similar fashion, Prime Minister Hara Kei decided that simple repression was the wrong way to
sustain colonial rule in Korea. The overall goal of Hara’s policies was to assimilate Koreans into
Japan not as colonial subjects, but as a relatively equal people who were to be integrated with
Japanese through shared neighborhoods, schools, and even intermarriage. In the wake of the
March 1 protests, he appointed a new governor general, Admiral Saito Makoto, with a mission to
restore ‘harmony between Japan and Korea.’ Saito’s new departures came to be called ‘cultural
rule.’ The essence of his program was a strategy of divide and rule. Colonial administrators were
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charged to support cooperative Korean leaders and organizations, while isolating and
suppressing any sign of anti-Japanese activity.
‘Cultural rule’ has often been dismissed as cosmetic reform that masked unrelenting
authoritarian control. After Saito’s arrival, the Japanese quickly and dramatically quadrupled the
number of police stations and substations in just one year. The police developed a huge network
of spies and informers throughout Korea. In the name of economic development, colonial
administrators funded improved irrigation, and production did expand, but most of the increase
was exported to Japan. Per capita rice consumption in Korea actually declined.
But Governor General Saito’s reforms were slightly more than window dressing. Saito
gradually expanded the number of public schools for Koreans. He recruited more Koreans into
the colonial administration. He narrowed the inequality between their wages and those of the
Japanese. Koreans were permitted to publish books, magazines, and newspapers more
extensively than before. Colonial administrators allowed a much wider range of Korean
organizations to carry on activities. Korean people founded thousands of new education and
religious groups, youth groups, and organizations of farmers and laborers. A small number of
Korean capitalists were given new economic opportunities.
Even if policies of cultural rule and assimilation had been widely and consistently
implemented, it is hard to imagine they would have brought Koreans and Japanese into a happy
state of unity. Precisely because they understood this, it would seem, the colonial rules continued
policies of intensive censorship and surveillance. Those who challenged Japanese rule even
slightly were jailed and tortured. Nonetheless, nationalist political activities continued, either
openly in subtle disguise or in secret. If anything, the space opened by cultural rule offered the
subject population a chance to improvise a Korean-inflected modernity. As in Japan (although in
a more tightly constrained fashion), a newly diverse and energetic modern cultural life – cinema,
radio, and literature – flourished throughout the 1920s and into the early 1930s.”
Source B:
Chung, H. (1921). The case of Korea: A collection of evidence on the Japanese domination of
Korea, and on the development of the Korean independence movement. Fleming H. Revell
Company.
Excerpt taken from pp. 206-208
“One peculiar feature of Japanese rule in Korea, which is found in no other country in the
world, is its spy system. It is incredible from a Westerner’s point of view. It is true, none the less.
In Korea everyone must be registered and is given a number, which is known to the police.
Every time he leaves his village or town he must register at the police station and state fully the
business he intends to transact and his destination. The policeman telephones to this place, and if
the registrant’s actions are in any way at variance with his report, he is liable to arrest and
mistreatment. A strict classification is kept on the basis of a man’s education, influence, position
etc. As soon as a man begins to show ability or qualities of leadership, he is put in class ‘a,’
detectives are set on his trail, and from thenceforth he becomes a marked man hounded wherever
he goes…Officially authorized spies are stationed in every town and village; they force their
presence even into private household parties. Their acts are backed by the Japanese gendarmerie,
and woe to the native who dares to resent their intrusion! He will be charged with treason as
opposing the Government authorities! The Japanese enlist as sub-spies a large number of the
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worst scoundrels in the country. These incorrigibles are paid good salaries, and in many cases
given rewards for the merit of their work; not infrequently the well-to-do natives are blackmailed
by these spies, and the Government winks at the crime.
Such abuse of the method might naturally be expected, but the worst feature of it all is
that it is often used as a machine by the Government in relentlessly crushing out the spirit of
nationalism. If a Korean is suspected of keeping alive the spirit of his forefathers, the
Government instructs its spies to bring certain charges against him. Upon the testimony of the
spies, he will be imprisoned, his property will be confiscated, and he will be punished in such a
way as to e disabled for life; or he may even be executed on the charge of treason. Like the
medieval ‘Ironwoman’ that crushed its victims without bloodshed, this spy system of the
Japanese administration in Korea removes from the country the ablest and best educated Koreans
without technically violating the regulations of the colonial policy of the Japanese Empire.
Indeed, Baron Saito, the new Governor-General, admitted the cynical truth when he said recently
to an Asahi representative that all the Koreans of sufficient intelligence or force of character to
lead their countrymen to higher things are either in prison or in exile.”
Source C:
Kim, Y.J. (2013). Politics of Communication and the Colonial Public Sphere in 1920s Korea. In
Colonial Rule and Social Change in Korea (pp. 76-113). University of Washington Press.
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 76-77
“The third governor-general, Saitō Makoto (1919–27), instituted a new policy of cultural
rule (bunka seiji) in 1920 that lasted for a decade. Cultural rule introduced a new era that
permitted the rebirth of Korean newspapers and political magazines. Governor-General Saitō
recognized the fact that the total absence of indigenous, political, social, and media rights in
Korea was not so much a sign of success, but rather a major cause of the failure of former
Governors General Terauchi and Hasegawa’s administrations. Japanese rule was, according to
Governor-General Saitō, moving toward a stage of civilized rule owing to his own new
benevolent decision. As a result of this decision Saitō revived the vernacular press in the early
1920s to address key issues of colonial society. This tentative liberal policy of the colonial
authorities, however, gradually turned more and more into a sophisticated system of
manipulation and control by the end of the decade.
How to interpret the give-and-take between vernacular discursive space and colonial
repression has always been a difficult issue. Robinson (1984) argued that in the end the cultural
nationalists were co-opted by the colonial authorities. More recently in looking at the 1930s
Robinson and Shin have argued that Korea developed a kind of ‘colonial modernity’ that
‘produced cosmopolitanism without political emancipation.’1 In the cracks between the official
ideology of cultural rule and the growing vociferous demands of the colonial residents, the
vernacular media in the 1920s could plant nationalist views on various colonial issues. In fact,
through the contentious battle against the colonial authorities, nationalist cultural elites
constituted at that time what could be termed a public sphere. Though vernacular newspapers
existed throughout the period of Japanese colonial rule, the incipient public sphere of the 1920s
should not be interpreted as part of the linear and unbroken development of modernity through
colonialism. The severity of official censorship was heavier and more extensive not only before
but also after the period of cultural rule. The media, thus, lost their initial critical function and
became truly ‘colonized’ by 1926, which in turn led to the demise of the colonial public sphere.
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1

Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, Colonial Modernity in Korea, 11.”

Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 81-84
“Saito’s cultural rule policy was a compromise measure to handle the colonial crisis and
earn the favor or the Korean population while continuing to maintain a firm grip on Korea.13 In
December 1919, Saito’s colonial administration decided to give permits to Koreans to publish
vernacular newspapers, thinking that the increasing discontent of the colonial population would
have been detected earlier if the colonial society had had the ‘safety valve’ of vernacular
media…
Governor-General Saito recognized that he needed a grand plan to propagate his new
governing doctrine and to further implement a reform agenda.
Some prominent Japanese, such as Yoshino Sakuzo of Tokyo Imperial University,
blamed the military rue of former Governor-General Hasegawa for the March First
demonstrations; even Japanese Prime Minister Hara recognized the need for a change in
Japanese ruling methods in Korea.15 The failures of the old colonial administration were closely
studied, and it became increasingly clear that colonial rule could not be based on force alone.
The cultural rule proclaimed by the governor-general laid claim to civilized government, putting
great emphasis on the equal treatment of Koreans and Japanese, the extension of Japanese rule to
Korea, and permanent peace of the Far East. This policy, however, simply masked the ruling
ideology that had always been premised on assimilation. The colonialists’ strategy was basically
designed as a two level strategy. The surface level being a doctrine of cultural politics or
‘civilized rule,’ such as suggested by the reform measures of the new governor-general. The
hidden level, which was never officially acknowledged, was a project of building hegemony and
co-opting Korean elites through incentives and manipulation.16 Japan’s covert project for
building cultural hegemony has been understood and criticized by nationalist historians as a
policy of ‘divide and rule,’ or as a policy of ‘appeasement and manipulation.’ What these
analysts often do not notice is that this two-level policy was not a contradiction, but rather
something that was consciously designed to make up for the weakness of the cultural rule
doctrine.
Saito’s communication policy stemmed from his grand strategy to establish long-term
colonial rule on the basis of persuasion and consent.17 First and foremost this hegemonic strategy
was designed to establish a governing coalition that incorporated some pro-Japanese Korean
elites. Propagation of communication either favorable to or positive of the colonial ruling
ideology was considered to be a vitally important part of Governor-General Saito’s ruling
strategy. Saito worked on propaganda activities by personally attending and summoning local
magnates to offer propaganda seminars. Nationally well-known figures such as Pak Yonghyo,
Yun Ch’iho, and Song Pyongjun were often selected as guest speakers and used as unofficial
Korean spokesmen for the colonial government. Initial efforts to create pro-Japanese public
opinion by holding political propaganda seminars did not show much success owing to the lack
of the speakers’ influence on the native population.18 However, the colonial authorities continued
to resort to similar methods in the 1920s by covertly influencing conservative local magnates.
The colonial government understood the importance of rural areas where the majority of
the population remained in a traditional life style, and it tried every means available to separate
local publics from the influence of the national anti-colonial movements. Governor-General
Saito himself made regular ‘propaganda trips’ to the provinces. In his eight years in office, Saito
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paid visits to the provinces thirty-five times, spending 171 days. During these visits Saito met
and explained cultural rule to various opinion leaders of the provinces, such as landlords, literati,
evangelists, and local magnates.20…
Lastly, manipulating cleavages of class and ideology was an unwritten policy of Saito’s
colonial rule in Korea. The favored allies sought by the colonial government were reactionary,
conservative forces: the landlord class, the literati, peddlers,23 former government officials, and
the yangban from the last years of the Choson Dynasty. Creation of pro-Japanese groups from
among these social allies was an essential measure on which the colonial government in Korea
relied. As a result, these pro-Japanese elements acquired important influence in colonial society
particularly at times of political crisis. Among the pro-Japanese groups sponsored by the colonial
government, early key examples are the School Spirit Society (Kyop’unghoe), the National
Society (Kungmin Hyophoe), and the Comrades of Greater East Asia (Taedong Tongjihoe).
Kim Kyuhwan, Ilche ŭi tae-Han ŏllon, 169. Cultural politics were devised as a part of a
defensive scheme to handle the crisis situation create by the March First movement. Hence, it is
important to understand how the sense of colonial crisis affected Governor-General Saitō’s rule
in the 1920s. For the 1919 crisis, see Kang Tongjin, ‘Munhwajuŭi ŭi kibon sŏngkyŏk,’ 166–67.
13

Pak Ch’ansŭng, Han’guk kŭndae chŏngch’i sasangsa yŏn’gu, 317; Han Paeho, ‘Samil undong
chikhue Chosŏn,’ 82–83.
16
The covert strategy of cultural politics was a hegemony building project. An important aspect
of hegemony is that its intellectual and moral leadership is ‘objectified in and exercised through’
civil society and not led directly by the state. Joseph Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought, 24.
17
Those who assert the importance of the ‘divide and rule’ strategy of Governor-General Saitō
understand some aspect of ‘hegemony building’ of Saitō’s cultural rule. But hegemony building
is a distinct phenomenon constituted by complicated and systematic efforts to form a network of
diverse social allies. Collaboration is one element of the grand project, but cannot be identified
with the whole project.
18
Kim Kyuhwan, Ilche ŭi tae-Han ŏllon, 189.
19
Kang Tongin, Ilche ŭi Han’guk ch’imnyak, 26.
20
Ibid, 36-37.
15

23

Itinerant peddlers (pobusang) were organized on a national basis and used by conservative
forces from the late nineteenth century to break up ‘progressive’ political movements.”
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 84-85
“Although a new era for Korean nationalism had begun when the Saito administration
allowed the publication of three vernacular newspapers in 1920: The Tonga ilbo (East Asia daily,
the Choson ilbo (Daily), and the Sisa sinmun, there was no ‘liberal’ change of regulations and
laws in regulating media and publication. The colonial government did, however, loosen its
policy of banning all vernacular newspapers and political magazines. ‘Print capitalism,’ which
Anderson (1991) identified as the chief impetus to the spread of nationalism in countries around
the world, had developed in late nineteenth-century Korea, before being cut off by Japanese
repression in 1910. Japan’s new policy on publication freed cultural nationalists to once again
embark on a reformist project. Newspapers were most important for the formation of public
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opinion because they cut across all walks of life and served to overcome or confirm misgivings
and skepticism about the leadership of national figures.
The corresponding increase of social communication in the 1920s was phenomenal.
Among the various new magazines published in the 1920’s were Kaebyok (creation) published
by the Ch’ongdoyo church, Asong (Our voice) of the Korean Youth League, and Ch’ongch’un
(Youth) edited by Ch’oe Namson. In the first three years of the cultural rule (1920-1923) some
seven thousand organizations were created. Among the daily newspapers in colonial Korea, the
most widely read was the Tonga ilbo with thirty-seven thousand subscribers. The official
government gazette, the Maeil sinbo, had a circulation of only about twenty-three thousand. The
circulation of the Choson ilbo and Choson chungang was about twenty-three thousand and
fourteen thousand respectively. The total number of subscriptions to the four major newspapers
steadily increased until 1929 when it reached one hundred thousand within the national
population of twenty million.25 As in the period before 1910, newspapers were the heart of the
nationalist revival in the period after 1920.
25

Chŏng Chinsŏk, Han’guk ŏllon sa, 553.”

Source D:
Kwon, I. (1998). “The New Women’s movement” in 1920s Korea: rethinking the relationship
between imperialism and women. Gender & History, 10(3), 381-405.
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 3484-386
“The birth of Korean New Women was not just a natural reaction caused by centuries of
Confucian patriarchal oppression. The movement was a product of the complicated meeting of
Confucian patriarchy, the expansion of women’s modern education, the spread of the ideas of
Christianity and Western feminism and the imposition of several foreign governments’ imperial
power.
Here, an important point must be made. The colonial experience of Korea was
significantly different from that of other countries colonized directly by Western imperialists
who brought concepts of modernity with their intrusion. Korea, from the end of the nineteenth
century to the early twentieth century, experienced imperialism in two forms: the collapse of
traditional feudal ideology in the face of Western imperial modernity, and the loss of land and
independence through Japanese imperialism…
It is the resultant separation of, on the one hand, cultural intrusion by Western
imperialists into Korea’s feudal social order from, on the other, direct colonization by Japan that
distinguishes the Korean case from that of most other colonized countries. It is a separation that
has had an important effect on the birth of the Korean New Women’s movement. The largely
favorable view of Western religion in Korea is one product of this separation. Haseuk La
explains this tendency: ‘In the case of Korea, Christianity is commonly viewed as being separate
from imperialism, as Korea was occupied by Japan which was a non-Christian country.
Therefore, Koreans could not make sense of the symbiotic relationship between Korean
Christianity and Western imperialism; rather, they evaluated Christianity as contributing to the
build up of Korean nationalism.’13 It was possible, consequently, for Christianity to influence
Korean women and the women’s movement without provoking a resistance derived from their
nationalist consciousness.
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At the end of the nineteenth century, when Western imperialism penetrated Korean
society in the name of modernization, it shook the cultural foundations of Confucian patriarchy
and its caste system, which were the two central pillars of the Korean feudal system. The
subsequent conflict between modernity and tradition was unavoidable. In this conflict, women’s
status was picked out by many Koreans as the divisive feature that distinguished an oppressive
traditional culture from an emancipatory modern culture. In 1888, Younghyo Park, the
modernizing protagonist of a failed coup against the Korean dynastic regime, insisted on the
prohibition of early marriage and polygamy, and the abolition of the law prohibiting women to
remarry.14 Early marriage, concubinage, and the prohibition of women’s remarriage in particular
became targets of modernizing intellectuals’ criticism of Confucian patriarchy.15…
In the middle of this nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century reform movement,
many women challenged the traditional women’s consent to male dominance and set up new
counter-hegemonic discourses. Christianity especially influenced Korean women. Even though
Christianity was a patriarchal religion in its Western context, some Korean women found a
liberating discourse within it: men and women were equal under God. Korean women reformers
found they could use this discourse to attack Confucianism’s naturalization of an unequal
relationship between men and women…
Another way in which Christianity planted the early seeds in the 1920s New Women’s
movement was by playing a leading role in the expansion of women’s education. While the first
state-sponsored public school for girls was not opened by 1908 and only three private schools for
girls existed in Seoul at the time, Protestants had already built 732 elementary schools, nineteen
middle and high schools and one university around Korea. Before 1905, 174 schools for girls
were founded by Protestants, and women students comprised 30 per cent of the total 18,000
students attending Protestant schools in 1905.21 This notable increase in women’s schools and
women students signified not only the success of a Protestant strategy to spread Christianity
through education, but also the growth of the strong desire of Korean women to liberate
themselves through the education provided by these non-Confucian religious institutions.
13

Lee analyses the important roles missionaries played as pioneers in opening the Korean market
to imperial interests in contrast to the way they are usually seen. He emphasises the American
missionaries’ nationalism by discussing a US marine who was also a teacher and who hoisted the
Stars and Stripes along with Korean flags in a missionary school. He criticises the educational
work of missionaries because it made Koreans worship Western imperialists and Westernisation.
See Haesuk Lee, ‘What Did American Missionaries in the Early Days Do?’, in Correcting 37
Events of Our History, ed. the Institute of Historical Problems (Yoksa Bipyong Press, Seoul,
1993), pp. 23–5.
14
Haejung Cho, Korean Women and Men (Moonhak Wha Jisong Press, Seoul, 1986), p. 94.
15
Cho, Korean Women and Men, pp. 94–5.
Haewon Yoon, ‘Protestant Schools and Women’s Education’, in Women, Wake up!, pp.113–
19.”
21

Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 387-388
“One crucial commonality of Korean New Women, especially these three prominent New
Women, Haseuk La, Wonju Kim and Myungsoon Kim, was their studies in Japan. All three
studied in Japan around the same time (La, 1910-13, W. Kim, 191?; M. Kim, 191?). This was a
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time when Japan was establishing its colonial rule in Korea; but it was also a time when many
Japanese feminists were engaged in the debate over their own construction of ‘the New Women’.
By 1910, the Japanese were instituting a centralized, mobilizing, nationalist, oligarchic state
which pursued rapid industrialization at the same time as it was modernizing its military. In a
Japanese context, the ideas of the New Women seemed to have two major aspects. On the one
hand, the term denoted a group of women who asserted their own new self-identity and
sexuality. Hiratsuka Raicho, in 1910 the first Japanese women to identify herself as a New
Woman, made no secret of her self-conscious absorption of ideas from Western liberal
feminism.34 On the other hand, Japanese feminist advocates for the New Women saw them as
offering a new ideal type of women in Japanese society. Thus, the New Women did not represent
only one ideological tendency for the movement’s Japanese supporters.
34

Sharon L. Sievers, Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern
Japan (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1983), p. 175.”
Excerpt 3, taken from p. 393
“Haejung Cho defines the era from 1900 to 1920 as a time when Korean liberal idealism
strengthened progressivism, while she sees the era after the mid 1920s as a conservative era,
when traditionalists re-emerged to oppose the products of the preceding progressive era.64 This
change in the 1920s was related to a change in the thinking of Korea’s colonized intellectuals.
After colonization, Japanese imperialists practiced a modernization policy in its Korean colony.
This served to rob any Korean male intellectuals of their will for modernization, which they had
believed to be the only way to empower Koreans. These male intellectuals searched for an
alternative way of bringing about their intellectual nationalist restoration.65 Thus, it was in the
1920s that many once progressive intellectuals came to believe that through deconstructing
tradition as a national cultural root and symbol, the New Women’s challenge to Confucian
patriarchy could weaken the Korean nation’s power to stand against Japan.
64
65

Cho, Korean Women and Men, p. 96.
Jongwon Lee, ‘Role Conflict for New Women’, p. 74.”

Excerpt 4, taken from p. 395
“From the mid 1920s, many nationalists who had previously advocated women’s
education as integral to Korea’s modernity began to oppose the ideology and practices of New
Women. Only a decade earlier they had welcomed challenges to Korean patriarchy as a modern
nation-revitalizing discourse, especially with regard to women’s matters.75 By contrast, in the
mid 1920s, in their revised nationalist discourse aimed now against Japanese colonialism,
tradition was reformulated and revalued. For instance, Gwangsu Lee, a famous male novelist76
and an influential enlightenment activist during the early years of the Japanese era, after 1910,
asserted that Koreans could have self-control only through self-enlightenment and called for the
destruction of traditional morality. In his first novel Mu Jong (Without Love), published serially
in Maeil Sinbo (Maeil Newspaper) during 1917, Gwangsu Lee criticized the absurdity of the
existing marriage system and its perspective on love. He claimed that ‘the relation between wife
and husband in Korea was a permanent illicit union’ and the old perspective of chastity was ‘a
kind of religious supersition’.77 However, by the 1920s he had changed his opinion. He began
now to celebrate motherhood and to criticize married women who had paid occupations.78 In his
later novel, Huk (The Soil), published in 1932, he described a man’s conflict in choosing
between the traditional woman, because he admired naïve women who maintained traditional
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virtue.79 Gwangsu Lee’s reaction reflected the redirection of Korean nationalists’ discourse.
Under colonialism, male nationalists thought that the New Women’s direct denial of existing
patriarchy and sexual morality might cause the collapse of Korean tradition and solidarity.
Oho, ‘Korean Women’s Movement’, p. 146.
He was a leading thinker and a novelist who published the first long novel in Korea.
77
Jungwha Byon, ‘Short Review of Lee Gwangsu’, Chongae Moonhak, 13 (1980), p. 225.
78
Cho, Korean Women and Men, p. 99.
79
Gwangsu Lee, Huk (The Soil), (Bakyoung Press, Seoul, 1966).”
75
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Source E:
Uchida, J. (2013). The public sphere in colonial life: residents’ movements in Korea under
Japanese rule. Past & Present 22, 217-248.
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 221-222
“A re-examination of political life in colonial Korea would further move us beyond such
a dichotomy and allow us to explore the possibility that critical public spaces emerged not only
within but between national and imperial communities. I illustrate my point by using the case of
the citizens' movement for public electricity (denki fueika undo). Launched by urban residents
across Korea in the late 1920s and early 1930s, this movement aimed to reduce public utility
bills by bringing electricity under the direct management of each municipality, rather than leave
it in the hands of a corporate monopoly.16 Pivotal to the municipalization campaign was the role
of Korean and Japanese members of the recently installed city assemblies, who constituted a
small but influential local bourgeoisie. Conventionally viewed by scholars of Korea as
handmaidens of state bureaucracy, these civilian elites led the campaign with new authority and
awareness as representatives of the 'people', as they performed an intermediary function of
channelling public opinion to the state and putting 'the state in touch with the needs of society'.17
In bringing the daily concerns of local residents into public and policy debates, the assemblymen
adopted a shared language of common good to challenge the state-sanctioned corporate
monopoly on public utilities and the authoritarian structure of governance more broadly. And,
while the assemblymen clashed viciously over strategies to realize their vision, with each camp
claiming to represent
the popular will, they shaped and spread the concept of a public and publicness (Japanese:
kokyosei, Korean: konggongsong) in the process.
16
For a study on consumer agitation over water rates in London in the 1880s, a period of
transition from private to public ownership, that provides a fascinating parallel with the
municipalization campaign in Seoul, see Vanessa Taylor and Frank Trentmann, ‘Liquid Politics:
Water and the Politics of Everyday Life in the Modern City,’ Past and Present, no. 211 (May
2011).
17
Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 31.”
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 223-224
At the end of the 1920s Korea's political landscape was in a state of flux. Having created
the Sin'ganhoe (New Korea Society) as a united front of nationalist activity in 1927, Korean
moderates and radicals clashed over its leadership, its regional branches soon falling into the
latter's control.20 As the nationalist movement gravitated towards the left, the colonial regime
flexed its muscles, dealing a devastating blow to the communists and socialists, who were
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detained or driven across the northern border into Manchuria and the Chinese interior. For those
who stayed in Korea and out of jail, however, political life began to take a different turn. In 1929
Saito Makoto, governor-general of Korea in 1919-27 and 1929-31, returned from a conference in
Geneva to assume his short second tenure. As a fitting conclusion to his 'cultural rule', Saito
enacted a second round of local government reforms to invest the existing advisory councils with
legislative authority and to create new assemblies at provincial, municipal and selected town or
village levels. City assemblies, the most important units of local governance, were now permitted
to legislate on the general economic and educational affairs of the municipality. A fair ethnic
representation was also ensured by the stipulation that the number of Japanese and Korean
members could not be less than a quarter each of the overall quota.21
As a result of these reforms, Korean interest and participation in local politics showed a
visible increase in the 1930s. To be sure, voting qualifications remained unrevised and the
electorate small: even in May 1935 only 4.63 per cent of the local population (Japanese: 12.3 per
cent; Koreans: 2.4 per cent) were eligible for the city assembly elections held in fourteen cities.22
But, when limiting our focus to those who did run for office, we find that Koreans fared rather
well, taking much greater strides than their Japanese counterparts. Between 1930 and 1940 the
total number of Japanese office-holders, including officials and employees of the governmentgeneral and local assemblies, rose by 75 per cent (from 40,398 to 70,845), whereas that of their
Korean counterparts rose by 129 per cent (from 24,675 to 56,503). In 1930, 8,637 Japanese and
7,628 Koreans served in city and provincial assemblies and on school boards, but their numbers
became more or less equal by 1940 (Japanese: 20,938; Koreans: 20,501).23 In ensuring a certain
balance of power between Japanese and Korean delegates, these statistics suggest, the new
system of legislative assemblies undercut the settlers' ability to dominate local politics.
20

Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley, 1972), I,
112.
21
These reforms were completed by Saito's successor, Ugaki Kazushige, who assumed office in
1931. City assemblies (Japanese: fukai, Korean: puhoe) and town assemblies (Japanese: yukai,
Korean: umhoe) came into operation in 1931, and provincial assemblies (Japanese: dokai,
Korean: tonghoe) in 1933. Chosen Sotokufu, soshiki to hito [The Organization and Personnel of
the Government-General of Korea], ed. Gakushuin Daigaku Toyo Bunka Ken, suppl. to Toyo
Bunka Kenkyu, iv (Mar. 2002), 248 n. 16.
22
Kang Jae-ho, Shokuminchi Chosen no chiho seido [The Local Government System of Colonial
Korea] (Tokyo, 2001), 252.
23
Namiki Masato, ‘Shokuminchiki Chosenjin no seiji sanka nit suite: kaihogoshi tono kanren ni
oite’ [Political Participation of Koreans in the Colonial Period: Its Relationship with PostLiberation History], Chosenshi Kenyukai Rombunshu, xxxi (1993), 35.”
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 244-246
“Nevertheless, the cacophony of voices of the 'people' channelled by the city
assemblymen, community heads and the media finally moved the local authorities to begin a new
round of negotiations with Keijo Electric. After a series of protracted discussions (whose details
were never publicly disclosed) between the governor of Kyonggi province and Keijo Electric's
managing director, Musha Renzo, by the spring of 1932 the company executives had come to
accept as a compromise much of what was outlined in the alternative proposal.118 The colonial
government extended the company's franchise as planned from July 1932 to August 1935 but, in
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accordance with the proposal, the headquarters of Keijo Electric was moved from Tokyo to
Seoul in May 1932. As token compensation, Keijo Electric also donated a million yen to Seoul
and a hundred thousand yen to other cities, towns and villages where the company had
branches.119 Moreover, the company agreed to reduce gas and electricity prices as far as possible
at each review.120 Short of achieving the goal of municipalization, the residents' movement
managed to win significant concessions, at least from the stand point of gradualists within the
city assembly.
Not only did the campaign manage to exert pressure on Keijo Electric to respond to
public opinion, it also compelled the colonial state to look at itself 'through the eyes of the
public'.121 The advocates of municipal electricity continually enjoined the quasi-state Keijo
Electric to focus on community (Japanese: kokyo, Korean: konggong) rather than corporate
interests, urging greater self-awareness as a company in charge of managing utilities that affected
the daily lives of residents. That the campaign enabled the voice of the people to be heard, as the
chief of the Electricity Section of the government-general's Communications Bureau later
acknowledged, served to shake up the entire industry and its supervising state authorities by
'awakening' them to the fundamental 'mission of electricity as a public utility'.122 In arguing that
city planning must proceed in dialogue with public opinion, the residents' campaign for
municipalization broadly served as a referendum on the colonial state's exercise of power.123
And, as the ultimate outcome of the campaign showed, the colonial government made significant
concessions to the power of public opinion that problematized governing processes over which
the state authority had hitherto exercised a near-monopoly.
118

Ibid., 10 Apr. 1932; Choson ilbo, 29 Apr. 1932
Son, Ilche kangjomgi tossi sahoesang yon’gu, 427-9. The one million yen was used to build a
low-fee clinic and a residents’ hall.
120
Choson ilbo, 29 Ap. 1932. The Seoul Chamber of Commerce and Industry also appears to
have responded to the residents’ campaign by requesting a reduction in price at the time of Keijo
Electirc’s Review in May 1935, stressing ‘the urgent need’ to reduce the charges for household
usage and small factory operations in Seoul: Keijo Shoko Kaigishio, Chosen Keizai geppo,
ccxxxiii(1935), 95-6.
121
Bhattacharya, ‘Notes towards a Conception of the Colonial Public’, 156.
122
Chosen no denki jigyo o kataru, ed. Sasaki 200.
123
The campaign also affected the way the colonial administration managed society. New
awareness of the need to incorporate civilians into the governing process translated into a
‘corporatist’ approach adopted by the government-general to manage local communities in the
1930s. Gi-Wook Shin and Do-Hyu Han, ‘Colonial Corporatism: The Rural Revitalization
Campaign, 1932-1940,’ in Shin and Robinson (eds.), Colonial Modernity in Korea.”
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Unit Three
Inquiry Design Model (IDM) Blueprint™
Compelling
Question

Does war justify extreme measures?

Standards and
Practices

Staging the
Question

MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of Western
values and direct political control.”
MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the colonizers and the
colonized.”
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an examination of the
credibility of each source.”
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.”
MWH.9-12.3: “Historians analyze cause, effect, sequence, and correlation in historical events, including
multiple causation and long- and short-term causal relations.”
Students will read a CBS News article about the ongoing controversy between Japan and South Korea over
the issue of World War II-era Korean “comfort women.” After individually reading the news article, the
teacher will share an image of the comfort woman memorial statue in Seoul with the students. As a large
group, the teacher will lead the class in informal verbal MOTU analysis for each source. The main point is
for students to understand how salient the issues stemming from this era still are to Japan and South
Korea.

Supporting

Supporting

Supporting

Question 1

Question 2

Question 3

Why and how did Japan’s Korea policy shift
with the outbreak of the Fifteen Year War in
Asia (World War II in Asia)?

How did World War II change how
Koreans identified with the Japanese
Empire?

Was Japan’s wartime mobilization of
Koreans justified?

Formative

Formative

Formative

Performance Task

Performance Task

Performance Task

Students will analyze 1-2 of the featured
sources in jigsaw groups using the MOTU
framework. After analyzing in jigsaw
groups, one spokesperson from each group
will peer teach the class about his or her
group’s assigned source(s).

Students will construct a short essay in
response to the lesson compelling
question. Students will then debate in
small groups how they would have
identified as an ethnic Korean living in
occupied Korea.

Students will participate in a Socratic
seminar consisting of three ten-minute
rounds. Each round will focus on an
open-ended question posed by the
teacher.

Featured Sources

Featured Sources

Featured Sources

Source A:

Source A:

Source A:
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Excerpts from Gordon, A. (2020).
Depression crisis and responses. In A
modern history of Japan: From Tokugawa
times to the present (4th edition) (pp. 187208). Oxford University Press.
Source B:
Excerpts from Caprio, M. (2009). Radical
assimilation under wartime conditions. In
Japanese assimilation policies in colonial
Korea, 1910-1945 (pp.141-170). University
of Washington Press.

Kim, M. (2007). The aesthetics of total
mobilisation in the visual culture of late
colonial Korea. Totalitarian Movements
and Political Religions, 8(3-4), 483-502.

Excerpts from Kang, H. (2001). The war
effort. In Under the black umbrella:
voices from colonial Korea, 1910-1945
(pp. 130-138). Cornell University Press.

Source B:

Source B:

Caprio, M. (2009). Korean critiques of
Japanese assimilation policy. In Japanese
assimilation policies in colonial Korea,
1910-1945 (pp. 171-187). University of
Washington Press.

Excerpts from Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K.
(2011). Assimilation and segregation of
imperial subjects: “educating” the
colonized during the 1910-1945
Japanese colonial rule of Korea.
Paedagogica HIstorica 47(3), 377-397.

Source C:

Source C:

Excerpts from Kang, H. (2001). Becoming
Japanese. In Under the black umbrella:
voices from colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (pp.
111-122). Cornell University Press.

Asian Boss. (2018, October 27). Life as
a “comfort woman”: story of Kim BokDong, stay curious #9 [Video].
YouTube.
https://youtu.be/qsT97ax_Xb0.

Source D:
Excerpts from Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. (2011).
Assimilation and segregation of imperial
subjects: “educating” the colonized during
the 1910-1945 Japanese colonial rule of
Korea. Paedagogica HIstorica 47(3), 377397.
Source E:
Excerpts from Ryu, D.Y. (2016).
Missionaries and imperial cult: politics of
the Shinto shrine rites controversy in
colonial Korea. Diplomatic History, 40(4),
606-634.

Summative
Performance Task

Argument

Source D:
The 2nd Independent Heavy Siege
Artillery Battalion “Regulation for the
use of Comfort Stations” March 1938,
Shiryoshusei, Vol. II, pp. 351-358,
quoted in Asian Women’s Fund. (n.d.).
The life in comfort stations. Asian
Women’s Fund.
https://www.awf.or.jp/e1/facts09.html.
Source E:
Inaba Masao, ed. Okamura Yasuji
taisho shiryo: Senjo kaiso hen, jo
[Sources of general Okamura Yasuji:
Recollections of the battlefield, vol. 1]
(Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1970), pp. 302303, quoted in Asian Women’s Fund.
(n.d). Who were the comfort women? –
the establishment of comfort stations.
Asian Women’s Fund.
https://www.awf.or.jp/e1/facts01.html.

Students will construct an essay of 500-700 words in length, responding to the unit
compelling question: Does war justify extreme measures? Students should include a strong
thesis and cite specific evidence from the featured sources in their essays.
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Extension

Taking Informed
Action

Students will write and deliver a short speech to the class that responds to the compelling
question. As with the argument, students should include specific evidence from the featured
sources in their speeches.

Students will further research the contemporary tensions between Japan and South Korea over the
comfort women. Based on their research and knowledge gained from the unit, students will propose a
solution to the tensions (such as formal Japanese apology or Korean acceptance of reparation payments).
Students will write a blog post detailing their solution, and why it is appropriate given the historical context
of the issue. When finished, students will post this to a class blog created through a platform such as
Wordpress.

The unit design template is by Grant, Swan, and Lee (2014) from the C3 Teachers.
Grant, Swan, & Lee (2014). IDM Working Blueprint Template. C3 Teachers.
https://c3teachers.org/inquiry-design-model/.
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Staging the Question
Students will read the article linked here.
Kwon, J. (2021, January 8). South Korean court orders Japan to pay “comfort women,” WWII
sex slaves, reparations. CBS News. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/comfort-women-koreajapan-court-order-wwii-sex-slave-reparations/.
Students will view the following image of a comfort woman memorial statue in Korea. The
teacher should note to the class that it was placed in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul in
2011 by Korean activists who wanted to shame Japan for its lack of official apology on the issue.

Ahn, E.N. (2015). A statue of a girl representing the sexual victims of the Japanese military is
seen in front of Japanese Embassy in Seoul, South Korea, on Monday [Photograph]. The Wall
Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-and-korea-have-long-disputed-comfortwomen-1451337632.
After viewing the article and the photo, the class as a whole will analyze both using the MOTU
framework. This may be done informally and verbally, or written out on the board if the teacher
wishes. The main idea is to understand that this issue remains a salient source of disagreement
between the two countries today.
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Unit 3, Lesson 1
Objectives:
• SWBAT evaluate Japan’s reasons for changing Korean policy beginning in 1931.
• SWBAT understand the World War II era Japanese policies which are the basis of
modern tensions between Korea and Japan.
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and
secondary sources.
Standards:
MWH.9-12.10: “Imperialism involved land acquisition, extraction of raw materials, spread of
Western values and direct political control.”
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.”
MWH.9-12.3: “Historians analyze cause, effect, sequence, and correlation in historical events,
including multiple causation and long- and short-term causal relations.”
Lesson compelling question: Why and how did Japan’s Korea policy shift with the outbreak of
the Fifteen Year War in Asia (World War II in Asia)?
Hook (5-8 minutes):
• Making inferences/predictions (5-8 minutes): Prior to class, the teacher will make
the following mini-source available to students. This should be done by projecting it
onto the whiteboard. The teacher should also make the text available to students via
an online learning management system, such as Google Classroom. The teacher will
tell students they will be reading a source about the outbreak of the Fifteen Year War
in Asia, beginning with Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Students will be
given approximately 1 minute to read independently and silently. (See under “Text
for hook” after the closure in this lesson plan.)
• After the time is up for students to read, the teacher will pose the following questions
to students.
• Why did Japan invade Manchuria?
• Based on Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and the outbreak of the Fifteen Year
War, can you infer how Korean policy will be affected?
• Students will voluntarily supply responses. After 4-6 responses have been shared, the
teacher will move on to the main body of the lesson.
Body (30 minutes):
• Jigsaw groups (30 minutes total):
• The teacher will begin by splitting the class into four groups. The number of groups
will vary depending on class size, but each group should have approximately 3-5
members. If class sizes are larger, the teacher may create additional groups and assign
the same source(s) to two different groups. After splitting the class into groups, the
teacher will verbally give directions. The teacher should also project directions and a
general outline for the day on the whiteboard so students may follow along.
• Each group will be assigned either one or two of the featured sources for the lesson.
Group 1 will be assigned source A, group 2 source B, group 3 source C, and group 4
sources D and E. Students will receive 15 minutes to complete MOTU analysis for
their assigned source. Groups should choose a spokesperson and be prepared to peer
teach/share out upon completion.
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•

Peer teach/share out (15 minutes): When the 15 minutes are up, the teacher will
verbally alert the students. Each spokesperson will share out/peer teach by standing
near the whiteboard (or another appropriate location near the front of the room) and
verbally sharing his or her group’s answers. The teacher should project blank MOTU
worksheets on the whiteboard, one for each group. While the spokesperson is peer
teaching, another student from the group should be typing in his or her peer’s
answers. The worksheet should be projected onto the whiteboard as the student is
typing, so it is updated in real time. Each group should receive adequate time to share
its answers.
Closure (10 minutes):
• Large group debrief (5 minutes): The teacher should keep the MOTU analyses
projected on the board. The teacher will briefly review each group’s analysis. The
teacher will bring it into view on the whiteboard and ask students to verbally share
what they believe is the most important takeaway from each source. After all sources
have been reviewed, the teacher will introduce the exit ticket.
• Exit ticket (5 minutes): The students will answer the lesson compelling question on
an exit ticket, either by writing it on a piece of paper or typing and submitting it
digitally via an online LMS. Answers should be 3-5 sentences. Regardless of format,
students must be sure to submit the exit tickets to the teacher before the end of the
class period. Finally, the teacher will assign homework for the following day.
Student should read lesson 2’s featured sources and analyze each using the MOTU
framework.
Text for hook:
Mallory, W.H. (1932). The permanent conflict in Manchuria. Foreign Affairs 10(2), 220-230.
“The Permanent Conflict in Manchuria
The industrial development of Japan is, of course, built on iron and coal. She secures an
important share of these essentials from Manchuria. For instance, probably half of the pig iron
imported into Japan comes from Manchuria, and imports are roughly one-fourth of local
Japanese production. In the case of coal, Manchuria’s production is about a fourth of Japan’s. Of
the Manchurian coal perhaps a third is exported to Japan. While the supply of these materials is
important in peace time, in case of war Japan’s other foreign sources might be cut off; then the
Manchurian coal and iron would be indispensable.
When Japan counts up her reserves of iron and coal she becomes more convinced than
ever that her very life depends on the control of the Manchurian mines and the transportation
facilities which will bring their output to her shores. At the present rate of consumption the iron
ore reserves in Japan are entirely inadequate. If domestic ore alone were used to manufacture the
iron and steel consumed annually in Japan, the estimated utilizable ore would be exhausted in
thirteen years and the total reserves, including low grade ores, in about twenty-five years.”
Sources:
Source A:
Gordon, A. (2020). Depression crisis and responses. In A modern history of Japan: From
Tokugawa times to the present (4th edition) (pp. 187-208). Oxford University Press.
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 196:
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“As they developed policies for the new Manchurian state, Japan’s rulers also revised
their strategies toward the older colonies of Korea and Taiwan. They no longer believed it
enough to seek local stability and local profits. They redefined these colonies as places where
human and material resources should be mobilized to support the expanding empire. In Korea
beginning in 1931, Ugaki Kazushige took office as governor general. He launched ambitious and
harsh economic and social policies. The colonial regime took a more aggressive stance toward
northern Korea’s forest resources after the takeover of adjacent Manchuria. Colonial officials
and private Japanese interests treated the rich forests on both sides of this border as a single
region, and they harvested vast tracts of timber for processing in state-owned lumber yards as
well as private pulp factories. Considerable deforestation resulted.14
Ugaki’s regime also encouraged Japanese industrialists to invest in the mining of
strategic ore and metals, electric power generation, chemical (explosives) and fertilizer
production, and the production of iron and steel. Some Korean entrepreneurs were able to found
profitable industries as well. But regardless of the ownership, most industries drew on Korea’s
inexpensive labor supply to feed products and resources to Japan’s own increasingly militarized
economy. To mobilize human resources, Ugaki pushed forward an increasingly coercive
program of ethnic assimilation in the schools. He expanded compulsory Japanese-language
instruction and sharply limited the teaching of Korean language in schools. By the late 1930s,
Korean had been banned entirely.
14
Tessa Morris-Suzuki, ‘The Nature of Empire: Forest Ecology, Colonialism and Survival
Politics in Japan’s Imperial Order,’ Japanese Studies 33, no. 3 (2013): 23-237.”
Excerpt 2, taken from p. 200:
“The military also supported several new business combines in hopes of nurturing
sympathetic private sector allies, especially in the development of Manchuria. These were called
the ‘new zaibatsu,’ a group of conglomerates centered in heavy and chemical industries. They
benefited greatly from military demand, and some, such as Chisso Chemical Fertilizer and
Showa Denko, grew to be industry leaders and survived the war. The new zaibatsu were
particularly dominant in Korea. But they did not have their own banks; in fact, the established
old zaibatsu constituted the major source of direct investment in Manchuria throughout the
1930s.
In this fashion, industrialists old and new followed the flag and moved into business in
Manchuria in close collaboration with the military and civilian bureaucracy. In addition to
zaibatsu funding, development in Manchuria and Korea relied on what officials called
‘comprehensive technology.’ The term reflected a desire to rationalize economic life through
massive engineering projects. The Sup’ung Dam, built on the Yalu River between Korea and
Manchuria, was the largest dam in Asia when completed in 1943. It generated electricity for the
growing colonial chemical industry. The colonial laborers who built such dams faced not only
grueling hours and unhygienic conditions, but also strict surveillance by management and police
who feared subversion or resistance. The afterlives of these projects were significant:
Bureaucrats and engineers who cut their teeth in the colonies went on to build dams in Japan and
Southeast Asia after the war.21 The Sup’ung Dam today adorns North Korea’s national seal.
21
Aaron Stephen Moore, Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan’s
Wartime Era, 1931-1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), ch. 4.”
Excerpt 3, taken from p. 201
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“Under Governor General Ugaki, the colonial regime in Korea implemented a similarly
named Rural Revitalization program to identify model villages, which would take the lead in
projects to raise output and reduce social tensions, and thereby increase the loyalty of Korean
subjects. Some Koreans had already been organizing campaigns for ‘rural regeneration’ with a
stress on traditional values of frugality or filial piety. The state project of Rural Revitalization
dissolved these private efforts, but it incorporated many of their initiatives. As in Japan’s home
islands, one finds a transwar process here. The regime of Park Chung Hee (1963-1979)
undertook projects of rural reform with a similar focus on both economic improvements and
‘traditional’ values.23 The combination of a traditionalist rhetoric of rural solidarity and
modernizing strategies of better farm management was a striking feature of the drive to revitalize
rural Japan and its Korean colony. This mix echoed social reform projects of earlier decades. As
in the 1920s, the rural reformers offered particular hopes to women and promised them new
roles. Women were exhorted to improve kitchen design and hygiene and to organize everyday
life more efficiently and scientifically. These responsibilities amounted to a significant public
role in the community. Many in Japan and some in Korea responded to the campaigns with
enthusiasm.
23
Gi-Wook Shin and Do-Hyun Han, ‘Colonial Corporatism: The Rural Revitalization Campaign,
1932-1940,” in Colonial Modernity in Korea, eds. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), pp. 70-96.”
Source B:
Caprio, M. (2009). Radical assimilation under wartime conditions. In Japanese assimilation
policies in colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (pp.141-170). University of Washington Press.
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 141:
“Japan’s mounting crisis on the Asian continent initiated yet another review of its Korean
administrative policies. Aware of the Korean Peninsula’s strategically critical geographic
location, the Japanese government realized that success on the Asian continent could not be
realized without Korean support and cooperation. In 1938 the government-general produced an
extensive report that advised measures to strengthen Naisen ittai (Japan-Korea, one body). The
report, distributed just over a year after the Japanese military’s July 1937 encounter with the
Chinese at the Marco Polo Bridge, introduced measures required for Japan to realize a ‘complete
strengthening’ of Korean assimilation in accordance with the circumstances of the
times.”
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 146-148:
“Vice Governor General Ōno Rokuichirō headed the committee designated to draft
policy recommendations to be included in this second document. This committee consisted of
distinguished Japanese and Koreans in the areas of business, education, and government
administration. The contents of the Counterplan Proposal indicated the growing crisis in northern
China that had evolved from the Marco Polo Incident, a relatively minor confrontation between
Japanese and Chinese troops that escalated into a prolonged battle. The strategic proximity of the
Korean Peninsula resting between the Asian continent and the Japanese archipelago required the
Japanese government to more closely integrate the Korean people into its empire. The
consequences of failure would be most critical to the empire’s future.
The Counterplan Proposal addressed a major concern emphasized in two reports penned
just after Sunjong’s 1926 funeral: the futility of expecting Koreans to assimilate as Japanese
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should they be provided access to their traditional culture, including the Korean language-based
media.18 The situation of the times no longer afforded the luxury of gradual assimilation, but
required procedures that expedited the process. The first chapter of the Counterplan Proposal
quoted from the 1910 Imperial Rescript on annexation. It then projected the extent to which the
Korean people must be assimilated, before concluding by detailing how Koreans and Japanese
would benefit from a closer relationship:
The roots (konpon) of [Japan’s] administration of Korea are grounded in the sacred words
isshi dōnin (imperial benevolence) extended to our peninsula brothers. It aims to bathe
them in the immeasurable imperial favors (kōtaku), to attain in both name and reality
(meijitsu) their complete imperialization (teikoku kōminka). Leaving not the slightest gap,
we will forge a Japanese-Korean unified body to confront future complications initiated
by the circumstances of the times (jikyoku). Together we will advance the mission of
realizing the great spirit (taiseishin) of international brotherhood (hakkō ichiū) from a
commissary base to be established [in Korea] to assist in the Empire’s continental
management.
The Counterplan Proposal centered on three broad areas: education, participation, and
unity. It encouraged the administration to provide the Korean people with proper ‘guidance and
enlightenment’ (shido keihatsu). It advised ways to strengthen Korean links with Japan by
engaging their participation in nation-building activities, specifically highlighting holidays and
Japanese calendar use. It proposed ways for the government-general to forge ties between
Koreans and other peoples of Japan’s continental empire, particularly with Manchurians and
Chinese.19
Education facilities again provided the most important places to disseminate to Koreans
the spirit that the present circumstances required. The Counterplan Proposal advised that this
instruction be based on three fundamental principles: clarification (meichō) of the national polity,
endurance (ninku) of Naisen ittai, and discipline. The instruction was to emphasize history,
particularly the diplomatic, cultural, and blood connections that the Japanese and Korean peoples
have shared from ancient times. It would encourage national language acquisition. And it would
foster within Korea’s youth the ‘spirit of industry and patriotism.’20 The Counterplan Proposal
called for an expansion of education facilities to ‘allow everyone to attend school,’ and
suggested ways to engage Koreans further in social education activities. Museums should be
built, movies produced, and seminars organized to educate Korean adults. This instruction aimed
to provide means for the Korean people to ‘rationalize their lifestyles and soften (yūka) their
[Korean] mannerisms.’…
A third area that the Counterplan Proposal targeted was imperial unification. Its authors
recognized the need to establish links not just between Japanese and Koreans, but also between
Koreans and continental Asians, devoting far greater attention to this latter concern. It advised
that ties be established through educational and cultural exchanges between instructors at
universities and professional schools, students and youth leagues, as well as information
disseminated through the media and exhibitions. These suggestions depicted Koreans serving as
living testaments of Japanese success, a display to allow the Chinese and Manchurians the
opportunity to view their potential development should they choose to cooperate.22
18
See note 86, chap. 4.
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Chosen government-general, ‘Chōsen sōtokufu jikyoku taisaku chōsakai shimon tōshinan
shian,’ 418–23.
20
Ibid., 417, 421-42.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid., 459-60.”
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 149-150
“Strengthening Japanese-Korean ties contributed to the military role that the Japanese
envisioned the Korean Peninsula assuming. The Counterplan Proposal revealed ideas on how
Korea’s northern provinces could serve the Japanese military. The region contained valuable
coal mines and industrial facilities that the enemy might target for bombing. Fortifying this
region militarily both protected this critical resource and strengthened the Japanese war-waging
capacity on the Asian continent. The Counterplan Proposal envisioned the militarization of this
region strengthening the Japanese capacity to ‘distribute weapons in a flash’ to troops fighting in
China.28
Implied, but not directly stated, was the importance of the empire gaining Korean cooperation
and establishing military facilities on the peninsula. The Japanese could not expect to succeed on
the Asian continent unless it tamed this region, often described as wild and uncivilized; it
harbored many insubordinate (futei) Koreans.29
29
See, for example, Kitakan Sanjin (probably a pseudonym), who offers this description in his
“Chōsen no futei senjin” (Korea’s Lawless Koreans), Chōsen oyobi Manshū (November 1921):
81–82; and Pak Sanghŭi, “Chōsen seihokujin no tokushitsu” (Unique Characteristics of the
Northwestern Korean), in Chōsen oyobi Chōsen minzoku (Korea and the Korean Race), edited by
Chōsen oyobi Chōsen minzoku, 112–23 (Chōsen shisō tsūshinsha, 1927). I describe these images
in ‘Images of the North in Occupied Korea.’”
18

Source C:
Kang, H. (2001). Becoming Japanese. In Under the black umbrella: voices from colonial Korea,
1910-1945 (pp. 111-122). Cornell University Press.
Ch. 11: Becoming Japanese
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 112
“Kang Sang’uk [Kang Sang Wook]
(m) b. 1935, physicist, North P’yongan Province:
The Japanese in almost every community set up Shinto shrines high on the hill and once a
month they held a ceremony there. They ordered everyone, Japanese and Korean, to attend and
bow to the gods of Shinto. The one in Kanggye city was quite large. Even though my family was
Christian, I went along with the school group. We went during class hours and we kids trooped
along without thinking too much about it.
Each village was supposed to have a shrine, but many villages were too small to bother
with. Our ancestral village of Toktari never had Japanese people or a Shinto shrine. It was simply
too small.
One Christian seminary told its people not to bow to the shrines and consequently they
suffered continual persecution. Many others did as they were told in order to survive. As a child,
I didn’t notice all this. Mostly I played happily, drawing airplanes, drawing maps with different
colors.
What did the shrine look like? As you waked up the hill, before you got to the shrine
itself you came to a red torii gate, just standing there. I mean, usually a gate serves as an opening
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in a wall, but there never was a wall, just the gate. It was big – wide enough for several of us to
walk through side by side.
Farther up the hill, in a clearing where all of us could stand, was a little house very much
like a small Buddhist temple, with the doors closed. From a building next door, the priest came
out dressed in full regalia – very impressive, great robes and scepter – and he stood in front of
the shrine. My teacher told us that inside was a statue of one of their goddesses, Amatersau
Omikami, the sun goddess, but I actually never saw inside. It was like the Holy of Holies, very
sacred. The priest shouted, ‘Bow,’ and we all bent over from the waist with flat backs, and that’s
it, that’s all. It was over. What took so long was you had to climb the hill and then walk back
down.”
Excerpt 2, taken from p. 113:
“YI OKPUN, (f) b. 1914, housewife, Kyonggi Province:
Of course we had to go to the shrine on Namsan (South Mountain). The head of our
neighborhood group was Japanese; that’s why we had to do everything he said. If we didn’t go,
we didn’t get any food ration. We didn’t go alone. A whole group went – our whole
neighborhood cell, about ten households, you know. Even with my babies, I had to take the
streetcar, then walk all the way up the hill. It was hard.
We had to go up a lot, sometimes once a week, certainly two or three times a month. The
ceremony took about, let’s see, thirty minutes. They pour some water, you clap your hands, then
you come down and get the food ration stamps.
Later when we changed our name, I just followed whatever my husband said. I didn’t
care. Just get the food ration card!”
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 115-116
“KANG SANG’UK [KANG SANG WOOK],
(m) b. 1935, physicist, North P’yongan Province:
We lived in many different towns and I attended many different schools, but it was
always the same. Every morning of every school day, sun, rain, or snow, we began with an
assembly on the school grounds for attendance and announcements. Every single day the
principal gave a homily and we all bowed east toward Tokyo and the Emperor and shouted
‘Tenno Heika Ban Zai’ – ‘Long Live the Emperor.’ About five or six times a year, on very
exceptional occasions, they brought out a special scroll containing the Emperor’s proclamation.
Two such days were December 8 for the Declaration of the Second World War, and in April for
Education Day.
The principal stood in front of us on a podium. The vice principal brought out the scroll
in its lacquer box, elegantly wrapped with the chrysanthemum seal of the Japanese Emperor. He
held the box high above his bowed head, eyes averted, wearing white gloves so his hands would
not even touch the box. The principal, also wearing white gloves, received the scroll and read it
reverently, then returned it to the vice principal. All of us kids were supposed to bow our heads
and not look upon the sacred words of the Emperor, but of course we peeked.
Each of these special days had its own speech and we had to memorize them in civics
class. The proclamations, of course, were totally serious. Ch’in omoni (‘We the Emperor,
consider’) wa ga (‘our’) k’o so k’o so (‘divine imperial ancestors’).
But kids, you. Know, are not the least bit impressed with speeches, and we made games
out of them. We stood facing each other with great ceremony, arms crossed over our chest,
intoning heavily ‘Ch’in omoni,’ throwing our arms wide to embrace the universe ‘waaaaa ga’
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and, surprise! One kid would quickly reach over and tickle the other under his outstretched arms
‘k’o so k’o so, k’o so k’o so.’ Gales of laughter!
When I was about nine and in fourth grade, we lived in Kanggye and actually had
japanese neighbors who also had fourth- and fifth-grade children, just like us. We became good
friends, exchanged comic books, and went to each other’s birthday parties. On rainy days we’d
play marbles, and then we found out that in their own Japanese schools the kids also poked fun at
the Emperor’s speeches, but they, of course, didn’t dare do it in public. They even did some
things we hadn’t thought of.”
Excerpt 4, taken from pp. 117-118
“PAKSONGP’IL,
(m) b. 1917, farmer/fisherman, South Kyongsang Province:
I got beaten up many times by the Japanese because I resisted changing my name to
Japanese. Everybody around me changed theirs, but I had lost my grandfather and then my
father, and had taken over the responsibility of eldest son. That is why I tried not to change my
name. But I got tired of being so badly beaten.
Out of desperation, I wrote to my aunt in Seoul, the one who had been arrested for the
Independence demonstration. I asked her, should I do it? By return mail, she said, ‘Do you have
two fathers? If you have two fathers, then change your name to the name of your Japanese
father.’ She was furious!
So I held out a while longer, but I couldn’t stand any more persecution. I finally changed
my name to Otake. The O in Chinese characters is Korean Tae, the first syllable of the place
where I was born. The take, meaning bamboo, is for the huge bamboo grove behind our house.
So my name signified that I was born in Taebyon township in the house with the bamboo grove
in back.”
Source D:
Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. (2011). Assimilation and segregation of imperial subjects: “educating” the
colonized during the 1910-1945 Japanese colonial rule of Korea. Paedagogica HIstorica 47(3),
377-397.
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 391-392
“As the Pacific war escalated, the Japanese stepped up their efforts to obliterate the
colonial subjects’ collective Korean identity altogether.50 Governor-General Minami Jiro, who
took office from 1936 to 1942, imposed new rules on the Koreans such as the obligatory
recitation of the ‘Pledge of Imperial Subjects’ (1937), the compulsory use of Japanese language
(1938),51 and mandatory worship at Shinto Shrines (1939). Koreans were forced to recite the
‘Pledge of Imperial Subjects’, which included such phrases as: ‘We are the subjects of the Great
Japanese Empire’ and ‘We are fully loyal to the Emperor’. The ‘Pledge of Imperial Subjects’
had to be recited not only in schools but also in public whenever the Koreans received food
rations or purchased train tickets. Also, the Korean colonial subjects were forced to accept
Japanese as the national language; while Japanese language programmes expanded and
strengthened, limited Korean language courses that had been offered as elective in the schools
were dropped altogether from the school curriculum by 1938.52 It should also be noted that
despite the fact that graduation from Japanese public schools was a prerequisite for economic
advancement, Koreans continued to patronise, in large numbers, private schools run by Koreans
or by Western missionaries.53 But near the end of the war many such schools were forcibly
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closed down, and in the surviving schools the Korean teachers were replaced by Japanese
counterparts.
The most egregious example of the assimilation policy is the ‘Name Change Order’
issued in February 1940 by which Koreans were forced to take Japanese names within six
months of the proclamation.54 Those Koreans who retained their Korean names were not
allowed to enroll at school, were refused service at government offices, and were excluded from
the lists for food rations and other supplies. Faced with such compulsion, many Koreans ended
up complying with the Name Change Order. Such a radical policy was deemed to be
symbolically significant in the war effort, binding the fate of the colony with that of the empire.
Under the General Mobilisation Order, the education sector in colonial Korea was
transformed to meet the needs of the changing situation. The 1938 Educational Ordinance set
forth three agendas: ‘clarifying the national polity’ (kokutai meijing), ‘Japan and Korea as one
body’ (naisen ittai), and ‘growing stronger by overcoming hardship’ (ninku danren).55 These
were unequivocally expressed in the ‘Pledge of Imperial Subjects’ that the Japanese forced
students to memorise and recite daily in unison in all the schools.56
50

Kada Tetsuji, Shokumin seisaku [Colonial Policy] (Tokyo: Daiamondo sha, 1942). Such an
openly declared assimilation policy of the Chosen Shotokufu is displayed exhaustively in
Tetsuji’s work.
51
Sawayanagi Masataro, Chosen kyoiku wa Nihongo fukyu ni zenryoku o keichu subeshi
[Korea’s Education should Concert its Efforts to Adopt Japanese], in Sawayanagi masataro
zenshu [Sawayanagi Masataro papers series], vol. 8 (Tokyo: Kokudosha, 1976). The
justification by the colonial authorities for the forced use of the Japanese language in schools is
documented in Masataro’s papers.
52
Kamihara Noboru, Komin shinmin ikusei no genjyo [The Present State of Bringing Up
Imperial Subjects] in Chosen (Showa, 1939), 39–48
53
Patricia E. Tsurumi, “Colonial Education in Korea and Taiwan,” in The Japanese Colonial
Empire, 1895–1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peatti (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984), 275–311. An overview of the Koreans’ attitude toward the colonial
education sector can be found in Tsurumi’s article.
54
Naoki Mizuno, “Chosenjin no namae to shokuminchi shihai,” [Names of Koreans and
Colonial Rule] in Seikatsu no naka no shokuminchi-shugi, [Amidst Life in the Colonial Era] ed.
Naoki Mizuno (Kyoto: Jimbun Shoin, 2004), 35–77. Until the late 1930s, Koreans were not
allowed to have Japanese names even if they chose to, as the colonial authorities preferred to be
able to distinguish the heritage of its citizens by their names on paper. The drastic change in
policy was intended to dismantle the traditional Korean family structure and at the same time to
accelerate the assimilation process with the escalation of war.
55
Chosen sotokuhu kanho, gogai [Chosun Government-General Official Gazette, Extra Edition]
(March 4, 1938), 2.
56
Takahashi Hamakichi, Shinkyoikurei ni yoru gakko, gakkyu, kyoka no keiei [Administration of
School, Class, and Curriculum in Accordance with the New Education Edict] (Keijo: Chosen
tosho shuppan kabushikigaisya, 1939).”
Source E:
Ryu, D.Y. (2016). Missionaries and imperial cult: politics of the Shinto shrine rites controversy
in colonial Korea. Diplomatic History, 40(4), 606-634.
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Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 608-609
“The purpose of State Shinto was to unify the Japanese people ‘in a single cult’ with the
emperor as head priest, and to have them worship his ancestors and the illustrious dead as
national deities.7 All the Shinto shrines were assigned an official rank within the single hierarchy,
with Ise Jingu (Grand Shrine), dedicated to sun-goddess Amaterasu, the mythic ancestor of the
emperors, at the top. All the people of Japan at birth were organized to be parishioners of local
shrines, and each household was to install taima, or the ‘divided spirit,’ of the Ise deities in its
house altar, thereby becoming a branch of Ise Grand Shrine.8 State Shinto proved effective in
instilling a sense of patriotism and loyalty to the emperor. It is natural therefore that the Japanese
rulers erected Shinto shrines in its occupied territories both to promote loyalty to the emperor
and symbolize the subjugation of the population. In 1925 the Japanese built a jingu, the highest
in the shrine hierarchy, in Seoul as ‘the great source of transplanting the national manners’ and
made it the sanctuary of Amaterasu and Emperor Meiji (Figure1).9 Under the umbrella of Chosen
(Korea) Jingu in Seoul, about 1,140 Shinto shrines had been erected throughout the Korean
peninsula by the end of the colonial regime in 1945.
7

Helen Hardacre, Shinto and the State,1868-1988 (Princeton, NJ,1989), 33.
Ibid., 28-29.
9
Letter from Hasegawa Yoshimichi to Hara Dakashi, December 16, 1918, Japan Center for
Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan (hereafter NAJ), available online at http://
www.jacar.go.jp/DAS/meta/image_A01200173500, last accessed on April 23, 2015 [in
Japanese].
10
Hardacre, Shinto and the State, 33, 37-39.
11
Masao Maruyama, The Idea and Behaviour of Modern Politics (Tokyo, 1964), 32 [in
Japanese]. Many western scholars, unlike their Japanese and Korean counterparts, are reluctant
to use ‘fascism’ in describing Imperial Japan. For an overview of the discussion of the issue, see
Marcus Willensky, ‘Japanese Fascism Revisited,’ Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 5
(Winter 2005): 58-77.”
8

Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 611-613
“However, as Japan prepared to invade mainland China, Japanese militarists and
ultranationalists had been instilling a war psychology and demanding unconditional loyalty. In
early 1935, royalists in the Japanese government and military launched the movement for ‘the
Clarification of the National Essence,’ an ultra-nationalist campaign to mobilize the nation under
the emperor’s supreme authority. The ‘national essence’ (kokutai) meant the theocratic ideal that
the emperor ‘rules eternally according to the divine oracle of the imperial ancestors.’20 They
condemned the idea that the emperor was a constitutional entity who should exercise his
sovereignty legally, and depicted him as a supra-legal god-man who commanded absolute
loyalty. In the wave of nationalistic-militarist fervor, the movement to build Shinto shrines and
the demand to attend the Shinto rites intensified throughout Japan and its occupied territories
(Figure2).21
The effect of this excitement was even more keenly felt in colonies than in Japan proper.
No wonder, then, that an unmistakable change in the Japanese colonial officials’ attitude came in
the fall of 1935. In September1935, the Government-General ordered provincial governors to
require all students to attend shrine exercises; governors had little choice but to comply.22This
insistence upon attendance accompanied a change in the nature of shrine ceremonies that
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Christian students had to attend. To this point, the ceremonies that they were urged to attend had
been memorial services in honor of the war dead. Now, they were ordered to participate in the
Shinto shrine rites and perform obeisance to the kami or spirits residing there. Missionaries, in
their capacity as school principals were ordered to go to State Shinto shrines. Since all State
Shinto shrines were branches of a single imperial cult, a refusal to do obeisance at Shinto shrines
or any question about the appropriateness of the rites was considered lèse-majesté. Any
unyielding Korean should expect imprisonment and brutal punishment, and any uncompromising
missionary was likely to be deported.
The loyalty of the occupied population was always a matter of concern, and the patriotic
ceremonies could be used both to enhance patriotism and to ferret out any malcontents.
Moreover, the mission schools were far more influential in Korea than in Japan. The
missionaries had founded dozens of middle schools, and Korean Christians, under their
guidance, had established hundreds of primary schools, long before the Japanese took control of
Korea. Such schools were among the earliest modern educational institutions for Koreans. In
1923, thirteen years after the annexation, 58,017 Korean children were attending 920 church
primary schools and 7,816 students were studying at 54 secondary mission schools.23 In
comparison, the Japanese government had established a complete public school system in Japan
proper; there were only a handful of Christian schools that ‘might be left out of account.’24
Therefore, one can understand why the colonial authorities in Korea, under pressure from
militarists, Shinto royalists, and the nationalistic Japanese press in Korea, came to insist on
missionary students’ obeisance to Shinto.
The missionary schools under the auspices of the American Northern Presbyterian
Mission, and especially those in Pyongyang, became the points of collision as the imperial cult
intensified. There were several reasons for that confrontation. First, the Korean students were the
main target of assimilation policy and patriotic indoctrination. The Japanese wanted to Japanize
Korea by making the Koreans loyal Japanese, but they found it extremely difficult to change the
mind and attitude of the adults. Thus they wanted the younger generation of Koreans to have an
intellectual comprehension of the need for the union of the two nations and to see their
responsibility as Japanese subjects. The worship of Japanese gods was ‘the most important
feature’ in the assimilationist campaign.25 This meant that the worship of the imperial ancestors
was, according to a Japanese official, ‘the basis of moral virtue’ of Japan and hence ‘must be
inculcated in the minds of all the students.’26 Therefore, Japanese authorities made imperial
worship a required part of the curriculum, and kept a watchful eye on the Shinto observation of
Korean students.
21

For legislative and administrative efforts to build Shinto shrines in Korea, see Society of
Shinto Services in Korea, ed., Collection of Shinto-Related Laws and Regulations ([Seoul],
1937), 286, 288, 336 [in Japanese]; “On the Revision of the Shinto System in Korea,”
Maeilsinbo, August 2, 1936 [in Korean]; Seung-Tae Kim, “Shinto in Colonial Korea,” 30-31.
22
Letter from William R. Langdon to Edwin L. Neville, December 10, 1935 (395.1163/21),
101, EMSC, RG 59, NARA.
23
Horace H. Underwood, Modern Education in Korea (New York, 1926), 102, 105.
24
The citation is from the reply of the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in the GovernmentGeneral to an American mission board, quoted in Underwood, Modern Education in Korea, 200.
25
Letter from Hasegawa Yoshimichi to Hara Dakashi, December 16, 1918, NAJ. See also “Vice
Governor-General’s Instruction at the Governors’ Meeting,” in The Complete Collection of
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Proclamations, Instructions, and Statements, ed. Department of Official Documents (Seoul,
1941), 137-38 [in Japanese].
26
“Statement of the Educational Bureau of the Government-General ,” December 30, 1935,
Shrine File, PHS.”
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Unit 3, Lesson 2
Objectives:
• SWBAT understand, evaluate, and synthesize the varying ways Koreans identified
with the Japanese empire during World War II.
• SWBAT compare, evaluate, and reconcile potentially conflicting views and
experiences. This includes both historians’ interpretations and the views of people
who experienced the events studied.
Standards:
MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the colonizers and
the colonized.”
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an
examination of the credibility of each source.”
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.”
Lesson compelling question: How did World War II change how Koreans identified with the
Japanese empire?
Hook (5-10 minutes):
• Review (5-10 minutes): The teacher will begin class by reviewing the previous
night’s homework with students. The teacher will verbally review MOTU analysis for
each assigned source with students. The teacher will begin with source A, and prompt
a different student to respond with his or her answers for each category of MOTU.
The teacher will do the same for source B. As the teacher reviews, students should
have their completed MOTU analyses in front of them (physical or digital) to check
their work and add notes if necessary. Once the teacher has reviewed both featured
sources for the lesson, he or she will move on to the body.
Body (35 minutes):
• Writing for understanding (20 minutes): Students will receive 20 minutes to
individually construct a short essay length response to the lesson compelling
question: How did World War II change how Koreans identified with the Japanese
empire? Student answers should be approximately 300-500 words. Depending on the
classroom, students may type this in a Google or Word Document and submit it
digitally via an online LMS. Alternatively, students may write this out by hand. The
teacher should provide paper for students to write on if this option is chosen. In their
responses, students should specifically address how they think Koreans identified
before the war, and how that changed (if they think it did) during the war. Students
should explain their reasoning and cite specific evidence from the lesson featured
sources in their responses. When finished, the completed short essays should be
turned into the teacher (either digitally or physically).
• Small group simulation/analogy (15 minutes): After students complete their short
essays, the teacher will split the class into small groups of 2-3 people. Group
members will debate whether they would identify with the Japanese empire or with
an independent Korea if they were ethnic Koreans living in Korea during this time
period. Groups will receive 6 minutes for each group member to share his or her
individual argument. Group members should cite specific evidence from the sources
and may reference any material or concepts from previous lessons or units. Groups
will then receive 4 minutes to decide on a consensus to share with the class. The
teacher should verbally alert the class when each of these time stamps has passed.
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•

After the first 10 minute section of the activity is over, groups will share out with the
class. One person from each group will share his or her group’s consensus on how
they would identify if they were an ethnic Korean living in Korea during this time
period. Each group should receive a chance to share. Group spokespeople should cite
specific evidence from the lesson sources and may reference any material or concepts
from previous lessons and units as appropriate. If they do not do so, the teacher
should prompt students to cite evidence and explain their group’s reasoning.
Closure (5 minutes):
• Exit ticket: The students will complete an exit ticket, answering the lesson
compelling question: How did World War II change how Koreans identified with the
Japanese empire? Students may complete this either digitally through an online LMS
or physically by writing answers on a piece of paper. Students’ answers should be
approximately 2-3 sentences in length.
• Assigning homework/previewing next lesson: The teacher will also assign
homework for the following day. Students should read/view all of the featured
sources for lesson 3. Students should analyze them using the MOTU framework and
record their answers. The teacher will tell students that they will be participating in a
Socratic seminar the next day, so students should read their sources with particular
care.
Sources:
Source A:
Kim, M. (2007). The aesthetics of total mobilisation in the visual culture of late colonial Korea.
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 8(3-4), 483-502.
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 486:
“The maturation of the Korean publishing industry took place a time when the outbreak
of war in the mainland would have a profound impact on the Korean peninsula. In Japan, World
War II is often called the Pacific War or the Fifteen Year War, because the hostilities began with
the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931. The establishment of the puppet state
Manchukuo in 1932 by the Japanese initially elicited a wide range of reactions from Korean
intellectuals. While some leading Koreans from the beginning supported the Japanese military
expansion, there was also a sense that a protracted war between Japan and China could
eventually lead to Korean independence. Yet, as Han To-yn and Kim Chae-yong suggests, an
important turning point in moving Korean intellectuals towards active collaboration with the
Japanese empire may have been the collapse of key Chinese cities in late 1938.11 When Paek
Ch’ol (1908–85), one of the most renowned literary critics of the colonial period, heard about the
news and saw photographs of the rapid fall of Chinese cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Nanjing,
he exclaimed, ‘My body trembled from excitement as our horizon suddenly became refreshingly
clear’, and he argued that Korean intellectuals who were critical of this event were being far too
shortsighted. Paek further remarked, ‘We may disregard everything else, but just the fact that the
feudal castle gates have collapsed gives this event more than enough historical significance –
since it’s already a crumbling castle gate, the faster it falls the quicker history will progress’.12
This sense that Japan’s stunning successes in China signified the emergence of a new East Asian
world order would convince many Koreans that resistance was ultimately futile. Instead of being
critics of the colonial state, increasing numbers of colonial intellectuals became active supporters
of
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Japan’s effort to build a New Order in East Asia.
The war on the mainland would have a major impact on colonial publications starting
with the first outbreak of hostilities in the early 1930s. Even though print production steadily
grew throughout the 1930s, strict censorship continued to limit expression and the relatively
liberal period of the 1920s would quickly come to an end. The second outbreak of hostilities in
1937 further transformed the peninsula and inaugurated the total mobilisation of the colonial
population for the war effort.13 Increasing paper shortages and wartime censorship policies
forced the closure in 1940 of the two major privately owned vernacular language newspapers,
the Choson ilbo and the Tonga ilbo. The considerable diversity of publications that could be
found throughout the 1920s and 1930s would disappear all together in the early 1940s. Only a
few vernacular journals and the Maeil sinbo newspaper, which was the official organ of the
colonial state, would continue to publish until the end of the war in 1945. However, despite the
contraction in the number of publications, the volume of production in the 1940s continued to be
significant and some titles recorded circulation figures that far exceeded those that could be
found in previous decades.
11
Han To-yon and Kim Chae-yong, “Ch’inil munhagwa kundaesong” (Collaborator Literature
and Modernity), in Kim et al., Ch’inilmunhakui naejok nolli (The internal logic of collaborator
fiction) (Seoul: Yokrak, 2003), p.36
12
Paek Ch’ol, “Sidaejok unyonui suri” (Accepting the circumstances of the age), Choson ilbo
(2–7 December 1938), cited in Han To-yon and Kim Chae-yong, “Ch’inil munhagwa
kundaesong” (Collaborator literature and modernity), p.37.
13
The Japanese colonial administration began to mobilise the Korean population for its expanded
war effort with the passage of the Kukkach’ongdongwonbop or the National General
Mobilisation Law in 1938 and intensified the process of assimilating Koreans into the Japanese
empire. For more on the mobilization of Koreans during the late colonial period see Carter J.
Eckert, “Total War, Industrialisation, and Social Change in Late Colonial Korea”, in Peter Duus,
Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds), The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 3-39; Ch’oe Yu-ri, Ilche malgi sikminji
chibaejongch’aegyon’gu (Research on late colonial policies of control) (Seoul:
Kukhakcharyowon, 1997).”
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 487-88
“One frequent theme in late colonial visual culture is the appearance of maps and
images that portray the expansion of the Japanese empire and Japan’s progress in waging the
Pacific War. What may be particularly noteworthy is that maps of Korea and Japan often show
the two countries as one contiguous geopolitical entity and distinguished from the rest of the
Japanese empire. Examples include the December 1942 cover of The Light of the Peninsula that
shows a young school-boy examining a map of East Asia and the October 1942 cover of The
Light of Korea that shows a close-up of the northern border. In both cases, Korea and Japan are
the same colour red and distinguished from the rest of the map.18 Such maps encouraged the idea
that Koreans and Japanese belong to the same contiguous nation, despite the obvious disparities
that existed between the colony and the metropole. Maps and images of Manchuria occupied an
especially prominent position in late colonial publications, and they drew attention to the
‘northern frontier’ as a space to be defended for the security of the peninsula as well as a site of
economic opportunity for Koreans. The Japanese expansion into Manchuria coincided with the
large-scale immigration of Koreans, who numbered approximately one million in 1930 and 1.5
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million in 1945.19 Manchuria would provide a new start for displaced Koreans, especially tenant
farmers forced off their land with the consolidation of agricultural land into large land holdings.
18
Pandojigwang (The light of the peninsula) (December 1942); Chogwang (The light of Korea)
(October 1942).
19
For more on Korean migration to Manchuria see Hyun Ok Park, Two Dreams in One Bed:
Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2005).”
Excerpt 3, taken from p. 489-492
“The reconfiguration of the geopolitical space under Japanese rule was not the only
change depicted in the visual culture of colonial Korea. Colonial ideologues placed considerable
effort in reinventing the colonial subject into an individual who was fully capable of meeting the
demands of the empire. The reshaping of colonial subjectivities and notions of beauty took place
at the most fundamental level with new aesthetics for appreciating the body. Working men were
often drawn shirtless and in muscular form, such as in the October 1941 edition of New Era (Fig.
2).27
These images projected a sense of virility and masculinity. Perhaps more significantly,
they portrayed the common workers as powerful individuals who had the capacity to build an
empire. Men were also shown exercising in military drills and presented in a dynamic and
forceful manner, such as the hundreds of prone exercising men on the August 1943 cover of The
Light of Korea and the hundreds of shirtless men shown exercising in the photo insert of the
same issue.28 This focus on depicting strong and healthy men was juxtaposed in the colonial
media with the images of Korean men lined up for health inspections by the colonial
authorities.29 In many ways, these pictures of the Japanese colonisers measuring the health and
determining the ‘fitness’ of their Korean subjects to serve the Japanese empire sent the message
that Korean men must strengthen and beautify their bodies to meet the criteria of the Japanese to
become ‘First Class Imperial Citizens’. While Korean men were encouraged to work in factories
and mines to
serve the empire, the ultimate model for emulation was the military man dressed in full military
gear. Pictures of soldiers often showed them fully equipped and standing guard ready to defend
the nation. A common theme in the visual culture of late colonial Korea is that of a fully dressed
soldier standing in stark contrast next to his traditionally dressed family.30 Such symbolic
contrasts between the generations reinforced the message that the soldier represents the New
Man who belongs to a new generation of Koreans who had refashioned their identities to
dedicate themselves to the wellbeing of the nation.
The men were not the only colonial subjects who underwent a transformation within the
colonial media, for there were also a number of new strategies for portraying women. Korean
women had a dual mission in the late colonial period. While women maintained their traditional
role of homemakers, they were also encouraged to labour in the factories for the war effort. The
traditional role of women, such as taking care of the children and the home, continued to appear
frequently in the colonial media. In that sense, the traditional ways of appreciating the beauty
and purity of women did not disappear. Yet the visual representations of traditional woman in
late colonial Korea often portrayed them waving Japanese flags (Fig. 3) or saving money for the
war
effort. Thus, the existing symbols of female femininity may have been retained, but a new layer
of wartime symbols was fused into the images. The women of late colonial Korea were also
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represented in non-traditional roles, such as factory workers and military nurses. These working
women were presented in dynamic ways that underlined their important duties as individuals
who could meet both the demands of the family and the state.
27
Sinsidae (New era) (October 1941).
28
Chogwang (The light of Korea) (November 1943).
29
One example is a photograph of a physical examination for naval recruiting where bodies are
being measured for fitness in the October 1943 issue of The Light of Korea.
30
Chogwang (The light of Korea) (November 1943).”
Excerpt 4, taken from pp. 494-495
The Japanese army began to accept volunteer Koreans in 1938 soon after the outbreak of
the Second Sino-Japanese War, and in May 1942 they announced that the conscription of Korean
soldiers would begin in 1944.33 The start of the compulsory draft in Korea triggered numerous
outpourings of ‘gratitude’ for allowing Koreans to enter the Japanese Army, and large public
ceremonies were held to celebrate the event. A wide variety of visual images were utilised to
mobilise support for the conscription of Koreans. The Maeil sinbo carried a series of
advertisements during the summer of 1943 under the caption ‘I will accept your call’. The
drawings depict many of the themes that were common during the late colonial period, such as a
young Korean soldier standing next to his traditionally dressed parents on 6 August 1943 and an
image of a marching soldier with full military gear on 4 August 1943. The photomontages that
show large enthusiastic crowds cheering the departing troops were frequently deployed to
mobilise
Koreans. A two-page pictorial in the September 1943 edition of The Light of the Peninsula is
entitled, ‘The Glorious Morning when the Army’s Gates of Honor Opened’.34 The caption raves
about the honour that has been bestowed upon the Korean people, because Korean men were
now considered full members of the Japanese military, which further implied that Koreans
would be treated just like the Japanese once they passed through the threshold of the ‘Gates of
Honor’.35 The portal imagery can again be found in The Light of Korea in the slogan, ‘From
the school gates to the army gates’.36 In essence, the public spectacles thatcelebrated the opening
of the gates to the military served as a metaphorical rite of passage that colonial subjects had to
go through to become fully formed modern subjects in the eyes of the colonisers.
While the mass gatherings in support of the military draft dominated the public lives of
Koreans, the visual images of the late colonial period also portrayed the transformation of their
individual private lives. The colonial state attempted to control the domestic realm of its subjects
by portraying individuals who showed loyalty to the empire and welcomed the militarisation of
colonial society. Representations of everyday life became permeated by the symbols of the
Japanese empire, such as a baby holding a toy warplane emblazoned with a Japanese flag
on the cover of the March 1942 issue of The Light of the Peninsula.37The invasion of the
everyday by the symbolic reminders of the colonial state served to normalize the totalitarian
culture of the late colonial period and urged Koreans to show patriotism for the nation, even
though it had been absorbed into the larger Japanese empire. The children in particular became
the objects of colonial propaganda, for one frequent theme among late colonial publications was
that of children playing with a toy airplane juxtaposed with photographs of warplanes flying
overhead.38 Pictures of soldiers interacting with children or farm women looking up at passing
warplanes are yet more examples of how the symbols of the empire’s military expansion became
portrayed as a normal part of the daily routine of Koreans.39 Thus, the Japanese empire
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attempted to dominate almost every aspect of the lives of its colonial subjects, and the wartime
mobilisation of the population encouraged the reinvention of both public and private life in late
colonial Korea.
33
Korean volunteers began to be accepted into the Japanese army after February 22, 1938. The
numbers enlisted remained started in the hundreds but eventually reached 6300 by 1943. Tens of
thousands of Koreans were drafted once conscription started in September 1944. Yet few
Koreans were actually sent to the warfront before Japan’s surrender on August 1945 because of
the length of time required to train new recruits. Miyata Setsuko, Chosonminjunggwa
hwangminhwa chongch’aek (The Korean people and policies to create ‘imperial citizens’), trans.
Yi Hyong-nam (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1997), pp. 42, 154-7.
34
Pandojigwang (The light of the peninsula) (September 1943).
35
The institution of military conscription led to increased calls for allowing Koreans the voting
franchise, for Koreans argued that they now paid both regular taxes and the ‘blood tax’. For more
on the relationship between military conscription and calls for equality among Korean
collaborators see Miyata Setsuko, Chosonminjunggwa hwangminhwa chongch’aek. A law was
passed in April 1945 that granted the vote to Korean colonial subjects, but it was never
implemented before the end of the war. Even had the law been instituted, the property
restrictions would have given the vote to approximately 2.3% of Koreans. Ch’oe Yu-ri, Ilche
malgi sikminji chibaejongch’aegyon’gu (Research on late colonial policies of control), p. 245.
36
Chogwang (The light of Korea) (December 1943).
37
Pandojigwang (The light of the peninsula) (March 1942).
38
Pandojigwang (Light of the peninsula) (September 1943); Sinsidae (New Generation)
(November 1941).
39
Pandojigwang (Light of the peninsula) (July 1943), Pandojigwang (Light of the peninsula)
(September 1942).”
Source B:
Caprio, M. (2009). Korean critiques of Japanese assimilation policy. In Japanese assimilation
policies in colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (pp. 171-187). University of Washington Press.
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 173:
“The Japanese (and Koreans) recognized the 1931 Manchurian Incident as being
instrumental in changing Korean perceptions toward Japanese rule. A number of changes
accompanied this event. Japan’s expansion onto the Asian continent increased Korean economic
opportunity both in Korea and in Manchuria as the government-general placed stronger emphasis
on industry. Increased opportunity, along with stronger assimilation rhetoric, encouraged
Koreans to consider their ethnic (Korean) identity in a broader racial (Asian or ‘yellow’) context.
The present Korean government investigation into the ‘pro-Japanese’ actions of these Koreans
condemns those it identifies to be ‘pro-Japanese’ Koreans for their traitorous actions to the
Korean state and people: rather than join other Koreans in the fight for Korean liberation, these
Koreans profited from Japanese colonial rule. Contributors to this discussion must consider the
circumstances under which all Koreans made their life choices. With the world quickly moving
toward war, did it make more sense for Korea to seek independence or to seek autonomy within
the context of a greater East Asian alliance?”
Excerpt 2, taken from p. 188:
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“From 1937, war escalation forced the government-general to once again reevaluate its
Korean policy. The review of the Naisen ittai-strengthening document gave Koreans another
example to critique Japanese assimilation policy. Discussion meetings held behind closed doors
empowered the Koreans in attendance to voice their opinions rather bluntly, and many directly
challenged Japanese policy for failing to live up to its hype. The twelve Korean participants
selected by the government-general were among the Japanese administration’s most trusted
Korean allies, people who had staked their future and their reputation on Japan maintaining longterm control over the Korean Peninsula. To them, Korean independence represented the worst
possible scenario. Rather, Korean liberation from their traditional roots, and Japanese recognition
of Koreans as imperial subjects, constituted the scenario that would best secure their fortunes and
dignity. Carter J. Eckert describes these Koreans as individuals who ‘had to abandon whatever
nationalist aspirations they might once have had and were ready to embrace a new Japanese
order that left no room for the expression of a separate Korean identity.’60
60
Eckert, Offspring of Empire, 241.”
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 190-191
“Yi also redirected the assimilation problem from Korean involvement to Japanese
recognition of Korean inclusion. The government-general’s Counterplan Proposal had focused
on improving Korean understanding but offered little in the way of instructing the Japanese
people on Korea’s place in the empire. The Japanese, too, needed to be better informed. Yi began
by making the extraordinary claim that ‘there was not a single Korean who did not agree with, or
welcome, Naisen ittai,’ before adding the conditional caveat: ‘If this means that [Koreans] will
be at the same level as Japanese (Naichi to onaji teido) then they will not run to communism or
nationalism.’ He continued: ‘What about the Japanese? Naturally, there are many who embrace
Naisen ittai, but there are others who disagree with it. Some feel that it would not work, while
others feel troubled that Koreans and Japanese were to be considered as equals.’ He explained:
I have traveled here and there in Japan, and save for the minority of those who travel
frequently to Korea, the majority of Japanese have not the slightest idea about what
Korea is. Some believe that because they have been to Korea a while back they know the
country. Some are talking about a time twenty years ago. They may know Korea of
twenty years ago but they do not know contemporary Korea.... It is important for
Japanese to understand Korea’s present situation, the present state of the Korean people,
and the value of the Korean Peninsula to the Japanese Empire.
He also cautioned that the Japanese have to come to accept Koreans as their ethnic
brothers: people can go around saying Naisen ittai! Naisen ittai, but if they respond to Korean
efforts to identify themselves as Japanese by refusing to accept them as such then people ‘will go
about as they like’(kattei ni suru).65
65
Ibid., 365–67. See also Eckert, Offspring of Empire, 240.”
Excerpt 4, taken from pp. 193-194
“Hyŏn Yŏngsŏp’s The Path That the Koreans Must Take represents one of the more
comprehensive efforts by a Korean to demonstrate support for Japan’s assimilation plan. The
book, first published in 1938, apparently enjoyed success. By 1940 it had already reached its
twelfth printing. Hyŏn’s motivation was to delineate reasons why the Koreans must change: to
narrow the gap separating the deprived Korean and the advanced Japanese. He then prescribed a
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remedy: the actions that Koreans must take to become ‘complete imperial subjects.’74 Hyŏn, who
acknowledged his thoughts to be a result of his quest for truth that led him to read widely in
Marxist, anarchist, and nationalist thought during his school days, became attracted to Japanese
group-centeredness (over individualism) upon arriving in Tokyo. He now described himself as
‘one Japanese national’ (Nihon kokumin nohitori) who felt a heavy concern for the people of his
birthplace. Since the1937 China Incident, he explained, the term Naisen ittai had injected
optimism within the Korean population. However, optimism alone will not bring this union;
much work needed to be done. He saw his book as his contribution toward helping Koreans
understand their responsibilities.75
He began his monograph by describing the historical significance of what he termed
Korea’s ‘Meiji Restoration’—the Japanese annexation of the Korean Peninsula. Hyŏn’s
summary of pre-annexation Korean history proved harsher (but just as misinformed) than that
offered by the Japanese: Korean history before 1910 was ‘hell’: it had passed through a ‘dark
history’ as a ‘colony’ under the Han Chinese; its culture did not even begin until the Three
Kingdoms period; unlike Tokugawa Japan, Korea had never developed a popular culture.
74
Hyŏn, Chōsenjin no susumu beki michi, 18.
75
Ibid., 1–4.”
Excerpt 5, taken from pp. 195-196
“This path must begin, Hyŏn explained, with Koreans coming to understand the
Japanese. They must first realize the ‘majestic existence’ (genzen tosonzai shiteiru) of Japanese
culture that synthesized different cultures. They must endeavor to ‘become Japanese’ (as he had).
That is, they must ‘shed the Chinese kanbun culture and widely accept Japanese culture.’80 This
was but the first step leading Koreans toward becoming ‘complete imperial subjects.’ Koreans
must also recognize the ‘historic significance’ of annexation and ‘thank Japan’ for admitting
their territory into its empire. Finally, the Korean people must recognize the ‘fate that the two
peoples share [and] adopt a feeling of being Japanese.’ Like the Japanese, Hyŏn placed full
responsibility on the Korean people embarking on this change. As Korea, he predicted, would
never again return to the status of ‘independent country,’ it is Koreans’ responsibility to adopt
the spirit of Japanese subjects (Nihon kokumin) if they wished to attain full political rights, be
provided with compulsory education, participate in Japan’s military service, and gain freedom of
residence. Koreans must ‘demonstrate their heightened respect and admiration for the emperor’
(by making pilgrimages to the homeland and to Ise and Meiji shrines), embrace the Japanese
language as their own, and discard their more obvious signs of Korean-ness (such as Korean
dress, cuisine, and housing).81
81
Ibid., 143–45, 151–54.”
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Unit 3, Lesson 3
Objectives:
• SWBAT understand the multiple Japanese-inflicted atrocities that are the basis of
modern tensions between the two countries.
• SWBAT construct an argument supported by evidence found in both primary and
secondary sources.
Standards:
MWH.9-12.11: “The consequences of imperialism were viewed differently by the colonizers and
the colonized.”
MWH.9-12.1: “The use of primary and secondary sources of information includes an
examination of the credibility of each source.”
MWH.9-12.2: “Historians develop theses and use evidence to support or refute positions.”
Lesson compelling question: Was Japan’s wartime mobilization of Koreans justified?
Hook:
• Review (5 minutes): The teacher will verbally review the sources assigned for
homework the previous night. As with previous lessons, the teacher will verbally
review all components of MOTU for each source. Different students should provide
verbal answers for each category of MOTU. The teacher may elect to randomly call
on students. The teacher should ensure that all students have a strong comprehension
and understanding of the sources in order to increase the chances of a fruitful Socratic
seminar.
Body (35 minutes):
• Note on time: The Socratic seminar will consist of three ten-minute rounds. The extra
five minutes is to allot for giving directions and allowing students to take notes in
between rounds.
• Socratic seminar (30 minutes):
• Students will arrange themselves in a horse-shoe/U-shaped pattern as much as
possible. The teacher will verbally give students instructions for the activity. There
will be three ten-minute rounds with one main question provided by the teacher for
each round. However, if the conversation is especially fruitful in one topic, it can
bleed over into the next round’s time. Students should have their MOTU analyses in
front of them and the lesson sources easily accessible as well. The teacher will keep
time, or can task a student with keeping time.
• After directions are given and students are ready, the teacher will begin keeping time
and pose the first question. It is: Was Japan’s wartime mobilization and use of
Koreans a generally justified emergency measure, or should it have counted as war
crimes? (Note: Japan was never prosecuted for any of its wartime use of Koreans. It
was prosecuted for incidents such as the Nanking Massacre, but not the comfort
women or forced labor of Koreans.)
• As students provide responses, the teacher should use follow-up questions when
necessary. The teacher should ask students to explain their reasoning, cite evidence,
and even play devil’s advocate where appropriate.
• After the first ten-minute round is over, the teacher will move onto the second and
third. In between rounds, the teacher should give students a few minutes to take notes
on the previous round. Students should note main points of the conversation as well
as any arguments they found particularly interesting or compelling.
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•

The last two questions are as follows:
o Should Japan formally apologize to Korea for the comfort women? Japan has
made various statements “expressing regret” but has never issued a formal
apology ratified by the Diet. Is this enough, or is a formal apology warranted?
o Moreover, should Japan apologize to Korea for the entire occupation period?
Similarly to the previous question, Japan has made statements “expressing regret”
about this time period but never ratified a formal apology through the Diet.
Students may draw upon knowledge from previous units for this question. Does
the overall occupation period represent an offense serious enough to Koreans that
such an apology is warranted?
Closure (10 minutes):
• Exit ticket/individual reflective writing (10 minutes): Students will receive ten
minutes to construct a brief written response to the lesson compelling question: Was
Japan’s wartime mobilization of Koreans justified? Students should cite evidence
from the sources as well as incorporate discussion points from the Socratic seminar.
Sources:
Source A:
Kang, H. (2001). The war effort. In Under the black umbrella: voices from colonial Korea,
1910-1945 (pp. 130-138). Cornell University Press.
Excerpt 1, taken from pp. 131-132
“SIN KWANGSONG, (m) b. 1915, farmer, North Kyongsang Province:
They drafted me to labor in early spring 1945. They just said, ‘You and you have to go.’
They sent me to work in a mine in Kyushu, Japan, but I got sick and they sent me back to my
hometown.
When I regained my health, they drafted me again. This second time they sent me to a
pipe factory in Saitama prefecture. People said, ‘Oh, it is so dangerous,’ but I found that it was
not really so dangerous. Physically, I mean. They paid us a tiny, tiny salary. I sent it all home to
my family. The mine where I was before had been safe, but at this Saitama factory there were
many B-29 bombing raids. We had to quit working every time there was a raid and go into a
bomb shelter.
They told us that the Americans had invented a new weapon and when the Americans
invaded the mainland, we would all die gloriously. We made sharp bamboo spears so we could
stab the Americans when they came.”
Excerpt 2, taken from pp. 134-135
“KIM PONGSUK, (f) b. 1924, housewife, Kyonggi Province:
When I was about twenty, the local Neighborhood Association – the watchdog group, spy
network, channel for government rules and dictates – came to verify my age and marital status.
I had no choice but to acknowledge that I was young, single, and living at home. The next
thing I knew, the local police came and summoned me to appear at the elementary school yard
on a certain date.
A lot of other girls got called also, all about the same age, and the Japanese told us that
we would serve the Emperor and the great cause of the Japanese empire by becoming nurses and
taking care of the Imperial Japanese soldiers. They told us that the pay would be very good and
we would be well taken care of. Some girls were really very excited about doing this.
We were to be sent to the front, but to do that we needed training. They gave each of us a
wooden rifle and we had to practice. I kept thinking, I'm a woman. Why do I need this rifle? The

103

rifle had a pretend bayonet and we had to plunge it into a straw "person'' on the ground, again
and again.
I hated this! I didn't want to do it. My parents decided I should get married, and then I
wouldn't have to go. So I obeyed my parents and got married, and it turned out to be a fortunate
thing. Much later, I found out that the women who went overseas to the front were forced into
being comfort women. Japanese called these Teishintai, meaning ''Volunteer Corps."
I also know about them because my husband met many Korean women serving the
soldiers in Manchuria when he was drafted into the Japanese army and sent to the front line.
Being married helped me but it didn't help him. He was taken only a few months after our
marriage.
My husband, having just married me and missing me, and also seeing that these comfort
women were Korean women of the same age as me, when his turn came to go in to them, his
physical desire was there, but he kept thinking of me, and he didn't do it. The men lined up
outside the barracks doors where the women were, and took their turn. The girl just lay there
inside. Each man had a given amount of time, about seven minutes. If he wasn't out in time, the
next man went right in and yanked him out. Each door had a long line of men waiting their turns.
But when my husband's turn came, he just couldn't go in and do it. The woman, on the wall near
her head, used chalk or a pencil to make a mark for each soldier she serviced. She thought she
would be paid that way, but it turned out they were not paid anything at all. All this I heard from
my husband in Manchuria.”
Excerpt 3, taken from pp. 137-138
“CHIN MYONGHUI, (f) b. 1932, housewife, South Hamgyong Province:
Things were all right until 1942, when I was in fifth grade. Our city of Wonsan was a
harbor, so in the morning I had classes and in the afternoon for two hours, our whole school
marched to the factory to can fish that were caught right there along the coast. The cannery was
huge, with row upon row of building after building. They were supposed to dry the fish, but first
the fish had to be pounded. So for two hours every afternoon, we had to go pound the fish. Kids
carne to work from every school, boys and girls, from fifth grade up to middle school. It was hot
and my arms ached, but we couldn't stop. In winter they couldn't dry the fish, so then, three times
a week they sent us into the hills to collect pine tree sap. Year in and year out we did this – 1943,
1944, 1945. When it rained, we learned how to give first aid and make bandages, and we
practiced running to the air-raid shelter in the hill behind the school. Even the holes in the hill
were dug by students, but not by me. I graduated from sixth grade in March 1945, and in April I
entered a Methodist mission school. All the missionaries were gone by then, sent to prison
camps. Here, after the morning assembly, there were no classes. We knew that the war in Europe
was over, so just Japan was fighting-nobody could study. Again, we all trooped over to the
factories to pound those awful fish.”
Source B:
Pak, S.Y., Hwang, K. (2011). Assimilation and segregation of imperial subjects: “educating” the
colonized during the 1910-1945 Japanese colonial rule of Korea. Paedagogica HIstorica 47(3),
377-397.
Excerpt 1, taken from p. 390:
“With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Japanese authorities in Korea
used the slogan ‘Japan and Korea as One Body (naisen ittai)’ as a rallying cry by which they
accelerated and expanded the assimilation policy.47 Under the slogan, the duty of the Korean was
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to ‘totally surrender the will to the Emperor, and serve in his name’.48 As Japan expanded the war
throughout the Pacific, the Japanese authorities sought to control all aspects of civilian life by
imposing the ‘wartime system’. By all accounts, the period known as Cultural Rule came to an
end as all sectors of the colony were mobilised as part of the war effort.49 After 1937, the
Japanese forcibly mobilised many Koreans to work in support of the war effort by promulgating
a General Mobilisation Law and subsequently a National Conscription Ordinance in 1939. In the
early phase of the war, large numbers of Koreans were put into menial jobs to relieve the
Japanese men to join the army. Koreans were initially drafted into service called choyo (labour
draft), which is essentially non-combat labour that involved assembly-line work and mining. As
the prolonged war resulted in mounting casualties, the Japanese sought more men to fight. The
Japanese implemented a colonial conscription system called chohei (military draft) near the end
of the war and drafted about 200,000 young Korean men to fight alongside the Japanese.
48
Kodawau Yusaku, Kokoku shinmin taruno chigaku no dettei suru chosen kyoikurei n gaisetsu
yori [An Analysis of the Chosun Education Edict from the Perspective of Imperial Subjects’
Self-consciousness and Resistance], in Bunkyo no Chosen, March Edition (1938).
49
Takada Kunihiko, Kodo kyoiku no genre [The Principles of Education in the Imperial Way], in
Bunkyo no chosen, October & November Edition (1938). A good example of the changing role
of education from colony building to wartime support can be found in Kunihiko’s article where
he exhorts the raison d’être of education to be that which serves the immediate needs of the
empire.”
Excerpt 2, taken from p. 392
“The fourth and final Educational Ordinance promulgated by the colonial authorities in
1943 was in fact an extension of the ‘Ordinance of Wartime Emergency Measures on
Education’.57 The emergency measures that were outlined had to do with how the school’s social
function had evidently changed with the war. In so far as schools in the colony needed to justify
their existence in times of total war, they were forced to become commissary bases for the war
effort. Both individual and social activities that could not demonstrate their usefulness and
practicality in the war effort were considered to be hindrances. In the schools, a fixed daily
routine began with the recitation of the ‘Pledge of Imperial Subjects’ followed by long hours of
physical labour as part of the war effort. Such practices reduced the individual student to a cog in
the imperial war machine.
In fact, the Japanese forced some 4500 technical college and university students into
uniform through a ‘student volunteer system’ implemented in 1943. They were forced to
volunteer as ‘student soldiers’ (gakuto hei) and fight alongside regular soldiers.58 Furthermore,
technical colleges and secondary school students were consistently mobilised as labour for all
kinds of public work projects. Even elementary school students were mobilised in the
construction of military facilities. In short, the schools in the colony during this period came to
resemble a garrison and a training ground for the soldiers of the empire.
57
Rangi Hisao, Chosen shokuminchi kyoiku no tenkai to chosen minzoku no teiko – chosen
kyoikurei wo chushin toshite [The Development of Colonial Education in Chosun and the
Resistance by the People of Chosun – With a Focus on the Chosun Education Edicts], in Sekai
kyoikushi kenkyukai: Sekai kyoikushi taikei 5 – chosen kyoikushi [Society for Research on
World Education History: A Genealogy of World Education History 5 – History of Education in
Chosun] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1975). Hisao argues that at each phase of the four education
edicts, the Japanese colonial authorities were met by local resistance.
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Ben-Ami Shillony, “Universities and Students in Wartime Japan,” Journal of Asian Studies 45,
no. 4 (1986): 769–87. According to Shillony, idealistic patriotism among Japanese students at
the height of war prompted them to regard dying as soldiers as a noble duty.”
58

Source C:
Asian Boss. (2018, October 27). Life as a “comfort woman”: story of Kim Bok-Dong, stay
curious #9 [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/qsT97ax_Xb0.
The relevant clip is from 0:00-10:56. Please note that this video contains a living (at the time of
the interview) comfort woman survivor sharing an oral history of her experiences. It contains
content which may be difficult and uncomfortable for students to view. Please use discretion in
determining how to utilize this in your classroom. Issuing a content/trigger warning and allowing
students to opt out of viewing the video may be appropriate.
Source D:
The 2nd Independent Heavy Siege Artillery Battalion “Regulation for the use of Comfort
Stations” March 1938, Shiryoshusei, Vol. II, pp. 351-358, quoted in
Asian Women’s Fund. (n.d.). The life in comfort stations. Asian Women’s Fund.
https://www.awf.or.jp/e1/facts-09.html.
Document originally in Japanese, English translation from Asian Women’s Fund
“Chapter IX Regulations for the Use of Comfort Stations
Clause 59 Basic Principle
To help to enforce military discipline by providing ways for relaxation and comfort
Clause 60 Facilities
Comfort stations are set up inside the south walls of Nikka Hall…
Visiting days are appointed to each unit.
Hoshi unit -- Sunday.
Kuriiwa unit -- Monday and Tuesday.
Matsumura unit -- Wednesday.and Thursday.
Narita unit -- Saturday.
Achiwa unit -- Friday.
Murata unit -- Sunday
Clause 61 Price and Time
1 For non-commissioned officers and enlisted men comfort stations are open from 9:00 to 18:00
2 Price
Time limit is one hour for one man.
Chinese -- 1 yen
Korean -- 1 yen 50 sen
Japanese -- 2 yen
Clause 62 Examination
Every Monday and Friday are examination days. On Friday women are examined for sexually
transmitted disease …”
Excerpt 2, from same page:
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“Clause 63 Instructions
1 Drinking in comfort stations is forbidden.
2 Payment of fee and time keeping should be correctly done.
3 Women should all be deemed as having venereal desease. Use of condoms is absolutely
necessary….
Clause 64 Miscellany
1 Women are forbidden to have Chinese as clients.
…
3 Women are forbidden to go out except to specially permitted places.
…
Clause 65 Responsibility of Control
A detachment of military police assumes the responsibility of control.
Clause 65 Supplementary points
1 On visiting days each unit should send leading staff to see around the comfort station.
2 Non-commissioned officers should lead men of his unit to comfort stations…
3 Official holiday of comfort stations is the 15th of every month”
Source E:
Inaba Masao, ed. Okamura Yasuji taisho shiryo: Senjo kaiso hen, jo [Sources of general
Okamura Yasuji: Recollections of the battlefield, vol. 1] (Tokyo: Hara shobo, 1970), pp. 302303, quoted in Asian Women’s Fund. (n.d). Who were the comfort women? – the establishment
of comfort stations. Asian Women’s Fund. https://www.awf.or.jp/e1/facts-01.html.
“There were not ianfus (comfort women) in former years of military campaigns. To speak
frankly, I am an initiator of the comfort women project. As in 1932 during the Shanghai Incident
some acts of rape were committed by Japanese military personnel. I, Vice Chief of Staff of the
Shanghai Expeditionary Force, following the example of the Japanese naval brigade, asked the
governor of Nagasaki prefecture to send comfort women groups. As a result, rape crimes totally
disappeared, which made me very happy. At present each army corps was accompanied by a
comfort women group, as if the latter constitutes a detachment of its quarter-master corps. But
rape acts did not disappear in the Sixth Division, even though it was accompanied by a comfort
women group.”
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